The Nature of Peace Agreement in International Law

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Abstract

Peace agreements offer rule-based approaches, which distinguish from some variable peace processes and are manifested as establishing a legal peace. This legal peace is provided in the following forms:

1) Peace agreements evaluate internal and external interactions for the legitimacy of government through distorting government and supporting human rights; a different composition of public and private (non-government) signatories;

2) Peace agreements are common treaties riding over national (interior) and international legal issues;

3) Different forms of legal commitments; peace agreements embraces both valid organizational regulations and contracts or pseudo-commitment contracts;

4) Various third party agencies; peace agreements rely upon common law coalition government and contain multiple oppositions, common law and political mechanisms and their implementation.

These various ways simultaneously reflect settlement ways of peace agreements. If legal issues are ignored and peace agreements are properly considered, they may be argued as a temporary international constitution. Peace agreements provide a powerful plan for governing; however, they are often minor and temporary requiring developed.

Keywords: peace agreement, terrorism versus war, nature of start-stop

1. Introduction

When September 11, 2011 occurred, it seemed that intergovernmental conflicts were refocused and surprisingly comprehensive function of peace agreements silently kept on and even new concepts arose.

Peace agreements of renewing communities follow intergovernmental conflicts obviously seen in Cuba, Afghanistan and Iraq. Now, applying intergovernmental force causes international conflict in the structure of internal government. This project requires forging agreements and documents between opposing groups through constitution instruction, which appear as negotiation agreement (Bilis, 1999; 22).

Despite the prevalence of documents regarded as peace agreements and evolving of legal standards viewed as one issue, the so-called peace treaty is comprehensively uncertain (unknown). Documented agreements between members of a conflict and a heinous and violent civil war are entitled so that the ceasefire is attached to legal and political instructions (Solhchi and Najandimanesh, 1999; 11). A decade and half after the Cold War, some measures were adopted relating to increasingly studying of peace treaties, in particular in social sciences and settlement. Furthermore, this literature also briefly noticed the role of peace treaty as a mandatory and necessarily communicated document. Social sciences scholars and settlement analysts investigate what causes peace treaties succeed or fail. They do try to distinguish different elements of agreements.

2. Different Patterns of Peace Agreements

As long as peace areas are introduced and evaluated, a large variety of documents are created as peace agreements. This issue is advantageously classified into three main types that offer tendency to different phases of disputes, i.e. pre-negotiation peace agreements, framework agreements (content agreements) and executive agreements/re-negotiation agreements, which are separately studied as follows.
2.1 Pre-Negotiation Peace Agreements

The best way to end the war is to conclude a peace treaty. Peace traditional establishment, which is still reputed, like an armistice relies upon a legal action with a bilateral or multilateral contract nature. By concluding a peace treaty, the hostiles officially announce the ended war and hostility such that peaceful relations are possible (Bilis, 1999; 42).

Peace treaty usually concluded following a series of preparatory measures such as ceasefire and armistice; however, hostilities may end without these preparatory and despite the war ended (Ziaei bigdeli, 2001; 272).

International disputes shall be resolved based on the equal sovereignty of states and in accordance with the principle of free choice of peaceful approaches such that international security and peace as well as justice are not endangered. According to this principle, states shall settle their disputes through peaceful approaches resorting to negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, judicial proceeding, institutions and regional arrangements or other peaceful means. Moreover, article 33 of the UN charter focuses that disputing parties, in case any mentioned peaceful settlement approaches failed, obliged to resort to other agreed peaceful measures for settlement (Sabbaghiyan, 1997; 20).

Pre-negotiation peace step is often called “negotiation around negotiation” and is about how individuals agree to negotiation according to the accepted agenda. For parties debating for a long time, any movement toward a negotiation table is a flow warning indicating that whether they see themselves more behind the table or in the battle field (Kliyar, 1992; 14). In this type of face-to-face and or adjacent negotiations that may not occur for all, the parties must be ensured that the negotiations are not politically and militarily utilizing the other party. Pre-negotiation step tends to concentrate on the individual intending negotiation that is qualified for dialogue. Most agreements in such conditions refer to ceasefire authentication, leading to negotiations of multilateral agreements. These negotiations basically do not include all involved groups; rather, include bilateral agreements between some parties and are hidden up to the recent date (Ziaei bigdeli, 2001; 270).

Pre-negotiations may also be obtained by regional legislation in order to create and enhance an effort notion in the negotiations. For instance, Harare Declaration by the African Union published in 1989 formulated the provisions for multilateral negotiations in South Africa; it influenced negotiation parameters and pictured main lines and approaches of secret negotiations by Nelson Mandela and President Clark.

In 1999, two member+6 groups (four border countries, Russian Federation and US) in Afghanistan were looking for offering a negotiation concept by Taskn statement. Successful pre-negotiations peaked in some cases of ceasefire. If imposed agreements never published, it induced the concept of statuary declarations and political treaties rather than presenting mandatory legal agreements (Saghafi Ameri, 1997; 55).

Pre-negotiation are documented such that any party and member unilaterally, disregarding the other party’s conducting is committed according to its perception scope. The existing documents largely target individuals outside the negotiation such that inside they tend to offer a concept in which the notion out of negotiation might be involved (Aghaei, 2003; 34). Lack of a legal comprehensiveness enables the parties to refrain from promised commitments. Issues such as participation extent and issues, as well as participation requirements are decisive topics of pre-negotiation step introduced in describing documents’ specification in the form of a statement or informal letter.

2.2 Framework Agreements (Content Agreements)

The purpose of basic or framework agreements is to keep on ceasefire. These agreements are designed for the states targeting conflict fundamentals and more permanently stopping hostility. The agreements of this step are more obviously entitled “peace treaty”. Such agreements try to include the groups involving military wars. Individuals out of the trend are considered for this. The Burundi Peace Agreement and Sierra Leon Peace Treaty as well as South Africa’s incidental and provisional constitution are all instances of this type of agreement (Kharazi, 1995; 15).

Basic or framework agreements confirm non-military mechanisms; it results from this issue that general mobilization tends to end military hostilities by connecting them to new basic structures that target government election and human rights organizations. The agreements differ in term of details meaning that presented details of combined improvement and reform measures’ rules. Further, such agreements to disagree on the right of sovereignty, government and nature such that are either fully determined or partially vote; and/or, partially or totally postpone it (Falsafi, 1990; 64).

A framework agreement is associated to formal negotiations and it is necessary to enforce. The members fundamentally compromise regarding dominant influence and use of strength, even if they feel the commitments
obtained from another party are enforced. This necessity and the need of reciprocity are reflected in relation to groups considering the details of agreements and frequent use of lawyers and legal advisors within negotiations (Kharazi, 1995: 20). Peace treaties characterize a legal face structure with introduction, chapters, statute and annexes. Furthermore, they also apply the legal language of parties and signatories’ requests and alternatively consider it as legal documents. In addition, these agreements do not easily fit legal issues such as convention, international agreement or treaties since the disputes are not explicit intergovernmental nor international (Valkil, 2004: 78).

Peace treaties associate to state’s foreign legitimacy and conflict transnational dimensions, and are in connection to US internal constitution. Private (non-government) signatories cause to be considered out of international legal issues of treaties or “international treaty”.

2.3 Executive Agreements/ Re-Negotiation Agreements

Executive agreements are to develop the framework dimensions and to intertwine the details. Executive agreement basically constitutes all groups of a framework agreement. Sometimes executive agreements are not documented; while, sometimes have identifiable legal forms. Indeed, to some extent, the notion of developing agreements that are called “peace agreements” may be dominant at this step such that settlement efforts of peace processes are partially disappeared in a continuous stream of general rules and lead to a level of achievement. Therefore, treaties are meant to specify and regulate local relations involved in disputes (Aghaei, 1996: 41). In cases where peace agreements are difficult or hard to enforce, re-negotiations and new agreements may be agreed, which have unclear affiliations to former peace agreements. Of these agreements is Palestine-Israel agreement that shows a clear ambiguity in defining a negotiable or executive contract or finally a new document. In short, peace processes provide the documents in the process of earlier negotiation and implementation that are evaluated as the characteristic peace agreements. Moreover, these agreements also reveal that many of the framework or real agreements prioritize executing peace treaties. Such agreements, principally and explicitly concentrate on other types of agreements (Kiliyar, 1992; 17).

3. Legal Nature of Peace Agreement

In the content of peace agreements, difficulties of legal classification mean that the agreement between compulsory and non-compulsory alternatives is not true. Governmental and non-governmental claimants, under imposed international law in a way that is applied in the common way, intending to sign legal mandatory agreements may legalize terms of agreements; in this regard, they may refer to international law as commitments’ basis and assign executive affairs in the scope of international claimants (Vakil, 2004: 49). Formal claimants of inter-treaty selection differ from agreements in favor of legal obligations and those with uncertain terms like mandatory international agreements. This is requested for the differently perceiving of various forms of law related to the called for terms in peace treaty context; it is based on breach valid costs and strategic election presented according to how the treaties are formulated (Billis; 45).

Governmental and non-governmental claimants directly signing these agreements try to apply other aspects of legalization (such as explicit language and third party executive) in order to compromise the absence of a clear bill; though, some affairs are still vague. Uncertain ambiguity in forced situations of an agreement may neutralize the obliged and committed parties’ intention (Kiliyar, 1989; 65).

The permanent international court of justice states that the right to join international agreements is a characteristic of state sovereignty. In peace treaties content and concept, accepting gal form may influence non-state claimants in minimally meeting the obligations as the credit may disappear in case of failure; unless the legitimacy achieved by a new situation, which is bound to the peace treaty position. Governmental claimants may expect precisely prevent an authorized legal position at the end of peace; therefore, a typical common condition of “terrorism vs. war” is presented. Transparency throughout the compulsory nature of agreements may be partially along non-governmental claims that so far were not verified by the true nature of the agreement and treaty (Seifi, 1995: 12). Formal treaty assigns cost rather than creating a position. On the other hand, ambiguity of whether the contract is compulsory or not, weakens the promotion for states.

Peace compromise and treaties are accurately formulated to avoid horror wars; of these, non-state armed groups less probably resist against already known agreements. An absolute and definite legal status of peace treaties is also significant for surrender and commitment since it significantly weights in legal courts, such that it is applied as starting point by courts determining the territory (Killiar, 1992: 26). The positivist law category varies as it is the ration of logically and properly decision making regardless of unconventional quality. It is shown by commodity case of request room of Sierra Leon Special Court approving that the individuals responsible for violating international human rights and the Sierra Leon law are to be prosecuted. On the contrary, the statute
must define (explain) innovation, according to the law and legitimacy format such that the parties and claimants are enabled to set legal commitments in accordance with principles and rules. Thus, they are classified in a specific, conventional legal category (Sabaghiyan, 1992; 23).

4. Treaty Nature of Peace Agreement

The main objective of the peace treaty is to decisively and finally end the war and to permanently establish the peace in the relationships between hostile states. In other words, the goal is to restore the pre-war peaceful situation among adversaries. Peace treaty theoretically follows the rules, which is prescribed in the Law of Treaties. These treaties are viewed as law-making treaties as they generally create objective situations imposed on all countries including border reforms or neutralization. On the other side, such treaties like other law-making treaties are approved by authorities with the potential of “treaty-making power” (Seifi, 1995; 17).

Peace agreements and peace treaties try to plan the status of convention through an agreement between government and non-government claims such that as if as easy as intergovernmental agreement. DPA and Seni as well as a Convention of Ireland/Britain, and finally, Belfast contract and Paris compromise treaty (Cambodia) all were formulated as intergovernmental agreements between government claimants still attempting to commit national or moral groups entering in governmental areas of war. These treaties apply cabinet obligations in order to make non-government claims inactive in bilateral activities (Ziaei bigdeli, 2001; 34). Government claimants influenced by the guaranteed non-government claims committed in the treaty and by other claims respecting obligations of non-government claims. To achieve and apply the relation between non-government claims and the convention, some “unique” legal features are written in agreements obliging non-government group to sign (Saghafi Ameri, 1997; 29).

Belfast agreement consists of a multiparty proponent and Britain/Ireland Convention classifying inter-governmental commitments as a convention. Both states, within this agreement, were committed to legal and constitutional obligations requiring under control claimants; it also included Ireland. It is also true for the agreement upon comprehensive political settlement of Cambodia disputes signed in 1991 by all members of the Cambodia Supreme National Council and Cambodia. According to Article 28, “all Cambodia claimants and armed forces by signing the contract by Cambodia and CNC members are obliged to paragraphs and regulations of this treaty” (Mousazade, 1998; 33).

In each case, a convention status is only obtained by direct signing of the convention members and embeds commitments of non-government claimants in new approaches. Whether this strategy compromises legal form deficiencies of the peace treaties, which were directly signed by non-government claimants. Consolidating efforts of convention status show significance of government commitments and increase costs of disagreement for government claimants; moreover, it may also relate to legal judgment. However, absence of any relation between dispute claims and groups of the convention may negate some rules of selecting a transparent legal sample for commitments and requirement. Status of conventions may be obtained by merely ignoring guarantying a non-government factor as a direct section of the convention (Mirzaei, 1994; 74).

Even non-government factor is wrongly obliged in the agreement, valid costs of formal treaty status only directly obtained for governmental groups; even if, they indirectly impose political costs on non-government claims. If government guarantees are not by non-government groups, it may be really difficult to say that whether this attempt is adequate or lacks any effect on non-government claimants (Kiliari, 1992; 19). Moreover, peace agreements suffer from two issues similar to Richard Debker Case regarding convention requirements. First, peace agreements often include partial agreements since are more considered for agreements staging and ordering issues and try to develop peace process. These characteristics enable them for a “delay-initiate” operation, which hardly evaluates that whether the failure of negotiation causes convention negation or not. This difficulty is emphasized in the peace treaty as groups basically study that whether the scores are reformed or compromised due to continuing conflicts of personal interests (Vakil, 2004; 49).

Second, when these considerations are attributed to peace treaties, the relationship is extended and the existing interests are compromised by a government regarding how to apply the sovereignty, power, and exclusiveness, as well as resistance versus non-government violence. These agreements may be particularly vulnerable versus secondary violence and internal election. Limitation of convention status in peace treaties partially describes that why these commitments embrace the characteristics of disagreement peace treaties like referring to obligations of non-government claimants and some third party signatories (Sajadi, 2001; 18).

5. Constitutional Nature of Peace Treaty

Another way of consolidating a typical legal form in a peace treaty is to be in the national legal range as a
constitution. As earlier stated, peace treaties provide a composite structure in the range of cooperation nature. It means considering state foreign status at international level as well state compositional structure. Fundamental revisions are often by governments, which are structured and systematic (orderly). Peace treaty in South Africa, for instance, was a temporary, implicit constitution investigating a temporary agreement designed for election and basic associations seeking for offering a final constitution (Seifi, 1995; 22).

Peace treaties may include a typical constitution, which is merely similar to one of the components. In fixed democratic communities, the constitution is prioritized to national rules and less reviewed. They are basic documents and lay down the power distribution, as well as keeping the criteria, mistakes, and traditions of a state.

Constitutions and peace conventions are negotiations of real precise “social contracts” among elites involving in disputes and are often pressed by the international community to approve notions of the constitution such that democratic conditions and private law ruling is established. As a result, in racial conflicts, these are not only a social contract between individuals and the state; but also, they issue a similar contract between different individual groups.

The constitutional nature of peace treaty has been often obviously temporary rather than regarding evaluation of permanent (consistent) sustainment; they are used for imminent review, development or even transfer. These agreements try to be distinct in frequent referring to international law; further, in the third party executives, they rely upon constitution courts of commitments (directly created by the notion of settlement) and upon pluralist (party coalition) scope of executive mechanisms passing throughout the legal and political scope, like a national and international convention. The lack of proportionality between peace treaties and national law issues offers a transparent, mirror image of disproportionality in the issues of international law (Seifi, 1995; 26). This gives a conventional nature of peace treaties disregarding legal classifications in combination of governmental and non-governmental signatories. It requires simultaneously specifying “outside” and “inside” dimensions of intrastate conflicts and objectives of short- and long-term peace process. Beside, this typical agreement negates distinct features of constitution usages (Mousazade, 1998; 42).

However, in conventional conditions, interpreting of these agreements consistent with the constitution as subject policies are more clearly and deeply approved comparing law interpretation in the authentic expressed discussions. Such disputes are considerably significant in nuclear democratic and social organization societies; and consider the agreements discussing intense, primary conflicts preventing a ceasefire (Aghaei, 1996; 36).

In fact, it is argued that the notion of legitimacy principles requires new theories of judgment. Legal interpretation in conventional contexts provides authentic notions of the law contribution and applies abstract conventional concepts of the stable society and command. Moreover, these notions are deeply expressed in conventional contexts and indeed, in impartial judiciary. Such conditions require activists and flexible interpretation of the constitution and judiciary of interest, enabling to use the legal and political nature of change, implicitly indicate the role of such agreements and specify the duty. In some cases, peace treaties apply this demand through introducing and representing flexible and targeted approaches for a typical interpretation; however, most try to offer such interpretation such that the political aspect of obligations is endangered by describing what political targets seem. Since judging consistent with the constitution is in respect to the new notion, legitimacy of judgment and the judiciary is bound to the target figuring out agreement details. The nature of “beginning- termination” of peace treaties also means that the judicial role of these typical agreements shall basically be studied by the capacity of major claimants working out of the constitution. Political violence and persistent difference of opinions with state legitimacy study and evaluate previous hypotheses of these typical agreements in which the commitments shall be consistent with the constitution (Ziaei bigdeli, 2001; 46).

The question raises here to what extent constitution -consistent arbitration is effective facing such differences of opinions or indeed, to what extent may control the large reactions. It seems that the judgment role remains the same and sometimes may be effective in a certain sense; however, in many cases, it is only at the margins and totally removed. Formulating peace treaties in the form of the constitution may be not useful within the demand and acceptance. Constitution -consistent situation raises the question on the relation between peace treaty rules and last constitution commands. Peace treaty rules replace the rules of review and replacement in a scope beyond basic measures; for instance, in some cases (like South Africa), lack of state legitimacy was agreed by all parties. It may not be true in all cases. Absence of continuity of law and interconnection of international conflicts requiring intermediate agreement releases the peace treaty and in the new government as a legal separation is accused of illegitimacy (Falsafi, 1990; 52). These are often discussed by the agreement opponents in favor of the former state. The other means of obtaining requirement of compulsory law is to avoid parties’ disputes in a
framework written by UN Council Resolution under the document.

6. Agreement Nature of Peace Convention

Nations, in ancient times, tried to resolve the disputes by means of war, which was allowed in international law for long times. Some scholars view war a natural phenomenon in the international arena. The use of force was rejected over time due to large damages caused by war; the countries tried to peacefully resolve the disputes. Many efforts were conducted on resorting peaceful settling international disputes; however, initial serious and comprehensive efforts are found in The Hague and later conferences (Seifi, 1995; 25).

A conference was held on June 29, 1899 suggested by Nikolai II, the Russian Tsar, to end increasing development of weapons and to establish sustained public peace. Nations welcomed to this convention and agreed upon mediating of third states in case of any disputes before restoring to war; founding an international inquiry commission was of the convention approvals. However, any efforts made for compulsory arbitration failed. The Hague peace 1907 conference was established to remove deficiencies in the Hague Convention 1899. The third convention of Hague was unsuccessful due to World War I preparations. In general, the Hague peace conventions were initial agreement of the League of Nations for law formulation and peaceful settlement (Aghaei, 1996; 27).

“United Nations Charter” is of the ever agreed documents of the civilization history and almost around the world. The main objective of this charter is to maintain international peace and security as well as international cooperation referred in article 1. According to Article 2, Paragraph 3, all members settle their international disputes by peaceful means such that international peace and security as well as justice are not endangered. Article 2, paragraph 4, prohibits the use of force and chapter six studies peacefully settlement of international disputes. Article 33 states that “the parties may settle any disputes continuing of which may endanger international peace and security through negotiation, mediation, compromise, arbitration and judicial proceeding, as well as referring to institutions and or regional arrangements and or other optional peaceful means (Saghafi ameri, 1997; 32).

UN Charter emphasizes on peace maintenance and peacefully settling the disputes and the use of force is prohibited. The United Nations General Assembly emphasized it by issuing resolutions.

According to classic theory, armistice and peace convention both create a totality; therefore, the Hague treaties, ignoring peace convention, merely mentioned armistice. Today, the realm of truce spread over the previously territory of peace convention; perhaps, this may more postpone peace treaties such that it may last over years or even never contracted (Mousazade, 1998; 41).

The Security Council Resolution is used for imposing a legal obligation in peace treaty commissions and creates some supervisory mechanisms obtaining agreements’ independence. Undoubtedly, the issue of Security Council may determine such framework for permanent ruling and negotiation even in case of disagreement (Beygzade, 2010; 55).

“Peace process” is rooted in the persuasion of UN Security Council Resolution and is mediated as a way of separation by the first international law. This way of separation specifies post-conflict processing and reform that lead to international use of force by NATO in Kesowa and the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq and turmoil in East Timor. Internal processes established in international community basically come from a primary framework for international supervision, which is founded by Security Council resolution. These are followed by legal proceedings to apply mediating an agreement among competitors (Mirzaei, 1994; 62).

The processes in Kesowa, Afghanistan, and East Timor can be summarized into four stages: adoption of Security Council Resolution, which offers power of attorney and commitment to internationally establish internal executive; founding a particular interim local government wherever proper, which is multiracial where gradually receive developing powers (from consultation to direct, limited maneuver of power), trying to promote cooperation among competing groups, paving the election roads as well as substituting temporary ruling organizations by fixed and permanent structures (the two latters usually occur in reverse direction) (Kharazi, 1995; 74).

The peace treaty implication is discussed in a concept lacking any basic agreement in order to focus on the execution of peace treaty as much as its deviation; all peace process samples are reflected that initially apply international commitments and apparently make a classification of local legitimacy and political principles possible as a permanent fixed carrier of separation of continuing conflicts in the last stage (Seifi, 1995; 16).

In summary, peace treaties are formulated trying to apply a legal form and it seems that they prove a legally determined target. Further, these targets were neutralized by constraints of domestic legal classifications up to
the present; and now, the problems of agreement proportionality between governmental and non-governmental claimants are guided in these issues. The level of acceptance and demand obtained by the requirement utilized as legal treaty or convention in a clear theory, analyzed by the absent relation between law claimants and agreement formal claimants; further, the particular nature of a peace agreement and a peace treaty is presented as a written document (Mousazade, 1998; 67).

7. Conclusion

This trend shows that why peace treaties constitution different composition of common factors; in addition, it also views peace treaty legalization as an effort to bridge the gap of turmoil in the objectives of short-term and long-term peace trends and mechanisms. The common nature of peace treaties goes beyond the form of signatories and even beyond discussion; further, it focuses on different relations of how a commitment is fulfilled in various processes. The objective of early phases of peace agreements is to implement the command as an agreed pseudo treaty; however, the potential of peace agreements enable them to function as settlement rules. For instance, Sarila Ranlikai amendments substantially overwheird of international treaty are still used following genocide in order to offer and legalize ruling main framework.

Peace agreements are provided at the best form according to temporary current law as dynamic and fundamental principles and enhance receptivity. This demonstrates that tendency to accept legal treaties occurred in the development potential among the pretenders interpreting and internalizing a rule over time such that the interests are rebuilt. This explanation, in the content of the peace treaty, embraces a truth and explains beyond how the joint dynamic of form and template and legal commitments and third party contribute in requirement encouraging. These requirements are offered about the theory of acceptance for two issues. Firstly, peace agreements rely upon the performances like results such that what places acceptance and requirement next to the issue, even in implementation, is under negotiation. This provides the need of a foundation to distinguish acceptance tending, temporary legal proceedings for claimants and acceptance of simple negotiations. Secondly, the concept of the principles of international law is interwoven to national law under the peace treaty, which is both the subject and object of the negotiations (negotiator and negotiatee). Such difficulties primarily lead to internalization of national legal proceedings.

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