The Continuity of Learning and Love in a Pragmatic View of Learning Organizations

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Abstract

Many organizational science theorists have drawn upon pragmatism in developing theories of learning organizations. However, these theorists have overlooked two important aspects of the pragmatic view of learning: continuity and the philosophy of love underlying this continuity. The present essay seeks to elaborate on these overlooked aspects in order to advance a pragmatic view of learning organizations. Drawing upon this elaboration, the essay suggests that a pragmatic view of learning organizations is advanced by a community of individuals united by common goods, such as shared values or ideals. Such goods provide individuals with a grounding for a unified view of the self in their pursuit of satisfying an endless desire for self-growth, which eros represents, and for an affective union with others, or philía, which intermediates the growth of eros into agape so as to enable the pragmatic view of continuity in learning.

Keywords: pragmatism, learning, learning organization, philosophy of love, evolution

1. Introduction

The present essay seeks to advance a pragmatic view of learning organizations. A pragmatic approach to learning, in general, and learning organizations, in particular, is not novel. Dewey's (1916, 1929) pragmatic approach to learning continues to attract a large and varied audience (Argyris & Schon, 1978, 1996; Cavaleri, 2008; Garrison, 1997; Prawat, 1999). Pragmatism has also been the prevailing philosophical framework in the theories of learning organizations (Cavaleri, 2008; Jensen & Markussen, 2007) since Argyris and Schon's (1978) path-breaking contribution, Organizational Learning. However, we still believe that learning organization theorists have overlooked some essential aspects of the pragmatic view of learning.

One of the overlooked aspects is continuity, which the originator of American pragmatism, Peirce (1892), advanced as one of the major premises of pragmatism, in learning. Curiously, the notion of continuity is largely neglected in Argyris and Schon's (1978, 1996) widely accepted pragmatic theory of learning organizations. Argyris and Schon's distinction between single- and double-loop learning gained immediate popularity among organizational scholars because the theoretical framework could easily be integrated with modes of radical organizational change (Easterby-Smith & Araujo, 1999), which implies discontinuity. Presuming the superiority, if not effectiveness, of double-loop learning (Argyris, 1996), Argyris and Schon (1978, 1996) conceptualized the transition from single- to double-loop learning as a discontinuous process, resulting in radical change in terms of organizational values, structures and even worldviews (Easterby-Smith & Araujo, 1999). From a different theoretical tradition, the notion of Nystrom and Starbucks (1984) regarding "unlearning" implies that discontinuity is an inevitable and often positive feature of organizational learning in innovative companies. To a lesser extent, the view that the underlying logics of exploitation and exploration are contradictory to each other (March, 1991) also reinforces the view of discontinuity in organizational learning for innovation. Basalla (1988) would note that the positive view of discontinuity and, accordingly, the relative neglect toward continuity in creative action and the evolutionary process is largely rooted in the revolutionary view of socioeconomic change, which is especially dominant in the modern Western intellectual tradition (Toulmin, 1992).

Another overlooked aspect in the literature of learning organizations is the philosophy of love underlying the pragmatic view of continuity in learning at various levels, individuals, interpersonal relations, and communities. Plato (1925) described eros as a type of love that internally drives us to actualize our potential and bring about our inner beauty to the world. The existentialist philosopher, May (1969), tried to recuperate this view of eros,

reflecting the high value that contemporary society places on an individual's need for self-actualization as a driving force of social development (Maslow, 1971). More recently, Garrison (1997) pointed out the significance of eros in Dewey's pragmatic theory of learning, advancing a view of learning motivated by the inner desire of individuals to actualize their potential. Peirce (1992), presupposing this traditional view of eros, advanced agape as an evolutionary love that enables the pragmatic view of continuity in the evolutionary process; accordingly, he referred to the pragmatic theory of evolution, agapasm. Peirce described the interpersonal relationship, which realizes the pragmatic view of continuity in evolution, in terms of the interplay between agape and eros. Moreover, Aquinas sought to establish that eros could grow into agape via the mediation of an affective union among individuals, or philía (Gallagher, 1999).

Elaborating upon the above interrelated aspects that have been overlooked by learning organization theorists, this essay seeks to contribute to the advancement of the pragmatic view of learning organizations in the organizational literature. The elaboration leads us to conclude that a pragmatic view of learning organizations is advanced by a community of individuals united by common goods, such as shared values or ideals. Such goods provide individuals with a grounding for a unified view of the self in their pursuit of satisfying an endless desire for self-growth, which eros represents, and for an affective union with others, or philía, which intermediates the growth of eros into agape so as to enable the pragmatic view of continuity in learning.

2. Eros in the Pragmatic View of Learning

2.1 The Significance of Eros in the Pragmatic View of Learning

In his book, Dewey and Eros, Garrison (1997, p. 20) argued that we cannot fully comprehend Dewey's pragmatic view of learning without appreciating his hidden philosophy of love. Garrison (Garrison, 1997, p. 1) noted the following:

"Love begins in need and lack. Everyone passionately desires to possess what is good, or at least what they perceive as good, and to live a life of ever-expanding meaning and value. Deweyan philosopher Thomas M. Alexander (1993) calls this "human eros" ".

The major premise of pragmatic learning involves an object of passionate desire that an inquirer seeks to acquire; pragmatic learning aims to satisfy the desire by deliberating a means-ends relationship to acquire the object (Garrison, 1997, pp. xviii-xix). According to Garrison, eros is the most basic type of human love that represents such a desire of an inquirer; thus, eros is central to the major premise of pragmatic learning.

Plato (1925) articulated the nature of eros in Symposium. Demos (1934) suggested that Plato's eros manifests itself as the desire to achieve a final cause (i.e., the end or object). Hausman (1974, p. 15) similarly noted, "To be lured by a final aim is to express eros"; pragmatic learning seeks to realize the aim. In this vein, Rosen (1987, p. 235) argued that the philosophical nature of Plato's eros is "manifestly practical rather than theoretical." Garrison (1997, p. 16) endorsed Rosen's (1987) view in arguing for the significance of eros in Dewey's pragmatic view of learning.

Philosophy as the love of knowledge raises two fundamental questions as to the nature of knowledge that we love, and why we love knowledge. Toulmin (1992) pointed out that the quest for certainty among modern intellectuals is established upon the theological assumption that the world was created with its own rational order by a single rational being, God. An architect of modern epistemology, Descartes "justified his search for natural 'laws' on grounds that such laws must exist because God is perfect and therefore acts in a manner as constant and immutable as possible" (Stark, 2003, p. 115). Accordingly, modern philosophy advances a view of knowing as the acquisition of timeless and universal knowledge regarding the rational order of the world, which exists and operates independently of the inquirer, resulting in "a spectator theory of knowledge" (Dewey, 1929). Within this modern philosophical perspective, eros represents the love of knowledge regarding the rational order of the world created by a single rational being, irrespective of an inquirer's subjective interests or purposes. This interpretation is quite different from Garrison's (1997) interpretation of eros and its relevance to Dewey's pragmatic learning. Garrison's interpretation follows the Greco-Roman philosophical tradition, which emphasizes philosophy as "a way of life" (Flynn, 2005).

According to Foucault's (1988) historical analysis, there are two large branches in Western philosophy: one that emphasizes the Delphic principle of "know thyself," and another that emphasizes the Socratic notion of "care of the self." Previously noted modern philosophy has inherited the former tradition. It has evolved into the presently dominant academic philosophy of theoretical disciplines in the natural and social sciences that stress dispassionate objective knowledge and absolute truth (Flynn, 2005). However, as Vernon (2008, p. 101) argued, this philosophical tradition has failed to offer "a vision of life because it has become too intellectual–too

intellectually brilliant, you might say–that brilliance casting the need for practical intelligence in the shade." Foucault (1988) shared a similar view and proposed revisiting the Greco-Roman philosophical tradition, which emphasized "care of the self" as a means of examining the problem of human existence in the modern world (Flynn, 2005).

Foucault (1988) considered Plato's Alcibiades as the most important philosophical elaboration of the Greco-Roman tradition. He believed that there are three major themes in Alcibiades that interrelate with one another to underscore the Greco-Roman tradition: (1) one desires wisdom in order to take care of the self; (2) "care of the self is care of the activity" (Foucault, 1988, p. 25) by which one defines himself; and (3) therefore, one desires wisdom in order to take care of the activity. Thus, Foucault concluded that maintaining the balance of a trilogy comprising activity (practice), knowing, and care of the self represents the main objective of the Greco-Roman tradition (Flynn, 2005, p. 612). Notably, the Greco-Roman tradition held that the love of knowledge arises from our practical need to take care of activities by which we define ourselves.

2.2 Eros in the Greco-Roman Philosophical Tradition

Heidegger (1962) emphasized the importance of context in interpreting the meaning of an object and a fact, as well as cultural artifacts, such as ideas. Accordingly, the meaning of Plato's (1925) eros should be interpreted in its original context in order to appreciate it as an integral component of Greco-Roman philosophical tradition, and subsequently, the insight of Garrison (1997). Plato (Plato, 1925, p. 555) established the model of eros through the myth involving the birth of Eros (Love) as the son of Poros (the immortal God, Resource) and Penia (the mortal human being, Need) as follows:

"On the day of Aphrodite's birth the gods were making merry, and among them was Resource, the son of Craft. And when they had supped, Need came begging at the door because there was good cheer inside. Now, it happened that Resource, having drunk deeply of the heavenly nectar-for this was before the days of wine-wandered out into the garden of Zeus and sank into a heavy sleep, and Need, thinking that to get a child by Resource would mitigate her penury, lay down beside him and in time was brought to the bed of Love. So Love became the follower and servant of Aphrodite because he was begotten on the same day that she was born, and further, he was born to love the beautiful since Aphrodite is beautiful herself."

The characteristics of Eros are derived from the opposite characteristics of Eros' parents: fullness versus emptiness, being versus not being, wisdom versus ignorance, and immortality versus mortality (Demos, 1934). For instance, the passionate desire that characterizes Eros is derived from Eros' need to fill emptiness in order to become like his divine father.

Poros, as a deity, has his own unique essence, determined by his specialized role in the cosmic division of labor in maintaining the universe. In contrast to his divine father, Eros is lacking the essence and is in need of filling this emptiness. However, Eros inherited potential by virtue of the resourcefulness of Poros, which he has to actualize through engagement in activities of his own will. By virtue of indeterminacy inherited from Penia, Eros is endowed with free will in choosing the activities by which Eros then creates his essence. Further, as a follower and companion of Aphrodite, Eros persistently strives to achieve perfection in self-creating activities in order to bring about higher forms of beauty and goodness to the world. Poros is also a guardian of specialized knowledge pertaining to his role in the universe. Eros, recognizing his ignorance, loves knowledge. However, his recognition of ignorance and love of knowledge are not independent of his need to create his essence. They arise in the context of taking care of the activities involving Eros' own will, by which he creates his unique essence and raison d'être.

Plato introduced the myth of Eros as a metaphor for explicating the view of basic human love that brings life to the Greco-Roman trilogy. Plato's eros casts light on the human desire to actualize innate potentials through engagement in activities of one's own will and to acquire or create knowledge to accomplish the activities by which one defines himself/herself. Thus, eros sets in motion the Greco-Roman trilogy comprising activity (practice), knowing, and care of the self. In this vein, May (1969, p. 79) noted that "[Plato's narrative of Eros] is a symbolic way of communicating a basic truth about human existence." The basic truth of human experience, according to Sartre (1957, p. 15), is that "man is nothing else but what he makes of himself." In response to Sartre, Foucault (1983, p. 273) noted, "From the idea [of Sartre] that the self is not given to us, I think that there is only one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of art." Human beings at birth do not have a ready-made essence; rather, they only have potential. As we live in this world into which we are born, we are responsible for actualizing our potentials toward the end of creating our own unique essence through engagement in a life project of our own will (Sartre, 1957). Further, we are responsible for developing our consciousness about the self and the world while engaged in this project. Within this existentialist view that

follows the Greco-Roman tradition, Plato's eros represents the human desire to actualize one's potential through engagement in a life project as an act of authentic self-creation. As Garrison (1997) pointed out, eros also represents the desire to acquire and create knowledge, or simply to learn in order to accomplish a sequential development of actions that arises during the self-creating life project.

2.3 Eros's Endless Desire for Growth of the Self and the Growing Aims

The self, portrayed in a symbolic way by eros, is always becoming for its developmental characteristic. As Nygren (1989, p. 94) observed, "Eros is an upward movement." Indeed, eros is a driving force internal to human beings, continually pushing us to achieve self-growth at a higher level of perfection. Along these lines, May (1969, pp. 78-79) remarked: "In contrast to our contemporary doctrines of adjustment or homeostasis or release of tension, there is in eros an eternal reaching out, a stretching of a self, a continuously replenished urge which impels the individual to dedicate himself to seek forever higher forms of truth, beauty, and goodness. The Greeks believed that this continuous regeneration of the self is inherent in eros."

Within the Greco-Roman tradition, the view expressing the developmental characteristic of the self can be found in *Nicomachean Ethics*, in which Aristotle (1962) advanced self-growth at the highest level of perfection possible as the heart of a flourishing life (Gilbert, 1992; Nussbaum, 1992). Aristotle stated, "Life is an activity, and each man actively exercises his favorite faculties upon the objects he loves most" (Aristotle, 1962, p. 12). Rawls (1971) interpreted this statement as the essence of the Aristotelian Principle, which stipulates that human beings have a never-ending desire to attain the highest level of perfection in the activity of their own will; the highest form of pleasure in life is derived from progressive self-growth through the persistent pursuit of perfection. Accordingly, the modern developmental psychologist, Maslow (1971), put forth this endless desire as a main characteristic of the being-need or the need for self-actualization.

In Maslow's (1971) view, satisfaction of the being-need is transitory. In other words, the being-need has no permanent equilibrium, and continually pushes the self toward a higher level of perfection. The ancient Greco-Roman tradition symbolized this endless desire for progressive self-growth in terms of the mythological portrayal of Eros as a demigod who strives to perfect his half-divine attribute and overcome his half-human imperfection (May, 1969). Dewey (1916) articulated this endless desire in terms of "growing aims" and advanced it as the cause of continuity in pragmatic learning.

The notion of growing aims denotes the emergence of novel purposes from within an individual's ongoing engagement in self-determined activity aimed at realization of the good an individual admires. Dewey's (1916) main argument was that novel purposes continually and progressively emerge in the context of an individual's continuous engagement in an activity as a result of an individual's endless desire to realize the good at a higher level of perfection. Dewey (1916, p. 121) suggested that the definition of a new purpose "must be an outgrowth of existing conditions." Dewey (1916, p. 124) also noted that "an end which grows up…is always both end and means, the distinction being only one of convenience." This is because every end serves as a means for pushing the activity to a higher level of perfection as soon as it is achieved. The end of the momentary past, once realized, becomes a means for the present time toward the establishment of a more complex and challenging end projected into the nearest future. Every end, once realized, enables one to pursue a more complex and challenging objective to realize the good that an individual desires in its finest form possible; an individual achieves progressive self-growth through ongoing engagement in an activity.

Dilthey (1962) observed that we attain a unified view of the authentic self as we continually confirm our actions to goods, such as values or ideals that we admire; every action we take is interpreted in terms of its contribution to realization of the goods to yield a unified view of the authentic self. Accordingly, unity in the sequential development of actions in self-determined activity suggested by the notion of growing aims is established by this conformity of actions to the good. Eros represents our endless desire for self-growth at a higher level of perfection. In light of Dilthey's observation, thus, the desire manifested in growing aims is directed toward realization of the good in its finest form possible that we can attain through an activity, by which, in turn, we define ourselves. This aspect of growing aims affirms the Platonian view of Eros' desire to confer beauty to the world: the good in its finest form is beautiful.

To summarize our discussion thus far, Plato's (1925) view of eros represents the endless desire of human beings to achieve self-growth at the highest level of perfection possible. Aristotle (1962) posited that satisfaction of this desire through the pursuit of perfection in self-determined activity is the essence of a flourishing life. Dewey's (1916) notion of growing aims puts forth this endless desire as the cause of continuity in the pragmatic view of learning, which aims at realization of the good an individual admires. Motivated by such a desire, individuals continually pursue more complex and challenging ends in their self-determined activities to realize the good in

its finest form possible that they can attain; individuals achieve progressive self-growth through this persistent pursuit. As Garrison (1997) suggested, individuals then continue to learn in order to make this progression possible: they actively construct efficient causation (i.e., a means to end relation) to realize aims that grow over time.

3. Evolutionary Continuity in Learning and Agape

3.1 Generalization of Growing Aims in Evolving Social Systems

Dewey (1916) introduced the notion of growing aims to explain the view of continuity in an individual's pragmatic learning process aimed at realization of the good that an individual desires in its finest form. Peirce (1892) presented the same idea regarding the continuous and progressive growth of purposes in terms of "developmental teleology" and generalized it to advance the pragmatic view of evolving social systems. Following Peirce, hence, we may generalize the notion of growing aims to describe the developmental characteristics of a group of individuals who are motivated to achieve growth through the pursuit of novel ends within that group, thus driving the evolution of the system that embraces the group. Such a community of practice (Brown & Duguid, 1991) or inquiry (Lipman, 2003) can realize the continuity of the pragmatic learning process to a level that a single individual cannot attain alone, leading to the progressive evolution of social systems.

In the pragmatic view of an evolving social system, novel purposes continually and progressively emerge as individual members seek to exploit the recently realized ends advanced by others (as well as by themselves) within that system for pursuing novel ends. Further, as individuals acquire or create new knowledge to achieve such novel ends, the evolving system continues to accumulate knowledge, thereby expanding the basis for further development by others in the future. Therefore, learning and the accumulation of knowledge in this evolving system are continuous, at least theoretically, and are motivated by the intrinsic desire of individual members to achieve growth through creative actions, and by the need for the sustained development of a system.

Notably, the generalized view of growing aims suggests that exploitation and exploration are continuous and even interdependent on one another. In terms of a means and end relationship, exploitation and exploration are continuous processes to the extent that exploration builds on the exploitation of previous achievements as a means to pursue and achieve novel ends. Hence, exploration is not independent of exploitation; rather, exploration is dependent on and enabled by exploitation.

In the pragmatic view of evolving social systems, a novel purpose emerges as creative individuals explore possibilities for achieving novel ends by exploiting the past achievements of others (or their own). Crossan, Henry, and White (1999) refer to such a recognition of possibilities as entrepreneurial intuition, which initiates creative learning processes within learning organizations. Accordingly, a hermeneutic view of creativity advanced by Gadamer (1977) suggests that the actualization of possibilities into concrete reality is the essence of creative action. In this vein, Whitehead (1933, p. 179) also noted that creative action diversifies experience of the familiar, including ideas in terms of their instrumentality for achieving novel ends: creative action realizes the instrumental value of the familiar in a variety of usage contexts. Exploration in this regard results in actualizing the instrumental value of achievement in the past and makes possible the exploitation of this achievement for attaining a variety of novel ends. Thus, exploitation is dependent on and enabled by exploration. For instance, today's wide exploitation of Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) technology, developed in the early 20th century for military purposes by Samson and Delilah's heroine, Hedy Lamarr, resulted from the exploration of a group of creative minds, leading to the use of the technology for wireless mobile communications (Mock, 2005). Without their exploration, Lamarr's creative achievement might have been lost without realizing its full potential. By realizing the instrumental value of CDMA technology for achieving this novel end, this exploration enabled not only exploitation, but also further development of the technology: the exploration enabled refinement of CDMA technology to realize its full potential in wireless mobile communications.

3.2 Agape as a Relational Basis for the Continuity of Learning

The generalization of principles at a higher level with increasing complexity requires the specification of a contingent factor that makes such generalization plausible (Rousseau, 1985); generalizing the notion of growing aims requires us to identify a factor that makes the pragmatic view of continuity in learning (which is suggested by such a notion) possible at a level higher than individuals. Advancing the notion of ba, or existential place, as the foundation of a knowledge creating company, Nonaka and Konno (1998) advanced love as the relational basis of ba, which motivates and supports individuals' commitment to the continuous and cumulative knowledge creation process in a company. In parallel, Peirce (1992) advanced agape as a driving force of the pragmatic view of evolution, and accordingly, refers to his pragmatic theory of evolution as agapasm. An explication of

agapasm, which, according to Hausman (1993), epitomizes Peirce's intellectual career as an evolutionary philosopher, is beyond the scope of this essay; we will limit our discussion to the ways that agape can enable us to generalize growing aims to advance the pragmatic view of continuity in learning or evolution in social systems.

The currently dominant view that human beings are selfish by nature (Dawkins, 1976) has resulted in the tendency to stress the relationships of conflicting interests and opportunism, among others, as our primary daily experiences at work (Ghoshal, 2005) and beyond. By contrast, existentialist philosopher Mayeroff (1971, p. 1) asserted that caring for and being cared for by others are primary human experiences, emphasizing that "to care for another person is to help him (or her) grow and actualize himself (or herself)" through the pursuit of objectives meaningful to him/her.

Erikson (1950) advanced the above existentialist view of caring for and being cared for by others as essential human experiences that enable individuals to accomplish progressive self-development. Erikson observed that caring is an essential factor that people need to receive from others in order for them to achieve progressive self-development. Erikson further argued that caring for others (i.e., the young and growing children) is also essential for individuals to achieve the highest level of self-development: ego-integrity. Erikson denoted this caring for others by the term "generativity" and put forth that generativity enables cumulative evolutionary progression in humanity.

Wakefield (1998) aptly indicated that the view of generativity Erikson articulated had been fully developed by Plato, although he did not use the term "generativity." Plato (1925) suggested that all individuals are pregnant with potential, both physically and mentally, and that to love others is to help them give birth to their potential. Frankl (1984, p. 116) elaborated this view by noting that to love others is to "see and recognize potentials" in others, "which is not yet actualized but yet ought to be actualized." Such recognition motivates an individual to care for his/her loved ones, to be aware of their potential, and to achieve growth through actualization of their potential. Therefore, to love others is to be generative (Wakefield, 1998). Love entails creation; it brings about the inner beauty of loved ones to the world.

Peirce (1992) considered the Platonian love of others, or generativity, as a main attribute of agape, and advanced it as the driving force in the pragmatic view of evolution. Peirce (1992, pp. 353-354) suggested that the pragmatic evolutionary implication of agape is fully summarized in the teachings of St. John, which stipulate the following: "Sacrifice your perfection to the perfectionment of your neighbors", which is motivated from "the ardent impulse to fulfill another's highest impulse." Thus, the pragmatic view of agape, according to Peirce, manifests itself in a type of love that cares for the growth of others. Motivated by such love, we can sacrifice our achievements for the growth of others. Others then can explore the possibilities for exploiting our achievements to attain novel ends that are meaningful to them, and achieve their growth through exploration. This generative aspect of agape enables the generalization of growing aims to establish the pragmatic view of continuity in learning or evolution at a level higher than individuals. Peirce, in this regard, considers agape as evolutionary love.

Peirce's view of agape as evolutionary love resonates with and substantiates the views of von Krogh (1998). Von Krogh adopts the previously mentioned Mayeroff's (1971) generative view of caring as the relational basis for constructing an indwelling social milieu that is conducive to ongoing engagement of individuals in knowledge creation. Von Krogh argued that a company's capability for knowledge creation depends on the extent to which caring among members of the company is present. When caring is high among members of a company, individuals will bestow their knowledge upon one another to enable further knowledge creation. When caring is low, in contrast, individuals use knowledge as a means to build up and defend their hegemonic power within the company. In this competitive organizational environment, sharing knowledge with others more than necessary implies a reduction of one's power and influence on others. As a result, knowledge sharing among individuals remains at a minimal level on the basis of self-interest in receiving expected returns.

4. Eros, Agape and Philía

4.1 Agape and Eros

Although implicitly stated in Peirce's argument, the view of agape as evolutionary love due to its generativity embraces the idea that eros is an intrinsic motivator for individuals' growth as an integral part of the pragmatic view of evolution; indeed, agape operates as evolutionary love in its essential, and yet, implicit link with eros. The relationship between eros and agape in the context of the pragmatic view of evolution is implied at two different, and yet, interrelated levels: one at an interpersonal level, and another at an intrapersonal level.

At an interpersonal level, agape presupposes the operation of eros as a crucial condition for realizing agape's generative aim. The generativity of agape cannot be realized without the desire of others to achieve their own individual growth that eros represents. In the absence of eros' desire, agape cannot realize its generative potential. Accordingly, the pragmatic view of continuity in learning is enabled by this interplay between agape and eros at an interpersonal level.

A more elusive, and yet, theoretically important relation between eros and agape in advancing agape as evolutionary love is implied at an intrapersonal level. The relationship is implicit in Erikson's (1950) individual development model in which Erikson advances the view of generativity. The model presupposes maturity in self-growth as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for an individual to cultivate generativity. Thus, Erikson regards self-love as more basic and fundamental in the individual developmental process. The love of oneself takes precedence over the love of others. Critically, the individual development model implies that agape grows out of eros at this intrapersonal level; in other words, agape is not separate from, but originates from eros, although such growth does not occur in all cases of individual development processes. In what follows, we will seek to explicate how such growth can occur. This is a crucial question we should address in order to comprehend the ways in which the evolutionary dynamics of agapasm originate and reproduce themselves.

4.2 The Growth of Eros into Agape and Philía

Any intelligible theory of evolution should account for the origins and reproduction of its core evolutionary force in terms of a relationship(s) among the concepts endogenous to the theory. Peirce (1992) noted that the evolutionary mechanism of agapasm is sustained because of the circular movement of love. Although Peirce himself did not provide us with further elaboration on the circular movement, we interpret that agapastic evolution continues as eros transforms into agape. Following Aquinas' view of love, we further argue that such a transformation, as Gallagher (1999) points out, is intermediated by philía, or an affective union with others, sharing the good that we desire for ourselves.

As noted previously, eros represents an endless human desire for growth of the self at a higher level of perfection. Yet, such an endless desire is limited by the facticity of human beings as mortals. Plato's (1925) model of eros suggests that human beings overcome this limitation through physical, spiritual, and philosophical (that of wisdom) procreation of the self, and realize the desire for perfection at a level higher than that which an individual alone can achieve. Thus, as Wakefield (1998) points out, Platonian eros in recognition of its limits, seeks to realize its infinite desire for growth through generativity that Peirce considers to be a major attribute of agape; therefore, agape is an outgrowth of eros. Thomas Aquinas, who considered the love of others as an extension of self-love, suggested that the growth of eros into agape is intermediated by a lover's affective union with others, which arises from his/her perception of a pre-existing ontological unity with them (Gallagher, 1999); thus, eros grows into agape in the mediation of philía, a feeling of affective union with those specific others sharing the same goods, such as values, ideals, beliefs, etc.

Peirce (1892) advanced the view of agape as evolutionary love within his metaphysical position, an objective idealism that considers everything in reality as a manifestation of one absolute mind similar to the Hegelian absolute idealism. The aspects of Peirce's metaphysical position relevant to our present discussion are elegantly illustrated in Leo Tolstoy's novels. In Tolstoy's works, human beings are portrayed as interconnected parts of a whole united by one absolute mind or spirit. Within this worldview, as Tolstoy (2015) depicts in Esarhaddon, King of Assyria, loving others is a natural sequel to the realization of such interconnectedness; to love others is to love ourselves in the view of a relationship among us as interconnected parts of a whole united by the same single spirit. Similarly, as Gallagher (1999) pointed out, Aquinas considers such a perception of pre-existing ontological unity as an intermediating stage through which self-love grows into the love of others.

We cannot say we love another person without desiring that the person should possess every possible good. Aquinas further observed that such love presupposes a lover's "affective union" with the person so that he/she takes the person with him/herself or as alter ipse in the words that Aquinas borrowed from Aristotle (Gallagher, 1999). By virtue of this affective union, a lover considers the good he/she desires for the person as his/her own. Accordingly, it is because of this affective union with others that a lover can desire their growth; a lover desires the growth of others because he/she she considers their growth as his/her own by virtue of the affective union with them.

Aquinas pointed out that our affective unions with others are founded upon our perceptions of pre-existing ontological unity with them (Gallagher, 1999). These perceptions of ontological unity with others begin to grow with the awareness that we share with them the same good, such as values, beliefs, ideals, etc., which provide us with a foundation of unified understanding of the self along its continual developmental path. However, such

awareness per se does not result in perceptions of unity that can grow into affective unions. We perceive unity with some specific others only when we consider the good we share with them as a basis for our positive self-identity, such that we find not only our possession of it, but also its advancement desirable for us. Aquinas, in this vein of thought, suggested that perceptions of unity with others grow out of self-love, the desire for the possession of good for the self (Gallagher, 1999). On these grounds, Aquinas further argued that we can love others as ourselves only in a community wherein individual members are united by the good that we desire for ourselves (Finnis, 2014).

The view presented above implies a circular movement of love. We develop affective unions with those specific others with whom we perceive ontological unity for sharing the good that we find desirable for our positive perception of the self, to love them in a way that is also meaningful to us. We care for the growth of those specific others (i.e., become generative), especially the young and growing ones, for them to realize the good on their own terms. By means of generativity, thus, we advance the good for ourselves to enrich our love of the self: generativity can enhance positive perceptions of our self-identity in connection with those specific others united by the good, an important attribute of what Erikson (1950) regarded as the highest individual developmental stage, ego-integrity. To love others, in this regard, is to love ourselves.

To recall, Plato's classical model of eros suggests that in our recognition of limits involving time and space as a mortal, eros can grow into agape to realize eros' endless desire for growth through others. This, in turn, gives an evolutionary characteristic to humanity as a whole by virtue of agape's generativity, as Erikson pointed out; in this regard, Peirce considered agape as evolutionary love. Moreover, Aquinas argued that the growth of eros into agape is intermediated by philía, or our affective unions with some specific others, which grow out of the perceptions of unity we have with them for sharing the good we love for ourselves.

5. Discussion: Pragmatic View of Learning Organizations

The present essay has explored two interrelated aspects of the pragmatic view of learning: continuity and the philosophy of love underlying the continuity. This exploration leads us to advance a few concluding remarks about the pragmatic view of learning organizations and directions for future research.

Indeed, the desire for self-growth is the greatest motivation for individual learning, and, thus, is an essential ingredient that an organization should foster among its organizational members to transform itself into a learning organization. In this vein, Garrison (1997) aptly points to the significance of eros in the pragmatic view of learning at the individual level. However, the discussion thus far suggests that eros alone cannot account for the pragmatic view of a learning organization with its evolving characteristics.

An organization comes to acquire an evolving character when it can facilitate not only the eros necessary for individual growth, but also the eros' growth into agape within its organizational boundaries by fostering affective unions (i.e., philía) among individual members. When such growth of eros into agape is fostered, an organization can set in motion the pragmatic view of continuity of learning suggested by the notion of growing aims within its organizational boundaries and acquire a progressively evolving characteristic.

Argyris and Schon (1978) suggested that the conformity of individuals' self-controlled action toward a commonly shared value is a necessary condition for constructing a learning organization: individuals engage in practical reasoning in order to accomplish self-controlled actions aimed at realizing the value. Critically, the analysis in the present essay also points out that the commonly shared value also serves as the basis for an affective union that nurtures generativity among individual members to enable the pragmatic view of continuity in learning at the organizational level when individuals consider it desirable for them as the basis for a unified view of the self on its continuous developmental path.

The pragmatic view of learning organizations is advanced by a community of individuals sharing goods, such as common values or ideals that they commonly seek to realize in their finest forms. This aspect sheds light on the ethical dimensions regarding the pragmatic view of learning organizations. Such ethical dimensions concerning the pragmatic view of learning, with its emphasis on community as the basis of ethics, were fully developed by Peirce in his theory of the normative sciences (Fontrodona, 2002), which a majority of pragmatic theorists of learning organizations in organizational science have overlooked so far. This is another important aspect that merits further exploration in future research to further advance the pragmatic view of learning organizations in organizational science. Such an exploration would provide us with a unified philosophical framework upon which various developments in the pragmatic view of learning organizations, including that which the present essay puts forth, can be meaningfully integrated, just as Peirce regards the theory of the normative sciences as a linchpin that gives unity to his pragmatism (Potter, 1967).

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