A Study of China's Elimination of Private Benefits of Control in State-owned Enterprises

  •  Yanling Wang    


To eliminate control of state-owned enterprise managers of self-interest is a key problem for management of state-owned enterprises, the Chinese government has adopted a separate government functions from enterprise management, clear property rights, the board of directors system, assignment of the board of supervisors system, disciplinary leadership system reform, the mixed ownership and other measures, are difficult to eliminate the soe managers to seize control of self-interest, together with the present situation of China's state-owned enterprises, this paper proposed by the board of supervisors as the center of the corporate governance structure, powers and running of the reform of internal management mechanism, to try to eliminate the control gain, achieving the value of state-owned enterprises.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
  • Issn(Print): 1927-517X
  • Issn(Onlne): 1927-5188
  • Started: 2012
  • Frequency: semiannual

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