Would Enterprises Send Food Traceability Information to Consumers?

Wu Tianzhen, Wang Ruimei, Hu Hongwei, Song Huan


Food security incidents have enhanced Chinese consumers’ concerns about food quality and security. These growing concerns have increased demand for security of food and led to development of Chinese food traceability system. Based on the literature review, this paper built a signaling dynamic game model of information delivery from enterprises to consumers to explore the refining Bayes Nash equilibrium. The analytical results show that “good” enterprise need to send enough food traceability information to get themselves separated from “bad” enterprises, while enterprises which were “not that good” had to send much more information to achieve that trust of consumers.


signaling game, food traceability information, food security

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.5539/jfr.v4n1p105


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Journal of Food Research   ISSN 1927-0887 (Print)   ISSN 1927-0895 (Online)  E-mail: jfr@ccsenet.org

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