Ideological Problems of the Modern Russia

Yury Grigorievich Volkov1, Sergei Aleksandrovich Diuzhikov2, Svetlana Ivanovna Imgrunt3, Valentin Semionovich Malitskiy4 & Eugenia Sergeevna Sagalaieva5

1 Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Director of the Institute of Sociology and Regional Studies of the Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don, Russian Federation
2 Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor of Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don, Russian Federation
3 Candidate of Sociological Sciences, the applicant to the Institute of Sociology and Regional Studies of the Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don, Russian Federation
4 Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor of the Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don, Russian Federation
5 Candidate of Legal Sciences, Associate Professor of the Law Institute of the North Caucasus Federal University, Russian Federation

Correspondence: Yuri Grigoriievich Volkov, Pushkinskaya street, 160, Rostov-on-Don, 344005, Russian Federation. Tel: 7-863-264-1755. E-mail: infoippk@sfedu.ru

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Abstract
The article covers the evolution period of ideological situations in the modern Russian society. This paper considers the following periods: the period of adjustment and revaluation of socialist values (1985-1991); the period of deideologization of the Russian society (1991-1996); the period of search for the ideology for Russia (1996-2000); the period of the implementation of neo-liberal values (2000-2008); the period of reappraisal of values of the neoliberal ideology and restoration of the neo-conservative values called the “modernist ideology” (2008-present). The paper features conceptual conclusions on the perspectives of creating an ideocratic humanistic society, in which the ideological power will prevail over the state power, and the ruling Russian humanist party will be leading and guiding force of the future Russian humanistic society, which will implement the principle of harmonious combination of spiritual and material wealth at a priority of yet spiritual development of Russian citizens. The authors focus on the specifics of the ideological situation in the south of Russia, in the Southern and North Caucasian Federal Districts, where the increasing role of religious Islamic ideology can be observed.

Keywords: ideology, ideological situation, communist ideology, liberal and neo-liberal, conservative and neoconservative, modernist ideology

1. Introduction
1.1 Introduction of the Problem
The modern world in general and Russia especially faces with the most acute problem of ideology. As it is known, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, based on the Soviet communist ideology, for the past 20 years, Russia is in the search for public or official, i.e. ruling ideologies, but to no avail yet. Thus, the majority of Russians believe that Russia has no official ideology (37.7%), and some said that they live in a democratic country (31.7%) (Research “Romir”).

It should be noted that by now, in contemporary Russian society, there are only attempts to apply Western ideology, or rather to adopt specific ideological values of neoliberalism and neo-conservatism in the public consciousness of Russian citizens. However, it turned out that developing the national ideology, corresponding to the mentality of the country, is not that simple. The first democracy reformers in Russia believed that they could take the values of Western ideologies and impose them on the national identity of the country, and eventually they would get the neoliberal or neoconservative ideology with national characteristics of Russia. Nevertheless, it turned out that implementing this ideological process of introducing Western values in a country with a
qualitatively different civilizational specificity is impossible. It means that the Russian civilization is qualitatively different from the Western civilization.

1.2 Relevant Scholarship

In recent decades, one can observe a revival of interest to the studies of ideology. Conceptual methodological bases of researching the questions of ideology were laid by Weber, Mannheim (Mannheim, 1950), Murton (Murton, 1994), Pareto (Pareto, 1966). The field of research interest covers the relations of ideology and science, ideology and truth, as well as the nature of ideology. A considerable interest belongs to the phenomenological direction, whereby the core of the ideology advocates natural world and the life world basing on everyday understanding and social attitudes (Schütz, 2004).

The concepts by E. Durkheim and K. Mannheim see the phenomenon of ideology, first, because of people living together, their natural and socio-historical circumstances. This approach defines the ideology as “false consciousness”, which functional meaning is ambiguous. Durkheim interpreted ideological form as the main factor that consolidates the social system (Durkheim, 1995).

The domestic social thought features actively developing researches related to the analysis of various aspects of the ideological sphere in the context of incomplete development of the present post-Soviet ideological structure. The work by the Russian scientist Volkov is of particular interest (Volkov, 2014).

2. Relevant Scholarship

For a clearer perception of the ideological situation in Russia, let us differentiate them into five periods or stages. The first period can be defined as the period of perestroika and glasnost of the modern Russian society.

As it is known, until Gorbachev’s perestroika, the Soviet Union had a clearly built ideological structure of the socialist society, which was led by the main ideological organization—the Communist Party. The Soviet Union was an ideocratic society, in which there was the priority of the spiritual wealth over the material one, as well as the priority of ideological power (CPSU) over the state power. Ideocratic secular societies are known for political and ideological ruling parties to perform the leading and guiding role in the life of the ideocratic society. The ruling party in ideocratic societies is a kind of a “backbone” of society; the government performs the subordinate role. Similarly, the theocratic societies feature with ideological religious authority of the church dominating over the governmental authority. As it is known, the same was in medieval Western Europe, where the priority belonged to the ideological power of the Catholic Church headed by the Pope over the royal and imperial state authorities. Currently we can observe approximately the same ratio of the religious ideological power and the state power in modern Iran. In this country, there is a priority of the ideological religious authority of the Islamic church over the state of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It means that in fact, Iran is a theocratic society, of course, with its specificity. Thus, the place the pan-European authority of the Pope in modern Iran is occupied by the rule of ideological power of the so-called spiritual leaders. In the beginning, it was Ayatollah Khomeini, and then Khamenei became the spiritual leader.

In non-ideocratic societies, on the contrary, the government authority prevails over ideological power. Because of this interaction, the community shows the priority of material wealth over spiritual wealth. Concerning the role of political and ideological parties, their power in non-ideocratic republics is subject to presidential or a similar authority; and parties, even the ruling, do not serve as the “backbone” of society, figuratively speaking, but serve as political clubs. In modern Russia, such a party is the party “Yedinaya Rossiya (United Russia)” (Zayats & Posukhovam, 2013).

As it is known, the period of perestroika and glasnost features the dismantling of the ideocratic socialist republic. The Communist Party lost its status of the ruling, leading, and guiding ideological force of the Soviet Union, and the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev, lost the status of the spiritual and ideological leader of the USSR. Of course, after the cancellation of the status of the Communist Party as the ruling ideocratic spiritual force, the party was disbanded as a “criminal organization”. Its successor was the party having no status of the ruling party—the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. It means that the party of Russian Communists in the modern Russian society does not have the status of the ruling ideological power prevailing over the governmental.

Thus, fighting for the power of the President of the USSR based on the tips of the Western liberal ideologues, Gorbachev was unlikely to understand fully that establishing political office of the President of the USSR, assuming the rule of the state power over the ideological power, and he destroyed the very essence of the ideocratic Soviet society. Eventually, the President of Russia, Yeltsin B. N. issued a decree banning the Communist Party in August 1991; and thus he finally completed the destruction of the Soviet ideocratic republic.
under the banner of return to the world, or rather to the Western civilization, in which there are no ideocratic societies, where ideological power is subject to the governmental, and the role of the chief ideologist formally belongs to the President of the country.

Of course, in ideological terms, the past socialist society had its positive side. Rudakov writes: “It is unlikely that there will be someone to argue with the fact that the ideology, which existed in the USSR was, of course, extremely tough and comprehensive, but had positive aspects. The main positive aspect of this ideology was educating positive moral qualities among people—help to each other, respect for others, especially for older people, courtesy, honesty, openness, responsiveness, and other qualities. Indeed, such an upbringing was coloured by excessive motto of building communism, but the very positive value of such education is not a matter of dispute. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the former ideology passed into history. It has been almost twenty years since the collapse of the USSR, but, unfortunately, the Russian society has not adopted another ideology yet. The absence of ideology creates the chaos of thoughts, because each individual sees own inner life ideology as the law. Of course, there are many people with the same internal ideology. But there are also thousands of people with a thousand variants of own internal ideology that will compete with each other, which caused and causes misunderstanding between each other, conflicts, and other negative processes. This is what is happening in Russia now due to the lack of the common ideology.” (Rudakov)

Of course, the future Russian society after overcoming the ideological stagnation and based on the new truly humanist ideology will create an ideocratic society, in which the ideological power will prevail over the state power, and the ruling Russian humanist party will be leading and guiding force of the future Russian humanistic society, which will have the spiritual wealth in priority over the material wealth, or, being more accurate, which will implement the principle of harmonious combination of spiritual and material wealth at a priority of yet spiritual development of Russian citizens. Talking about the future of the secular humanist ideocratic society in Russia and correlating it with the present theocratic society of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), in which the priority of ideological religious authority prevails over the state, which assumes the priority of spiritual riches and moral values over material wealth imposed by the West in the world, we can say that when creating future secular humanist ideocratic society in Russia, it is necessary to take into account the experience and lessons of creation and functioning in modern conditions of a theocratic, i.e., not secular, ideocratic society.

If putting the question, what caused the transformation of the Soviet ideocratic society into a non-ideocratic society, it shall first be noted that due to the coincidence of adverse circumstances, the economic causes of such changes of the socialist society were primarily the insecurity of material wealth of Soviet citizens. This definitely angered people, and the wake of these grievances brought so-called democrats, dissidents and other outspoken anti-communists to the power. Nevertheless, even before they got the power, the democratically minded party leaders began, and the Soviet clerisy supported the destruction of cultural and ideological core of Soviet nations in accordance with the concept of “molecular revolution” of Gramsci (Kara-Murza, 2007, pp. 61-69).

Thus, perestroika and glasnost were marked with “debunking”, or just destruction, in the minds of the citizens of the defining socialist ideological values and principles. For example, socialist principles of equality and justice were debunked, i.e. recognized as false through mass media (especially, through the so-called “thick journals”). Thus, the ideology of perestroika convinced people that equality abiological. Equality between people is impossible, for all individuals are of different nature. The same happened to the principle of social justice. In their arguments, ideologues even went up to the idea of fair inequalities between rich and poor citizens, and even among the countries of the “golden billion” and the rest of the world.

In general, the ideological situation during the period of perestroika and glasnost was characterized by the revaluation of the socialist ideological values that led to the destruction of the ideological core of the socialist society without changing the socialist ideological values on new ideological values; however, it is unknown, on values of what ideology. Moreover, the destruction of the core of the communist ideology was held under the slogan of deideologization in the beginning of the Soviet and then Russian society. Thus, the specificity of the ideological situation in the transition from socialism to capitalism was the revaluation of socialist values, leading to the destruction of the ruling Marxist-Leninist ideology in the form of uncompromising struggle of ideas and values of communism and liberalism.

After the period of perestroika, which led to the August political upheaval (1991), in relation to the evolution of the ideological situation in Russia, as well as in the former Soviet republics, such as Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, we might speak about the period of deideologization of the Russian, Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijani societies. The deideologization process led to the final destruction of the ideological core values of the former Soviet republics. As it is known, the idea of deideologization of the Russian society is reflected in the
Constitution of the Russian Federation (1993). Thus, Art. 13 states that Russia shall have no official, i.e., the ruling ideology (the Constitution of the Russian Federation, 1993, p. 8). As noted by Yakhyayev, the “developers of the Basic Law of the new Russia were caught up by the adverse social utopias of ‘deideologization’ and ‘end of history’, as expressed in the constitutional recognition of refusing the state ideology. Today, the example of Russia demonstrates that a state without ideology (both a program of action, aggregate benchmarks, and targets) cannot properly function. Already on the everyday level of consciousness, ideology in different versions always exists in the human psyche, providing a certain level of conservation of the basic structures of society and patterns of human activity. Indirect recognition of this is the fact that since the late 90’s in Russia, the following thesis is increasingly proclaimed: ‘Long live the new ideology of Russia!’ However, the search for a new ideology for Russia is recognized only as the problem of finding and developing the most appropriate forms of combination and coexistence of different ideologies. Often these ideologies include liberal ideologies, religious, and communist ideologies.’ (Yakhyayev)

During the deideologization process of the Russian, Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani societies, those processes have been developed that have led in some cases to stagnation and even degradation of spiritual, political, economic, family and domestic spheres of society. It was assumed that the liberation from the shackles of the Marxist-Leninist ideology would give freedom of thought, economic enterprise, political activity, especially to young people, and would provide the corresponding rise of the economy, politics, and free culture. However, as we know, everything happened in the opposite. In Russia and other Transcaucasia countries had neither the predicted democratic flourishing of the society, nor a normal economy, political structure and spiritual culture at all, but confusion and chaos, general impoverishment of the people. In a short time, there was a collapse of the great Soviet state and the transformation of Russia into a raw material appendage of the Western civilization. Such were the consequences of the thoughtless implementation of deideologization in the former Soviet republics.

Of course, the deideologization period in Russia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan was marked with the revival of religious ideologies: Christian, Islamic, Buddhist, but deideologized democrats did not correlate religion with the type of religious ideology. For them, religion and ideology are the two different things, entities. However, as it is known, an originally wide flow of those going along the road leading to religious temples, gradually began to dry up. This happened because those people began to realize that religious values were clearly outdated and exhausted. A modern human being of the late 20th century was unlikely to be guided in their daily lives by the ideas of heaven and hell, the court of the Lord, despite the construction of temples and preaching spirituality. Yet the Christian and Islamic churches could not cope with the flow of spiritual degradation of citizens, were not able to give the broad masses of the people, especially to the youth, the spiritual guidance, certain controls for the behaviour of the bright future in an environment where all the mass-media carried out an aggressive propaganda of the Western way of life based on the primacy of the material wealth over spiritual. All citizens of the Russian and Georgian societies were inculcated with the main idea of neo-conservatism and neoliberalism, implying to enrich by any ways in material sense in the first place. Naturally, such ideological terms put religious propaganda of human spirituality in such conditions, that it did not receive any recalls in the “materialistic souls” of individuals.

This period is marked with the introduction of neo-conservative values made unknowingly for the people. The main idea of these values was the privatization of national wealth into private hands of businesspersons, especially, of the nouveau riche and the first oligarchs. However, politicians who introduced the neoconservative values, by ignorance called them as the liberal values, as the most progressive in the world. Surely when introducing the Western neoconservative values, the political elite of Russia and Georgia, in particular, did not seem to be concerned about the creation of a coherent theoretical neoconservative ideology with national characteristics. Thus, the apparatus of the Presidential Administration of the President of the Russian Federation has established not only no ideological department, but even no ideological office involved in the development of the neoconservative ideology acceptable to the Russian mentality or any other ideology with the Russian feature. Such a negative attitude to the ideology certainly stemmed from the idea deideologization, although some philosophers and political scientists say that the idea of deideologization is actually the idea of the Western ideology.

The process of deideologization of the Russian society continued until mid-1996 until the assistants and advisers of Yeltsin changed. We mean primarily his assistant Mr. Ilyushin (Candidate of Technical Sciences), responsible for the ideological work in the Russian state. Because of the change of ideological advisers-deideologizators, in July 1996 B. N. Yeltsin announced the need for a unifying idea and the national ideology.

Of course, tracking the deideologization period more accurately and its replacement by the period of finding a
new ideology for Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, is very difficult. Therefore, the third period of the evolution of the ideological situation will be mainly based on the Russian experience in search of a new ideology for Russia.

Creating an ideology for Russia proved to be very difficult. In order to form a new ideology, first, it is necessary to identify the core idea, which would accumulate the remaining ideological ideas, creating a single ideological whole, i.e. it is necessary to create a coherent ideology that gives a holistic view of the world, place, and purpose of a human being in the universe. Developing of a new modern secular ideology is impossible without modern scientific knowledge of the natural, social sciences, and humanities. Therefore, a new ideology must be, first, a scientific ideology, which gives the complete knowledge of the world and the human’s place in it. Of course, only one scientific ideas are not exhaustive for the coherent ideological doctrine. In addition to scientific knowledge, a complete ideological knowledge must include philosophical, artistic, moral, legal, political, economic, sociological knowledge and values. Connecting all of the knowledge and values in a single holistic ideological doctrine was not that easy. Therefore, the first developers of ideology for Russia, who faced with the difficulties of creating a new ideology of Russian society, rapidly cooled against the problem of creating a new ideology. However, most importantly, the developers of the new ideology for Russia could not clearly define what kind of ideology they should develop: either neo-conservative or neo-liberal or social democratic, or even some new ideology.

Such uncertainty of the ideology developers led them to the decision to abandon the creation of a new ideology. The result of their spiritual quest was a “wise decision”, which laid in the fact that the ideology would be formed itself in the public consciousness of the Russian people.

Another attempt to create a new Russian ideology was made in the second half of 1999 on the orders of the Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Under his leadership, the so-called “Kremlin Research Institute” was established. Its employees were tasked with creating the ideology for Russia. Nevertheless, no attempts to form an ideology just like the earlier attempts were fulfilled. After the inauguration of the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, in May 2000, the ideological institution was dissolved.

As rightly pointed by Shevelev, “the fact of repetitive appeals “to formulate the national idea” indicates the worldview fiasco and indirectly indicates the corrosion of the social contract between the government and the people. The decisive role in the life of society belongs, apparently, to the semantic space. Various forms of life on earth, the way for arrangement of human society, in fact, is not nothing but a visible embodiment of social mentality. In this sense, the theory of modernization is the means of political domination, since being a symbolic practice, they reproduce the domination of the Western model of the social world over others; and thus, consciously or unconsciously, legitimizing the economic, political and cultural domination” (Shevelev, 2012).

Of course, the next fourth period of the evolution of the ideological situation in Russia has such a significant difference from the ideological evolution of the situation in the Caucasus. This makes our analysis of the implementation period of the neo-liberal and neo-conservative Western values at a slow process of finding the new national ideology (2000-2008) to be based only on the Russian experience.

After unsuccessful attempts to create a new Russian ideology made in the second half of 90s, as well as due to the appeared danger to the powers that be, that due to the spontaneous process of ideological creativity of the Russian clerisy, such an ideology will be created, whereby people will demand for the answer for the unfair privatization of the national wealth. This was the reason for the political elite to contemplate about the value of which ideology can legitimize the process of the unfair-for-the-people “grabbing” of the national wealth belonging by birth to the Russian people (Volkov, 2013).

Of course, they did not have to contemplate for long, because even the neoconservative values, spontaneously encouraged by the first democrats, and disguised as liberal, suited in a good and perfect way to the political and economic elite of the country. It means that these were the neoconservative values to legitimize the process and results of the unfair privatization.

Thus, since 2000, Russia is facing with an ideological process of introduction of Western neo-conservative values (but without the creation of a coherent theoretical neo-conservative ideology of the Russian society) under the guise of the world’s finest liberal ideological values, but subject to all the same “low current” process of finding a new ideology for Russia. The President V. V. Putin in one of his annual letters said, referring to the search for a new Russian ideology, that we have a “Russian entertainment”—seeking for the Russian national idea.

During the fourth period of the evolution of the ideological situation in Russia, political elite has periodically
filled into the public consciousness with slogans about creating a new ideology. Thus, until 2006, there was the slogan of creating an integrated or unifying ideology, then in 2006, the idea of creating a patriotic ideology was put forward. Since 2007, the public consciousness was introduced with the idea of creating a conservative ideology with Russian characteristics, based on the Russian Orthodox values and traditions. The idea of creating the Orthodox conservative ideology for Russia taking into account the Eurasian nation of the Russian civilization is still being developed in various ideological centres of the Russian society.

The leader of the conservative Orthodox “Eurasian Movement”, Dugin said in his speech at the second meeting of the Izborskiy Club, “we have two ideological currents—the liberals and the conservatives. Today 90% of the discourse is the liberal discourse—pleasure, individualism, and career. These are totally liberal-imposed values under the pretext of lack of ideology... Today democracy is the power of the minority, which is defending against the majority” (Izborskiy Club, 2012).

The director of the Centre for Geopolitical Expertise, Valery Korovin, also shared the ideas of Dugin. In his speech at the second meeting of the Izborskiy Club, he noted the following: “We underestimate the function of the liberals in our society, while it is monstrous and total. We will never come to the model of a single ideology as long as we clean the liberals out of everywhere. The liberals of the modern era caused enormous damage to our state... While liberals dominate over the senses, the basic paradigms, we will achieve nothing and will make no our ideological models acting, determining the course of history” (Izborskiy Club, 2012).

The financial crisis that broke out in 2008, developed into an economic crisis as a whole, and, in our opinion, led to the origin of the fifth period of the evolution of the ideological situation in Russia. This is primarily connected to criticism of the values of the Western ideology and the formation of modernist ideology of the Russian society. Thus, with the beginning of a new global crisis, and the world in general and Russia in particular were expected to have a re-assessment of neo-conservative and neo-liberal ideologies, especially its monetarist option, which, of course, would lead to a search for a way out of the ideological impasse. This is certainly implied the renaissance of Marxist ideology in modern Russia, as well as the social-democratic ideology, i.e., a kind of “shift to the left” of the ideological values was assumed. On the other hand, it was also assumed that the criticism and reassessment of the Western values would strengthen the influence of religious and spiritual values. First, it would strengthen the role of the Orthodox ideology and church. However, as social practice demonstrated, the introduction of the Orthodox religious values in Russia caused at least a strong revival of Islamic ideology, especially in the North Caucasus region. Such uncontrolled rebirth of the Orthodox and Islamic religious ideologies led to their confrontation, calling religious extremism on a national basis. In extreme forms, it leads to not only Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism by Islamic extremists, eager for world domination across the Islamic Caliphate, i.e. the global Islamic empire. This is the way for the ill-conceived ideological religious policy of the ruling circles of the Russian society to lead to the interaction of the Orthodox and Islamic ideology in the form of an uncompromising struggle in the southern regions of Russia because of policy’s deideologization. For example, the number of cases of explosion of Christian churches increased in Dagestan.

Of course, the political and economic elite of the Russian society are unlikely to welcome joyfully the “shift to the left” of the ideological values. In the end, this would lead to the revision of the results of privatization of the national wealth of the Russian society based on the re-assessment of the neo-conservative values. Therefore, paradoxically it sounds, but the ruling circles will attempt to gain “rightwards” instead of the “shift to the left”. It means the gain of the neoconservative values, followed by the new terms of the privatization of state property. However, in order not to implement frankly the neoconservative values that are worldwide criticized and re-evaluated, the country’s leaders camouflage the neoconservative values under the value of the so-called modernist ideology. Indeed, from outside, it the looks plausible that we need modernization based on the values of the Modernist ideology. It is given as a prerequisite for exit from the crisis, but, more importantly, the means to achieve the modernization of the Russian society. The proposed response of the ruling elite means strengthening of the privatization process.

Thus, the modernist ideology is the old neoconservative ideology of the Western style offered as the new one. In order to ensure the modernist ideological privatization, the Institute of Contemporary Development, or abbreviated INSCD, is specifically established. The institute is headed by Jurgens and Gontmakher. It aims to develop a modernist ideology as a new species of the same neo-conservative ideology. It is interesting that one of the achievements of the Institute of Contemporary Development is the idea for Russia to join the military-political alliance of NATO.

It shall also be noted that the ideological field of Russia, except for the modernist ideology, is used to develop the Russian conservative ideology as well. This ideology has been designated at the previous stage of the
evolution of the ideological situation of the Russian society. Therefore, as noted by contemporary Russian political analysts, there was interaction between the Russian conservative ideology of the Eurasian wing and the modernist ideology. This interaction takes the form of mutual development.

Before the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation in December 2011, the position of the leader of the Russian conservative ideology and at the same time the leader of the “United Russia” party was awarded to Putin, while the leader of the modernist ideology was Medvedev. However, after Putin was elected as the president in 2012, Mr. Putin and Mr. Medvedev began to implement all the same values of the Western-wing neo-conservative ideology. Again, as in the 90-ies of century, the President and the Prime Minister are talking about the new wave of privatization of the state property for more, as they believe effective management by private company. Dissatisfaction of the intellectual elite with the introduction of the neo-conservative Western ideology has led, in particular, in September 2012 to the creation of Izborskiy Expert Club in the town of Izborsk of the Pskov region to implement, as expressed by the participants of the club, “the ideological leap” in the modern Russian society.

3. Result & Discussions

It is interesting how the foreign authors evaluate the current ideological situation in contemporary Russia. Thus, the American reporter Max Fisher proposes to call the Russian state ideology, which does not exist yet, as the “New Putinism”, representing, according to him, a kind of “blend of the two old Russian ideas: patriotism (with a hint of anti-Western ideas) and Orthodox Christianity in its conservative interpretation”. The “New Putinism”, writes Fisher, in Russia wants to “fill the ideological vacuum created by the collapse of the Soviet Union” (The New Putinism ...).

Speaking about the prevailing ideological situation in Russia in general in our study of ideologies of the Eurasian region, we should be more focussed on the specifics of the ideological situation in the south of Russia, in the so-called South and North Caucasian Federal Districts, or in the south social regions of the Russian Federation. In these regions of Russia, as we said above, the growing role of religious Islamic ideology is observed.

A number of researchers involved in the study of Islamic ideology note the emergence of such a political and ideological phenomenon as Islamic fundamentalism, caused by the realization of insolvency borrowed or, more precisely, imposed by Western propaganda of Western social models of social development such as liberalism and socialism. Especially significant it was manifested on the background of the backlog of Islamic countries from the economically developed Western countries, as well as dependence of the majority of the ruling elite and the political regimes in the Muslim countries as the whole on the policy of the Western countries. In such western-subordinated conditions, the West Islamic ideology in its radical, fundamentalist form has become a powerful domestic political force, acting in foreign policy for the creation of a worldwide Islamic Empire or Islamic Caliphate in the territories of the Islamic societies, including the North Caucasian republics of the Russian Federation.

Islamic fundamentalism in such form as Wahhabism is the ideological beginning aimed primarily at solving the problems of Muslim societies, including the Russian North Caucasian republics. Moreover, the influence of Wahhabism ideology leads to arising of ultra-radical fundamentalist organizations using terrorist methods to achieve their goals.

Supporters of the radical Islamist ideology in the South Russian regions shall be conditionally divided into three groups. First group consists of the members of the ideological armed forces, being a kind of ideological Order of the armed fighters for the Islamic faith. These fighters for the Islamic faith act both at the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the neighbouring republics of the South of Russia. Providing armed resistance to the federal forces, extremists implement basic tenets of radical Islamic ideology: the “Greater jihad” (war against the infidels) and the “Takfir” (the fight against anti-Muslim apostates). The second group of followers of radical Islamic ideology includes the adherents of “purification of Islam”. The proponents of this trend in Islam act in favour of the purity of the Islamic faith and create such organizations, as they believe are real authentic Islamic ones, as “Jamaat” i.e. truly Islamic communities. For example, in Kabardino-Balkaria, there are communities of the “purified Islam” (Jamaat) supporters, such as “Free Aul”, “Nur”, “Mansour”, “North” and others, that are part of the Republican Shura (council), in which the Sharia court is applied. Thus, the management “Sharia vertical” is already formed within the framework of Islamic Jamaat, which can serve as a prototype for future governmental organizations of the Muslim state. The third group of the Islamic ideology proponents comprises of the opposition movements among the major regional Spiritual Administration of Muslims of the South of Russia. This branch of Islam is caused by the competition between the spiritual leaders, mobilizing their
supporters to influence the political and ideological processes in the Russian regions. These contradictions are pushing traditionalist-minded religious leaders on the relationship with moderately minded fundamentalists. In general, the activities of armed Wahhabi groups in the North Caucasus are a manifestation of the crisis in the Muslim community of the region, part of which involves the radical groups within the Muslim communities. Yet, in the current difficult ideological situation in the South Russian regions, the most effective prevention of the religious Islamic extremism can be the spread throughout the Russian secular (non-religious) true humanistic ideology that will superecede all extremist ideology including the Islamic extremism ideology.

4. Conclusions
In conclusion, it shall be noted that, despite the current ideological situation, characterized by mutual development of Russian conservative and modernist ideologies, yet the ideological future is not for them, because we are at the beginning of the epoch of transition from the capitalist world order as the industrial civilization to the humanistic world order as the anthropogenic civilization. We believe that the ideology of global humanism will rule the coming new historical era.

Thus, the future Russian society after overcoming the ideological stagnation and based on the new truly human humanist ideology will create an ideocratic society, in which the ideological power will prevail over the state power, and the ruling Russian humanist party will be leading and guiding force of the future Russian humanistic society, which will implement the principle of harmonious combination of spiritual and material wealth at a priority of yet spiritual development of Russian citizens.

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