A Catering Model of Dividends and Share Repurchases

Yordying Thanatawee

Abstract


This paper develops a theoretical model to demonstrate that the firm’s payout/investment decision may be affected by the relative magnitude of dividend and repurchasing premia. The model shows that the manager of high-quality firm may pass up a positive NPV project in order to cater to investors’ demand for dividends or share repurchases (adverse selection problem) if the catering premia are substantial. On the other hand, the manager of low-quality firm may have strong incentives to return free cash flows to shareholders if the catering premia are higher than the private benefits from investing in a negative NPV project. Under this case, the agency costs of free cash flows are mitigated.


Full Text: PDF DOI: 10.5539/ijef.v4n1p120

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International Journal of Economics and Finance  ISSN  1916-971X (Print) ISSN  1916-9728 (Online)

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