Constitutional Democracy for Divided Societies: The Indonesian Case

Munafrizal Manan

Abstract


To build a democracy is to choose a model of democracy. Countries that are building their democracy have often been faced to choose a model of democracy that is suitable to their particular needs. Theoretically and practically, there are some models of democracy. This article discusses the prospect of constitutional democracy for divided societies by putting constitution as a social contract for them. It argues that if a common consensus for a constitution has been reached, then the prospect of a harmonized society can be realized since people have a common platform that binds them legally, politically and socially. By taking Indonesia as a case, it argues that constitutional democracy is relatively able to overcome potential conflict in a divided society. Thus constitutional democracy should be considered as a resolution for divided societies.


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Journal of Politics and Law ISSN 1913-9047 (Print) ISSN 1913-9055 (Online)

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