Determinants of Electoral Budget Cycles and Its Relationship with the Likelihood of Re-election of Mayor in State of Parana (Brazil)
- Luciane Franco
- Nestor Baptista
- Márcia Espejo
- Luciano Scherer
- Cristiano Nascimento
AbstractThis research aims to detect whether there are variables determining the contribution of the phenomenon Electoral Budget Cycles (EBC) for re-election of the Mayor is justified in the fact there is evidence that the results of the public financial statements sheets suffer affectations by political decisions that may involve negative effects on society. Research of Nordhaus (1975), Tufte (1978), Klein (2009) and Batisda et al (2009) reveal ideological convergence that in election years, managers can manipulate the budgets in favor of his re-election. This phenomenon seeks to explain the adhesion of political variables in the management of the public financial statements sheet items, such as debt, deficits financial and intergovernmental revenues. Data collection was performed for all 399 municipalities of the State of Paraná, the total public debt, transfers, agreements, population, as well as a screening party of the linkages of managers with the Governor of State and/or the President of the Republic. The analysis considered voting in the elections following enactment of the Fiscal Responsibility Law, the elections of 2004 and 2008, and was used probit regression of the econometric model. The results show that the mayors linked to the party of the President or the Governor increase by 25% and 14%, respectively, their probability of re-election.
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