Oil and Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Reflections on the External and Domestic Linkages

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Abstract
The age-long significance of the West African Sub-region to global commerce or economy is not dwindling and, by all appearances, will not even in the distant future irrespective of shocks in the price of oil. Retrospectively, the region was key to European search for economic opportunities in both the pre-colonial and colonial eras as it provided the haven of resources needed for industrialization in Europe. A great number of slaves shipped from Africa to the New World were also taken from the region because of the advantage of huge oceanic freeway. Now, amidst threats of energy insecurity due to crisis in the Persian Gulf and increasing concern for securing reliable source of supply by oil importing countries, especially by the US, the Gulf of Guinea has come to the fore once more as a region with great potential for providing a significant part of the answer for emerging fears of global energy insecurity. This paper seeks to explain this role on the part of the Gulf Guinea in the context of external and domestic linkages to security and oil conflict in the region. The paper argues that quest for energy security and failure by oil importing countries to seek alternative energy sources breed insecurity for oil exporting countries. We suggest an explanation on how this operates, especially in relation to the mode of governance of the oil by national leaders, multilateral institutions and multinational oil companies in the case of Nigeria’s delta region.

Keywords: Oil, Security, Gulf of Guinea, External, Domestic, Linkages

1. Introduction
Owing to its enormous potential in serving the strategic economic and energy interest of national leaders, multilateral institutions and multinational oil companies, the Gulf of Guinea has become, for the scholarly and policy communities, one of the most important regions of interest in the world. Unfortunately, it appears that scholars and policy makers, in the discourse on the Gulf of Guinea have either promoted the interest of external investment and equated it with development for countries in the region (GG) or explained economic problems, governance, conflict and so on in relation to natural resources in the region without needed significant effort at identifying the need to balance the argument within the context of issues beyond the oil, as revealed from observable external and domestic linkages in the economy and politics of oil in the Gulf of Guinea. The Niger Delta provides an example of these linkages which becomes a basis for somewhat generalization about the Gulf of Guinea. This may be problematical in the face of superior arguments against grounds for such generalization.

In terms of population and size, the Gulf of Guinea has about 300 million residents. The area includes a range of countries across west and central Africa, namely: Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo (Mane, 2005). These countries have, individually, diverse natural resource endowments and have similar characteristics of natural resource induced conflicts, mismanagement of public funds, corruption, bad governance and high incidence of poverty among citizens.

The ecosystem, including the advantage of oceanic freeway, easing global investment and transportation of goods and services, is in part, the cause of the global interest in the region. Apart from known natural resource deposits, such as oil, diamond, gold, coal, iron ore, and so on in the countries of the Gulf of Guinea, the ecosystem, such as the rich biodiversity was until intense industrialization and urbanization which started during the past 50 years, natural provider of resources or means of survival and life for people living in the coastal areas across the border. For example, the rain forests of the region contributed tremendously to meeting world’s
The result was disastrous for the global economy, as for example, British and French oil companies operating in
However, in 1956, when Britain and France attacked Egypt, with Israel on the side of the duo against Egypt
west generally and support for the Arab states blocked its oil pipelines against Israel's Haifa terminal (Ali, 1987).
Republic of Congo are key oil producing countries in the region that are by extension expected to play more role
in addressing the problem of global energy security. For example, Nigeria’s proven oil reserves are estimated at
40 billion barrels, making the country, the eleventh largest world producer of oil. In fact, Nigeria has 60 percent
total oil deposit in the Gulf of Guinea. In addition, Nigeria’s estimated natural gas reserve of 176 trillion cubic
feet is the largest in Africa.
Against this background, this paper seeks to explain this role on the part of the Gulf Guinea in the context of
external and domestic linkages to security and oil conflict in the region. Specifically, the paper examines how
global quest for energy security might also breed insecurity and contribute to the nature of national governance
of the oil, and how, if at all, the mode of governance of the oil further leads to socio-economic and political
conditions that fuel conflict or even transform it. Three main questions are addressed in this paper: what are the
security implications of dependence of oil importing countries on oil for energy for the Gulf of Guinea? How
does such dependence on oil contribute to insecurity of the region? To what extent is the drive for energy
security on the part of oil importing countries a contributing factor to conflict transformation in the region? The
paper argues that quest for energy security and failure by oil importing countries to seek alternative energy
sources breeds insecurity for oil exporting countries. We suggest an explanation on how this operates, especially
in relation to the mode of governance of the oil by national leaders, multilateral institutions and multinational oil
companies in the case of Nigeria’s delta region.
2. Oil
Africa’s oil, like its palm oil, cocoa, rubber and other raw materials in the heydays of early European
industrialization, is increasingly assuming influential role in global politics, trade and investment. It is needed to
run the aviation and automobile industries, manufacturing, service sectors and so on. With yet no substantial
effort at promoting reliable alternative to oil, the commodity has remained politically volatile and strategic in
domestic and global economic and political spheres. Already, with over 4 percent world’s proven reserves and
daily supply of 5 percent to world consumers, 15 to 25 percent supplies to the US and China respectively, the
Gulf of Guinea, where Africa’s oil is concentrated, can no longer be underestimated in its role of providing the
haven of sort for meeting global energy security needs. In fact, current demand for Africa’s oil, especially from
West Africa, is expected to increase as the political significance of the oil continues to grow between the United
States and the Persian Gulf, where long lasting political issues of mutual interests in relations between the US,
Western European nations and region have remained relevant for key economic and oil production and supply
decisions. For example, the Persian Gulf has been a site for global economic and political competition between
world powers dating back to early history (over four millennia) when empires rose and fell. The region gained
strategic importance when, for instance, Britain contested with the Portuguese for economic and political control
of the region. In fact, as Ali (1987) notes, Britain needed the Persian Gulf as its ‘security zone for its empire in
India.’ Several years ago, precisely in 1948, when fighting broke out in Palestine between Israel and the Arab
world, though a country like Saudi Arabia, with huge oil reserves and resources, refused to use the oil as a
diplomatic weapon (oil embargo) against the west at the time, Iraq, in a show of defiance against Isreal and the
west generally and support for the Arab states blocked its oil pipelines against Israel’s Haifa terminal (Ali, 1987).
However, in 1956, when Britain and France attacked Egypt, with Israel on the side of the duo against Egypt
(note 1), the Suez Canal was blocked, making it impossible for oil to flow to Israel and the entire Mediterranean.
The result was disastrous for the global economy, as for example, British and French oil companies operating in
the region had to secure supplies from the United States at higher cost. Western Europe had no choice than to
ration oil supplies from the US. Strangely, the US worked in alliance with the Soviet Union during this war and
called on Britain, France and Israel to end the war and withdraw their forces from Egypt. Both countries (the US and Soviet Union) then called on the Arab countries to lift their six months oil embargo against their enemies.

A similar occurrence followed the third Arab-Isreali war in 1967. The Suez Canal was again blocked, although, this time, Western Europe was not as hurt as previously as alternative supplies of oil were secured from the US, Libya, Algeria and Venezuela. Besides, the Arab countries suffered poor revenue yield while American, Algerian, Libyan and Venezuelan oil companies made fortunes from the war. Not only was oil seen as badly used politically in that war, the war was to change the face of oil and global politics extensively. For example, by the 1970s, surplus oil production in the US – which assisted in cushioning effects of oil embargoes -- became a thing of the past. Besides, the adoption of control of volume of production by OPEC, against previous lawlessness of oil companies of production was intended to put pressure on the US and Western Europe to resolve the Middle East crisis while maintaining a line of sustainable profit or revenue margin for oil producing countries. Nevertheless, the fourth Arab-Isreali war – precisely on 6 October, 1973 – again reflected the propensity by the Arab states to use oil as a political weapon in the Isreali-Palestine conflict. At this time, Saudi Arabia joined easily in the imposition of oil embargo against Isreal, even as Western Europe and the US oil surplus regimes had ended.

Oil embargoes may not repeat themselves in the same frequency and content, but certainly, global demand for oil has expanded, leading to a need for diversification of sources of supply for oil importing nations. In the face of lack of alternative energy source, shortages due to the character of oil politics and conflict in the Persian Gulf, the US and West European states are gradually finding a need to strategically develop alternative regions for security of oil supplies. Nigeria is at the heart of this gradual shift in favour of the Gulf of Guinea strategy for security supplies of oil. Incidentally, this rising dependence on the Gulf of Guinea for energy security has large-scale implications for security of the oil importing and producing nations in the region. The Niger Delta of Nigeria represents a central area of focus in the global attention on the Gulf of Guinea for energy security and investment on the part of oil importing nations and the Nigerian government and peoples. Trouble, and more trouble, seems clearly associated with this quest for energy security. This has been well summed up by “resource curse” theorists, who see oil fueling the world but failing the Gulf of Guinea region (De Soya, 2011; Roll, 2011).

3. Oil-Security Nexus

External and domestic linkages in the relationship between oil and security may be discussed on different levels and perspectives, depending on how the issues of security are contextualized in terms of what it means to each of the parties in the oil business between importing and exporting countries in the Gulf of Guinea (De Soya, 2011; Roll, 2011). Understanding the meaning of security within the context of nature of interests of the importing and exporting countries in the case of Nigeria and United States of America should help illuminate the problem as suggested in this paper -- how global quest for energy security might also breed insecurity and contribute to the nature of national governance of the oil, and how, if at all, the mode of governance of the oil further leads to socio-economic and political conditions that fuel conflict or even transform it.

Some observers of oil production and trade relations, for instance, between Nigeria and the US and China are already weary of the security implications of increasing dependence of these countries on Nigeria’s oil as a strategy for meeting energy security needs. It would appear that for these countries, security may mean no more than uninterrupted access to oil. This notion of security has been reflected in reports by the National Energy Policy Development Group headed by former Vice President Cheney of the United States, during the regime of President George W. Bush. The concept is now also common among scholars interested in American foreign policy towards oil producing countries and post-9/11 unilateralism (Kiely, 2005). Already, Nigeria’s share of total oil import by the US stands in the range of 10 to 15 percent (Lubeck et al., 2007). In fact, total import by the US alone is projected to rise upwards of 13 million barrels per day by 2025. With uncertainties of supply owing to fluctuations in production volume, price, conflict and politics around key areas of oil producing regions of the world in the aftermath of 9/11, an alternative source of supply is not only strategic, it certainly speaks volumes about a need to protect the national security interest of the US. There is no surprise therefore, that national energy policy of the US looks to the Gulf of Guinea with Nigeria playing a leading role in meeting a great part of this energy need. As Lubeck et al. (2007) argue “Oil from other sources could increase the security of supply and make the United States less beholden to potentially unstable or hostile regimes. As a result, American energy security planners have redefined the Gulf of Guinea as a strategic interest of the United States, a more stable and secure source of future petroleum needs, with potential reserves as high as 60 billion barrels”.

By the same token, it would appear that ensuring uninterrupted production of oil is paramount to the security of the Nigerian state. This is a government-centred perspective to security that speaks to the domestic or national
imperatives. As much as this view remains critical for socio-economic and political transformation of the state and well-being of its peoples, it is seriously in doubt how useful it is for understanding, planning and providing security that meets the needs of broader segments of society as individual and community components of countries in the Gulf of Guinea. Worse, force or physical violence is freely deployed or utilized by government officials or political leaders in fighting off what is considered threats against the state. Security, then, for the oil producing states in the Gulf of Guinea, as typified in the case of Nigeria focuses on protecting the life-blood of the state -- the oil -- since the state runs basically with revenues generated from its production.

Embedded in the above argument is the neglect of human security in the general discourse on the subject up to very recent times. Presumably, it was first mentioned in a United Nations Development Programme report of 1994 after the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio Earth Summit in 1992. A range of issues are introduced as properties of human security -- security of individuals and communities -- basically undermined by other conceptualizations of security. A long list of economic, political, environmental, food, health, community and personal components of human security in which citizens’ well-being occupies a primary position is suggested. Of essence is the nature of impact of the oil and gas business in the producing states of the Gulf of Guinea while meeting the needs of the importer.

The post-cold war era has come with a conviction that the concept of security is elastic, beyond mere guard of sovereignty of states. It encompasses safeguard of the human environment from destructive economic activities to comprehensive improvement in the well-being of citizens (Owolabi & Okwechime, 2007). What this means is that security focuses on the root or source of human pain and not on mere military threats against the state and its citizens. This, again, speaks volumes about the significance of human security over other forms of security within the security discourse. As Griffiths and O’Collagahan (2002) note: ‘This more radical approach to the issue of human security reflects a more holistic concern with human life and dignity. The idea of human life invites us to focus on the individual’s need to be safe from hunger, disease, and regression, as well as protected against events likely to undermine the normal pattern of everyday existence. It also implies a need for significant redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor countries.’

Beyond notions of posing security threat to the Nigerian state and importers, violent crisis in the Niger Delta, which is in part, result of negative socio-economic, political and environmental impact of the oil industry on the region, is a threat to human security in the region (Owolabi & Okwechime, 2007). This human security perspective provides very useful insights into how multinational oil corporations in the Gulf of Guinea constitute threats to security of individuals and communities and the state. As part of the oil capitalist complex, human security perspectives help to illuminate the underlying factor of repressive and violent state institutions against citizens or communities in the Niger Delta.

Interpretation of security in terms uninterrupted profit arising from sustained exploration and production of the oil, limited only by global forces of demand and supply on the part of multinational oil companies, remains a threat to human security in various ways. Not only does it create a strong need for physical protection of oil facilities and access to profit, it represents much of what can be seen as capitalist or multilateral view of security --institutions and ideas in support of the global oil capitalist complex and efforts to secure legal and social license for sustained exploration and production. This goes along with a need for strong investment portfolios and profit in and from production, externally driven to ensure sustained cost-friendliness and steady supplies. Security, in this sense means opportunities for and safety of externally driven investments in the oil sector.

In any case, oil multinational corporations are agents of capitalist globalization. An important characteristic of capitalist globalization is its relationships of domination and exploitation in alliance with the national economic and political class. As Kiely (2005) argues, market societies do not arise naturally; they are products of political and social processes. Relationships of domination orchestrated by global capital breeds insecurity at one end of the spectrum –Gulf of Guinea – manifesting through the removal of citizens from basic benefits from the land and its oil resource. Access to equal benefits from the capitalist production of the oil is the result of external and domestic political and social processes that are basically determined by the agents of capitalist globalization in alliance with their home governments and host political and economic leaders.

The rising global quest for oil in the Gulf of Guinea is not merely to satisfy energy security needs of key oil importing countries, but also to protect their investments in the oil sector in the region and seek new investment opportunities; all of which are fundamental to the economic security of home governments of the oil multinational corporations. The next section discusses how this quest for oil simultaneously contributes to the nature of national governance of the oil and how it further leads to socio-economic and political conditions that fuel conflict or its transformation in the Gulf of Guinea.
4. Governance

Governance of oil resource at the levels of exploration, production, marketing and utilization of revenues from the oil has not been quite favorable to countries in the Gulf of Guinea and their citizens. At best, only national political and economic leaders have smiled to their banks along with their foreign counterparts and lived comfortably. External pressure for energy and economic security on the part of major importing countries like US and China has no corresponding pressure to address social, economic, environmental and political conditions that have resulted from oil exploration and production activities. In fact, it appears that nowhere else has the ‘resource curse’ thesis (see for example Collier & Hoeffler, 2002) been most pronounced than the oil producing countries in the Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria remains a key reference point.

Briefly, governance implies state-civil society relations within the context of policy or governmental and non-governmental response to societal problems and social processes. It is a concept that emanated from a tacit need to understand the nature of state-civil society relations as an important element in governmental processes and their outcome. The exercise of power and authority, success in political and socio-economic processes depend largely on the character of state-civil society relationship promoted or suppressed in society. This means that government business transcends state institutions to include non-state actors, especially as concern for development along with legions of social, economic, environmental issues remain strong on the political and social agenda of the state. These imperatives have taken society out of the limitation of state-centred solutions to a need to understand ‘interactions between local, national, regional and international actors’ (Kiely, 2005).

Perhaps, it is for this reason that Stoker argues that governance refers to ‘all sorts of new arrangements for creating order and structuring collective action.’ The ability to get things done without necessarily depending on state actors alone, nature of state and non-state actors, their involvement in addressing social problems, as well as the level of autonomy they enjoy in the social and political processes clearly signal important indices or properties of good governance.

Certainly, governance of the oil in the Gulf of Guinea has had devastating impact from pressures of global capitalism at the various stages of exploration, production and marketing. The global market society continues to dictate policy directions and implementation to national leaders.

There are two basic oil regimes between multinational oil companies and governments in the Gulf of Guinea, namely, Concession Contracts and Production Sharing Contracts. Initial exploration activities in the 19th and 20th centuries in the Gulf of Guinea, were done on the basis of concessions granted multinational oil companies. Transition from Concession Contracts to Production Sharing Contracts in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and 1980s has not changed the neoliberal character of the oil business. In the case of Nigeria, initially, Dutch/British Oil Company was granted concessionary rights to undertake oil exploration, production and marketing in the entire geographical area of Nigeria in the years preceding the Second World War. In some countries of the Gulf of Guinea, concession contract last over 60 years. By its nature - concession contract- the colonial state merely transferred its sovereign right to explore, produce and market to multinational oil companies who bore the risk and financed the stages of development of oil and bore the technological needs of the oil the industry. The state received a portion of the oil produced as royalty.

Production Sharing Contract is the result of a change of heart on the part of states over transfer of ownership rights to explore, produce and market the oil to multinational oil companies. In this arrangement, not only does the state regain its ownership rights to retain, it also regain managerial rights. Multinational oil companies continued to finance their activities and bore the highest burden of risks for technological capacity for operating the oil sector. In compensation, multinational oil companies receive a portion of oil production which covers cost of production of oil and profit after the cost has been deducted.

Majority of countries in the Gulf of Guinea have implemented one form of production Sharing Contract or the other. For example, Nigeria, Angola, Cameroon and Gabon and many others have implemented Production Sharing Contracts. Both forms of contracts have had implications for security. With oil companies calling the shots, sovereignty over the land and environment returned to the state. Under the colonial state, national security was coterminus with security of home governments of multinational oil companies. It would appear that oil hardly benefits citizens or local populations under the concession contract agreement. It is important to note that colonialism in the Gulf of Guinea, a period in which much of the regime of Concession Contract thrived for oil producing countries, was authoritarian. Typical of capital, concession contract took ownership rights away from national governments and citizens and bestowed on the multinational oil companies. In reality, transfer of ownership rights of the oil to these multinational oil companies by the state made oil economies vulnerable to external manipulation.
Generally, policy choices of politicians in determining the nature of contract for exploration, production and marketing, and how rents are to be utilized do not promote accountability. Instead, it has contributed to corruption, bad governance, poverty and decadence in social infrastructure. The resource curse thesis claims that abundance of resources, especially oil, fuels civil wars. Events in the Niger Delta since the 1990s shows how oil can be a key factor in understanding conflict in the region. Abundance of oil and commensurate financial yields in revenues and profits are sufficient incentives associated with capital’s activities of meeting the pressure from within and outside.

Insecurity associated with governance of oil in the Gulf of Guinea, as exemplified in the case of Nigeria’s Niger Delta, manifests in different forms. For example, the Nigerian state and multinational oil companies in joint-venture relationships seem unwilling or unable to tackle the problem of massive destruction of the environment through regular oil spills and flaring of gas. In this case, it is estimated that between 1976 and 1999, about 3,000 oil-spill cases occurred in the Niger Delta, causing enormous damage to the environment by multinational oil companies and the state have not received adequate attention. From the creation of the River Basin Authority to the Oil Mineral Producing Area Commission (OMPADEC), to the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), institutional response has been very limited at tackling the problem of damage to the environment.

Ensuing social and ecological issues following this institutional failure has clearly reinforced the link between environmental insecurity and violent conflict. Many years of environmental damage caused by activities of multinational oil companies in joint-venture with the federal government of Nigeria have destroyed local agro-based economy of people in the oil producing communities of the Delta. Resistance by local communities started subtly and nonviolently but gradually into violence when the state, with the support of multinational oil companies interpreted such resistance as threats to security of the state and profit. The ensuing use of force adopted by the state did not only escalate the conflict to violent levels; the conflict has endured, perhaps because of the failure by government to explore alternative human-centred approaches to its resolution. This is why current offer of amnesty by the federal government to embattled former militants need to be carried through without the usual problems of corruption and unwillingness of policy implementing officials of government that cause failure to government programmes or policies.

5. Beyond Oil

Neither the rising demand for Gulf of Guinea oil by the US, China and European countries, nor expected profits and revenues to multinational oil companies and the Nigerian state serve the human security needs of communities in the Gulf of Guinea and the global community in the long run. The broader issues of interest include, first the need to secure the global climate which is now clearly seen to be at the risk of collapse. There is need for less use of fossil fuel—less dependence on oil for alternative environment friendly energy source. In spite of a growing idea that environmental impact of the oil industry is currently being felt in all parts of the world, the need for alternative sources of energy on a large scale has not been considered viable by the more technologically advanced western nations. The reason is not farfetched. The oil capitalist complex in the producing states of the Gulf of Guinea is basically driven by western capital. The neoliberal order, championed by western capital is not receptive to a radical green revolution. In this sense, global environmental insecurity remains key outcome of rising demand for oil, oil exploration, production and market processes. Can the world reduce its consumption of oil and save the planet? It would appear that this is a difficult question to answer for capital, given its aggressive search for new oil fields in the Gulf of Guinea in order to meet global energy security needs.

The ‘resource curse’ thesis shows up very often, and is reflected in the emergence of weak state structures, that are not only privatized; they are unable to resist the hegemonic influence of global capital against human security in the region. In fact, the security situation is worsened by the state’s exonerating of self from known age-long social responsibilities to its citizens. Oil generates violent conflicts and has reduced state institutions to mere domains for intense struggle among ethnic chieftains, disguised as politicians. Failure to provide basic infrastructure such as good roads, affordable health care, potable water, affordable education, telephony and so on, has exposed the state in the region as mainly unable to live up to its responsibilities with huge revenues generated from oil. Poverty and general state of underdevelopment are the natural outcome for the majority of citizens. This failure by the government, to effectively utilize revenues from oil is part of the insecurity engendered by external and domestic linkages around the oil industrial complex in the Gulf of Guinea. Security, in all its ramifications has direct and indirect bearing on the nature of relationship between oil importing and exporting nations. The impact on national governance institutions has in turn created conditions that predispose communities to violent conflict.
6. Conclusion

The paper has critically explained the role of the Gulf of Guinea in meeting global energy security needs, especially of the United States, China and Europe. However, the rising quest for oil in the region generates human insecurity and will be sure to worsen given the countervailing interests of key actors in the oil industrial complex. National governance institutions, working in alliance with western capital have shown marginal interest in broader security issues of protection of the environment and weakness in proper response to threats posed by aggressive demand for oil and investment opportunities in the region. Violent conflict is the result of these social processes as clearly seen in the case of the Niger Delta where oil and gas are mined to satisfy the Nigerian state and energy security needs of importing nations to the detriment of local communities. This question, as to whether and how quest for energy security by importing nations imposes burden on countries in the Gulf of Guinea is undeniable, as it clearly enables different narratives on the relationship between the variables. The paper argues that quest for energy security and failure by oil importing countries to seek alternative energy sources breed insecurity for oil exporting countries. The paper has explained how this operates in the context of ensuing governance institutions of the oil, using the case of the Niger Delta of Nigeria. The solution lies partly in large-scale reduction in the consumption of oil and corresponding development of alternative sources of revenue for the oil producing countries. This, certainly will not only be a healthy development for current fight against global climate change, it will increase human security at the domestic level of communities in the region as emphasis on energy from fossil fuel would have slowed down. In the same vein, the social, economic, environmental and political properties which human security is embedded will remove tensions between or among actors in the political and oil economic space of countries in the region where violent conflict has had impact on human security.

There is no question that the Gulf of Guinea region is strategic to the US, Europe and China, with regard to meeting their security needs in a world regularly threatened by disruption in oil supplies. It has had a painful side of insecurity for the 23 countries making up the region.

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References


Note

Note1. Obviously, this became the second Arab-Israeli war.
Figure 1