Abstract

Top executives incentives and risk management are important contents of corporate governance research. However, few empirical data studies of risk management take top level manager incentives economic benefit into account, and the executive incentives effectiveness is unclear in most studies, the paper collected empirical data of listed companies in financial industry in 2008-2013, and we found a inverted “U” shaped non-linear curve exists from the relationship between ERM and corporate value, when it exceeds a certain level, ERM will come into being an significantly diminishing marginal effect. Secondly, when the degree of top executives incentives become weak, on the contrary, the risk management behaviors will happen with increasing frequency and improve reflected coefficients between enterprise value and ERM, and it’s contributive to raise enterprise value. However, this influence is weak and not significant for executive equity incentive. The empirical results provide some references for the financial enterprise risk management application and the practice of executive incentive.

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