Running Without Progress: How Game Theory Explains China’s GAOKAO Treadmill
- Chenxi Zhao
Abstract
The intense competition in Chinese education has led to several problems in both family and society. To understand the process of how the intense competition appears, past researchers are showcasing the long history of Chinese Keju or using qualitative analysis to present the diverse influence of high involution. Here, I apply the quantitative analysis: Game Theory Model to give a novel lens to explain the situation. Particularly, I use signaling games for a macro perspective and prisoners' dilemma as the micro angle. To conclude, I find ways to break the intense competition by the analysis using Game theory. Overall, I suggest that the government should raise cost for extra studying to weaken the short-run incentive to betray; increase the discounted factor and reduce short term benefit differential to emphasize trust in cooperation; introduce holistic evaluation to deflate the signal so no students gains from overly investment and input.
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- DOI:10.5539/jmr.v17n5p18
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