Abstract

Why do hydrocarbon-exporting states pursue climate diplomacy toward Pacific Island countries that call for an accelerated fossil-fuel transition? This article compares Saudi Arabian and Emirati engagement from 2010 to September 2026 through a qualitative analysis of official documents, regional communiques, climate-policy texts, project records, and scholarly literature. It combines status seeking, niche diplomacy, institutional assets, and recipient agency in a framework linking motivations, practices, and outcomes. The findings show that economic diversification, reputational pressures, and wider South-South engagement motivate both states, but their institutional resources generate different diplomatic pathways. The United Arab Emirates follows a project-technology-institution model based on renewable-energy delivery, specialized agencies, and multilateral platforms. Saudi Arabia follows a finance-forum-politics model centered on major pledges, ministerial convening, and high-level diplomatic outreach. Pacific Island countries filter both approaches through regional priorities, partnership rules, and fossil-fuel-free norms. Consequently, Gulf engagement has produced tangible functional benefits and some institutional access, but limited normative convergence. The article argues that climate finance becomes diplomatic influence only when commitments are implemented, embedded in Pacific-led institutions, and judged consistent with recipient-defined climate priorities. It thereby explains both the possibilities and the structural limits of hydrocarbon exporters' climate diplomacy in highly climate-vulnerable regions.

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