Non-consociational Federalism and Ethnic Strife in Pakistan

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Received: November 27, 2010    Accepted: February 23, 2011    doi:10.5539/ass.v7n7p225

Abstract
Consociational federalism has been regarded a viable solution for such plural societies where the segments of a society are geographically concentrated. But contrary to conventional wisdom, the consociational arrangements seem irrelevant to the Pakistani case. The absence of consociational features in the Pakistani federation does not contribute in the rise and fall of ethnic conflict. Equally, the evidence shows that it is the centralisation of political power that limits the capacity of Pakistani federation to manage ethnic diversity.

Keywords: Consociational federalism, Ethnic conflict, Centralisation, Pakistan

1. Introduction
Historically, the multiethnic societies have experienced ethnic strife and political violence. Resultantly, these societies remained politically divided and instable. Despite a considerable pessimism about the future of democratic rule in such states, a group of political scientists, since 1960s, have been suggesting a particular form of government to overcome the problem. Lorwin (1971) has branded this approach as a ‘segmented pluralism’; Lehbruch (1975) has labelled it ‘concordant democracy’; and Lijphart (1969) has called it ‘consociational democracy’. This model of democracy suggests a particular form of power sharing for divided societies. Lijphart developed this model of power sharing by examining the smaller European countries – the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, and Austria. Afterwards, the model was extended to the diverse societies of Lebanon, Malaysia, South Africa, Ghana and India.

Lijphart (1977) has argued that consociational democracy is the only possible solution for deeply divided societies to practice democracy. He suggested that the constitutional engineers of developing countries need to adopt the mechanism of consociational democracy to meet the challenges of ethnic conflicts. Subsequently, it was argued that Pakistan “will need to adopt and maintain consociational governance at federal centre” to “practice democracy (McGarry & O’Leary, 2005). Afterwards, Adeney (2009) opined that Pakistani federation’s incapacity to manage ethnic diversity is the consequence of its non-consociational features. Keeping in view this consociational argument, the paper attempts to examine the connection between non-consociational features of Pakistani federation and ethnic mobilization in Pakistan.

2. Consociational Federalism
Lijphart has used the term of consociationalism for a particular power sharing design that he identified while investigating the political stability of deeply divided societies of Western Europe, namely the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, and Austria. (Note 1) Consociationalism has been defined in terms of four characteristics: “(a) A grand coalition of the political leaders of all significant segments of the plural society; (b) The mutual veto or ‘concurrent majority’ rule as an additional protection of minority interests; (c) Proportionality as the principal standard of political representations, civil service appointments, and allocation of public funds; (d) And a high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its own internal affairs” (Lijphart 1977, p. 25). It has been argued that consociationalism and federalism are closely related and a “federation is fully consociational only if all principles of consociational democracy are present” (Lijphart, 1979). Hence to qualify as a consociational
federation, a federal state requires practicing all consociational devices. Conversely, a majoritarian federation lacks consociational arrangements. Switzerland, Malaysia and Austria are the examples of consociational federalism. Adeney (2009) has argued that the “institutions matter” and “federations in ethnically divided societies can either exacerbate or contain conflict”.

3. Historical Background

Pakistan came into being in 1947 as a result of Indian Muslims struggle for a separate homeland. Originally, it was composed of East Bengal, Western Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and some princely states that decided to join it. (Note 2) Soon after its creation, Pakistan suffered from ethnic mobilisation and politics of provincialism. The state adopted various nation-building strategies while coping with the ethnic issues. Under the one-unit scheme, the provinces and states of western wing were merged into the province of West Pakistan. The East Bengal was recognized as the province of East Pakistan. To overcome the differences, both provinces were provided equal representation in the unicameral legislature of Pakistan under the first constitution of 1956. A relatively centralised federal system was adopted under this constitution. It was thought that the one-unit scheme would strengthen the federation but it produced a sense of marginalisation in smaller groups of West Pakistan. Sindhis, Pashtuns, and Balochs resisted against the centralising policies of the state. Equally, in the eastern wing, Bengalis, who were 54% of the Pakistan’s population, remained discontented. They were engaged in violent demonstrations against the assimilative and coercive strategies of the central authorities. Eventually, Bengalis fall apart in 1971 with the help of Indian troops that intervened in East Pakistan. After this separation, the constitution of 1973 was enacted with almost consensus. Since then, the Pakistani federation is composed of four provinces – Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochistan; a federal capital – Islamabad; and Federally Administered Tribal Areas. It has been argued that “the Post-1971 Pakistan has witnessed Bloch insurgencies (1973-77, 2002-to date); Pashtun separatism (1970s); Sindhi regionalism (1980s); and Mohajir’s mobilization along ethnic lines (1990s)” in addition, “a low profile non-violent assertion is also seen in the southern Punjab” (Mushtaq, 2009). Therefore, Excluding Punjabis, all sub-national groups have been involved in ethnic mobilisation.

4. Non-consociational Federalism and Ethnic Strife in Pakistan

It has been argued that “federations may vary at the level of centralization, and in the forms of governance. On the basis of their distinctive features, federations can be branded as centralized or decentralized, and consociational or majoritarian federations” (Mushtaq, 2009). Obviously, the features of Pakistani federation suggest that it is an example of majoritarian or non-consociational federation. The consociational school of thought has connected the prevalence of political violence with the majoritarian features of the Pakistani federation. Adeney (2009) has believed that the non-consociational features of the Pakistani federation have “greatly influenced the identity formation and articulation in Pakistan”. She has asserted that the “tensions between different groups in Pakistan would be lessened” by applying proportionality element of consociationalism. She has substantiated this argument by narrating that “Pashtuns in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa possess a strong sense of identity, but they have not seen this as incompatible with their membership of Pakistan. One reason for this is their co-option in the core institutions of state”. However, she acknowledges that “proportionality, on its own, would not solve all conflicts” because some communities have tiny population. She maintains that Sindhis and Mohajirs are more concerned about the “recognition of language and education rights”. She concludes that the absence of consociational mechanisms has caused much of the conflict. Primarily, this section examines the argument that “the absence of consociational mechanisms has caused much of the conflict in Pakistan” (Adeney, 2009).

4.1 Grand Coalition or Executive Power sharing

First and foremost characteristic of consociational democracy is a grand coalition comprising the political leaders of all significant political parties. It is a device that provides ‘executive power sharing’ to various segments of a society. The grand coalition takes different forms in various cases of consociational democracy. Consequently, the critics have termed the Lijphart’s concept of grand coalition as a ‘catch-all concept’ (Halpern, 1986, p.190). The simplest form of grand coalition is the ‘cabinet of all significant ethnic, linguistic or religious groups in a parliamentary system’. Belgium and Malaysia were examples of parliamentary grand coalition cabinets during their respective consociational regimes. Since, there is a parliamentary form of government in Pakistan; we will observe the relevancy of parliamentary grand coalition with the political settings of Pakistan.

First, despite having a strong sense of distinctiveness, Pashtuns are not a cohesive group. They are internally divided by religious factions, ideology, and political objectives. The Pashtuns of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan have different representative political parties. While, ANP is a popular Pashtun party in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa, PKMAP dominates in the Pashtun belt of Balochistan. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that more Pashtuns polled their votes for mainstream parties in various general elections of Pakistan (1988-2008) than the Pashtun parties for federal and provincial assemblies. (Note 3) This pattern of electoral support suggests that the Pashtun identity does not imply identity with the ANP. In addition, ANP has some important contenders in the Pashtun constituency of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. If ANP is not a sole spokesman of Pashtuns, it would be unrealistic to stress over the inclusion of ANP in every grand coalition at provincial and federal level. Same is the case of PKMAP in Balochistan (Mushtaq, 2010). Therefore, the grand coalition element of consociationalism is not relevant to the representation issues of Pashtuns.

Second, discussing the internal conflicts of various groups of Pakistan, Siddiqi (2010) has observed that “though members of a single ethnic group have a common language, culture, religion or other features, this is not necessarily a sign of unity and commonness of purpose”. This notion is empirically verifiable in the case of Baloch nationalism. Balochs are a tiny minority that constitutes 3.5% of the total population of Pakistan (Census Report, 1998). Despite their small size of population, Balochs have several political parties and groups. In addition, more Balochs polled votes for mainstream parties than the Baloch parties (Mushtaq, 2010). The Baloch groups have different objectives and goals over how to best achieve the goals of Baloch community. Furthermore, various factions have joined coalition governments in Islamabad and Quetta in recent past. In this given situation, it is hardly possible to determine which group should be provided compulsory membership of grand coalition at federal and provincial level to ensure Baloch representation.

Third, Sindhis are the second largest ethno-linguistic group of Pakistan that constitutes 14.6% population of Pakistan (Census Report, 1998). Despite the common language and culture, Sindhis are a diverse society. Many settlers, particularly Balochs, have been assimilated in the Sindhi culture. It has been argued that Sindhis are internally divided, a division which is caused primarily by political differences (Siddiqi, 2010). A large majority of Sindhis have supported the ideology and vision of PPP, one of the mainstream parties of Pakistan that believe in a federal Pakistan. Still, various factions of PML have considerable electoral support in Sindhi-speaking regions (Mushtaq, 2010). The hardliners, like Jeay Sindh and Awami Tahreek, have very limited support. Although, Sindhis are members of a single ethnic group, they have different political objectives and goals over how best to achieve the goals of the Sindhi community. For example, difference of opinion can be seen between Jeay Sindh and Awami Tahreek. (Note 5) In fact, the Jeay Sindh has also now splintered into more than half a dozen different factions (Siddiqi, 2010). Nevertheless, Sindhis have been remained overrepresented in high echelon of the state. PPP has remained the vehicle of this inclusion of Sindhis at the federal centre. As Sindhis are majority in the province of Sindh, they do not require any grand coalition to share power at provincial level. Therefore, grand coalition element of consociationalism has no relevancy with the case of Sindhis.

Fourth, Mohajirs are also not a monolithic group. Siddiqi (2010) has elaborated the inter-ethnic competition and ethnic conflict in mohajir community in detail. He has recognized three smaller parties of Mohajirs that are competing with the dominant Mohajir party, MQM. These parties include Mohajir Qaumi Movement (Haqiqi) or Mohajir National Movement, Mohajir Ittehad Tehreek (MIT) or Mohajir Unity Movement, and Mohajir Rabita Council (MRC) or Mohajir Linkage Council. This account seems to suggest that Mohajir identity does not, necessarily, imply identity with the Muttahida Quami Movement. Siddiqi (2010) asserts that “many Mohajirs do not identify with the politics of MQM and Altaf Hussain and chose to remain neutral. Some of them are still drawn towards the politics of Haqiqi and MIT which implies the fact that MQM might be the most dominant of Mohajir parties but it does not command the support and allegiance of all Mohajirs”. This description challenges the argument that MQM should be provided space in grand coalition at provincial and national level as a representative of Mohajirs.

4.2 Proportionality
Proportionality is another key institutional feature of the consociational democracy. It involves allocation of representation in political institutions and the distribution of resources and jobs. The rationale behind proportional representation is to ensure the ‘just representation’ and ‘inclusion’ of all segments of society in the power structure of state. Electoral system of proportional representation (PR), as Lijphart suggests, facilitates the parliamentary proportionality in divided or plural societies. PR is an attractive choice in plural societies, according to Lijphart (2004), because “in addition to producing proportionality and minority representation, it treats all groups – ethnic, racial, religious, or even non-communal groups – in a completely equal and even-handed fashion”. Belgium and Switzerland use proportional electoral system to ensure proportional representation.
For the case of Pakistan, Adeney (2009) has observed that Pashtuns have overrepresented in military and due to this overrepresentation; they have not "pursued a secessionist agenda despite their strong sense of identity". Though, the available data on military confirms the relative overrepresentation of Pashtuns in armed forces, the representation of military is unevenly distributed among various regions of Pashtuns. It has been observed that almost “75% of all military ex-servicemen come from only three districts of the Punjab (Rawalpindi, Jehlum, and Attock (Cambellpur), and two adjacent districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Kohat and Mardan) (Cohen, 1987, p.318)”. This evidence suggests that Pashtuns of various regions have been unevenly represented in armed forces. While, Pashtuns constitute absolute majority in eighteen districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the overrepresentation of only two districts of NWFP in armed forces can’t be justified as a single explanatory factor for the fall down of Pashtunistan movement.

Adeney (2009) has admitted that proportionality is least concerned with Balochs because they are a very small section of the population. The reserved quota of federal jobs for Balochistan is 3.5%. The quota system worked well for Balochistan as its representation in federal bureaucracy rose from 2.5% in 1973 to 3.1% in 1983. But, it is noteworthy that it is the representation of Balochistan and not the Balochs. Pashtuns of Balochistan dominates in the bureaucracy of Balochistan. Still, proportionality seems misfit for up lift the Baloch representation in bureaucracy. However, the distribution of Balochistan quota between Pashtun belt and Baloch countryside could work. (Note 6)

Sindhis have under-representation in civil military bureaucracy. However, they have benefited from the rural-urban (60-40%) quota system introduced by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in Sindh. Their ratio in federal bureaucracy had risen from 3.01% in 1973 to 5.4% in 1983 against their specified quota of 11.4%. (Note 7) This trend shows that they are gradually acquiring their share in civil bureaucracy. It is pertinent to mention that Sindh is the only province of Pakistan that divides its quota of federal jobs between rural Sindh and urban Sindh. It has been discussed that Mohajirs are the largest group in urban centres of Sindh; and Sindhis are the overwhelming majority in rural Sindh. Therefore, the quota of federal jobs for rural Sindh, 11.4%, is in effect quota for the Sindhis. For this reason, Mohajirs have been advocating for the removal of this quota system. Furthermore, it has been reported that Pakistan army has decided to encourage Baloch and Sindhi youth to join the armed forces. (Note 8) Hence, it is hoped that the current arrangements to strengthen the Sindhis’ representation in civil military bureaucracy will work and the disparity would be lessened with the passage of time.

The introduction of rural-urban quota system in Sindh has undermined their earlier position of Mohajirs. However, they are still overrepresented in civil bureaucracy. They have reasonable representation in military as well. They have benefited from the high echelon of politics. For example, Musharraf (1999-2008) was himself a mohajir and was criticized for his ties with MQM. It is pertinent to note that Karachi, that witnessed the most terrible period in 1990s, have been remained remarkably quiescent in Musharraf period. Therefore, representation is not vital issue for mohajir case. Consequently, proportionality element of consociationalism has no relevancy with the case of Mohajirs.

### 4.3 Segmental Autonomy

Another primary characteristic of consociational governance is the segmental or group autonomy. The group autonomy refers to the “group’s authority to run its own internal affairs, especially in the areas of education and culture” (Lijphart, 2002, p. 39). Segmental or group autonomy can take two forms: territorial and non-territorial form (Lijphart, 1977, p. 43). According to Lijphart (2004, pp.104-105), federalism is the best way to provide territorial autonomy if the various groups are geographically concentrated and the groups’ boundaries coincide with the boundaries of constituent units. However, if the ethnic groups are dispersed and geographically intermixed, autonomy must assume a non-territorial form’. Assaf (2004, p.14) has pointed out the “vagueness” of the concept of segmental autonomy. He observed that Lijphart has not ‘made a clear distinction between issues that are of common interest and issues that lie in the community domain’. He maintained that there is “imprecision” about the locus of decision making. That is, it is not clear in Lijphart’s concept of segmental or cultural autonomy “where decision-making lies, or should lie, at the group level or at the elite cartel level concerning some domestic issues, as well as regional and international matters”. We have discussed the autonomy demands of various ethno-linguistic groups of Pakistan in the following paragraphs. This section will analyze the relevancy of segmental autonomy with the case of Pakistan.

First, the Pashtuns have been remained least concerned about the recognition of their language and culture than Sindhis and Mohajirs. Coalition government of NAP-JUI in NWFP, in 1972, did not propose any substantial
change in language and/or educational policies. Similarly, the present ANP’s government is also quiescent on these matters. This reality indicates the irrelevancy of segmental autonomy for Pashtuns.

Second, the Balochs are very touchy about their language and culture. But, the Balochi language is a relatively less developed language yet. Consequently, various governments of Baloch nationalists like Attaullah Mengal (1972), Akbar Bugti (1988), and Akhtar Mengal (1997) did not introduce any substantial shift in their policies concerning language and educational policies.

Third, Adeney (2009) has rightly observed that Sindhis are more concerned about the issue of the recognition of language and education rights. Sindhi is the most advanced regional language of Pakistan. In fact, it had been remained a medium of instruction in Sindh during British rule. The provincial government of Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, a Sindhi landlord, made an unsuccessful attempt to revive its earlier status. However, Sindhis say that their language and culture is so rich that they are not worried about its survival. (Note 9)

Fourth, Mohajirs are Urdu-speaking community and Urdu is the lingua franca of Pakistan. Therefore, Mohajirs are not worried about the Urdu. However, their interests were threatened when Sindh Assembly passed a Language Bill in 1972 stating that the learning of Sindhi language would be compulsory for provincial officials. The Mohajirs agitated against this move and the government had to withdraw this rule. Therefore, currently Mohajirs have no linguistic or cultural concerns. So, segmental autonomy is not a requirement of Mohajirs.

4.4 Mutual veto

Consociationalists believe that the mutual or minority veto provides shelter to minorities and guarantees that ‘it will not be out-voted by the majority when its vital interests are at stake’ (Lijphart, 1977, p.119). A grand coalition offers important political protection for minority segments in consociational arrangements but it does not provide reliable protection. Decisions, in the grand coalitions, are normally, reached by majority vote; though the minority’s presence in the coalition does give it a chance to present its case as forcefully as possible to its coalition partners, it may, nevertheless, be out-voted by the majority. Lijphart is not precise, as usual, in defining the concept of mutual veto. He is reluctant to ‘specify the form and forum mutual veto should take’ (Halpern, 1986, p.190). It may take different forms i.e. absolute veto or suspensive veto and informal veto or formal veto. It may also be a general or a specific: it may be applied either to all decisions or occasionally to only certain specified kinds of decisions, such as matters of culture and education (Lijphart, 1995b, p. 279). Practically, however, this device is usually restricted to the most vital and fundamental matters and it is usually based on informal understandings rather than formal legal or constitutional rules (Lijphart, 1995a, pp. 856-57).

Territorial grievances of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or Pashtun region, like NFC Award and Kalabagh dam project, have been, more or less, met through inter-provincial dialogue. This development makes the veto power element of consociationalism irrelevant for Pashtuns, at least, at the moment. Similarly, the territorial grievances of Sindhis such as NFC Award and Kalabagh dam project have been met, recently. Thus, the mutual veto element of consociational democracy is least concerned with the Sindhis case. Since 1990s, MQM is advocating the territorial grievances attached with the province of Sindh and the Karachi. Most of the issues have been already settled down. Thus, consociational elements are extraneous to the Mohajirs. In this way, the all four elements of consociational mechanism seem least relevant to the identity politics of Pakistan.

5. An Alternative Explanation of Ethnic Conflict in Pakistan

This section suggests that ethnic mobilisation is connected with the centralisation of political power. First, it is important to note why the Pashtuns associated with Khudai Khidmatgar Tehrik in 1947 and then with National Awami Party (NAP) in 1970s resisted against the central authorities. Why Dr. Khan Sahib, the younger brother of Ghaffar Khan and ex-chief minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa whose government was dismissed in 1947, agreed to become the chief minister of the West Pakistan after the introduction of one-unit scheme in 1950s. Why Ghaffar Khan declared in early 1970s that their demand for Pashtunistan has been fulfilled. The straight forward answer to these questions is that this political group was driven out from office of the government in 1947 and 1973 by the central authorities but was provided an opportunity to join government in 1955 and 1972. It was the installation of NAP-JUI government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa that led Ghaffar Khan to declare that Pashtunistan issue has been ended. This account seems to suggest that it is the interference of central authorities in provincial or regional matters that influence the identity formation and articulation among various groups of Pakistan. ANP is asserting for greater autonomy. (Note 10) It suggests that federation should retain only the control of defence, foreign affairs, and currency. It intends to strengthen the Senate, the federal chamber, with the power to initiate the money bills and to approve the higher appointments. These proposals seem to suggest the trust of ANP in federalism. ANP’s demand for renaming the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as Pukhtunkhwa has been fulfilled. Thus, a relatively decentralized federal design can meet the requirements of Pashtuns.
Second, the Balochs have mobilized more frequently and more markedly against the central authorities in post-1971 Pakistan. The most famous uprising of 1970s was a consequence of central authorities’ interference into the provincial matters. Mengal’s government in Balochistan was dismissed in 1973 on the grounds of lawlessness and failure to comply with central government directives. His removal from the office resulted in a conflict between his supporters and the centre. This confrontation continued up to 1977. It is imperative to note the timings and geographical scope of this conflict. This conflict started after the removal of provincial government and the Baloch tribal areas of Marri-Mengal tribes were the real battle grounds. It is important to note that Akbar Bugti agreed to hold the office of governor of Balochistan during this conflict. (Note 11) This displays the internal divisions of Balochs. The evidence shows that the Balochs entered into tripartite accord in 1972 and installed their government at Quetta, but they entered into an armed conflict with the central authorities after the removal of their government from office. Therefore, centralization of political power is the key explanatory variable of this conflict. The same is the case with other Baloch conflicts. Balochs have been remained quiescent and had joined various coalition cabinets at Islamabad and Quetta during the civilian period (1988-99) in post-Zia era. Balochs were marginalized during the Musharraf period as a consequence of a coalition between MMA and PMLQ in Balochistan. This marginality resulted in another armed conflict of Balochs with the central authorities. This account seems to suggest that decentralization of political power rather than consociational mechanisms have more relevancy and potential to manage the Baloch issues.

Third, Sindhis have some concerns about their representation and segmental autonomy. But, PPP has been, very successfully, involved Sindhis in national politics. Therefore, the absence of segmental autonomy or under-representation in military will not result in any horrible threat for the federation. In post-1971 Pakistan, Sindhis have protested sporadically and mildly than Balochs but strongly than Pashtuns. The substantial protest took place after the removal of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto from government in 1977, by the military establishment. While, Bhutto had violated the federal norms of polity during his rule by intervening in Balochistan and NWFP, the formal federal parliamentary system of Pakistan operated more likely a presidential unitary system during Zia regime (Mushtaq, 2009). In 1983, PPP and allies launched the movement for restoration of democracy (MRD) all over the country. However, interior Sindh revolted vigorously. It has been argued that MRD aimed at strengthening the federation by preserving and protecting the genuine interests of four federating units. (Note 12) MRD agreed that “after the restoration of democracy the 1973 constitution should be amended to effect that it provided a four subject centre leaving behind all the residuary powers for the provinces” (Hussain, 1989, p.191). Hence, it can be argued that the popularity of MRD movement in Sindh was underpinned by the Sindhis’ desires for greater autonomy. Finally, the Sindhi resentment subsided with the restoration of civilian rule at the end of Zia regime in 1988. Since then, Sindhis have not challenged writ of the state. It is important to note that Sindhis are more concerned about the provincial autonomy. The evidence shows that PPP leadership from Sindh is more vocal over autonomy issues than the Punjabi leaders of PPP. (Note 13) Therefore, it can be argued that centralization of political power is a key concern of Sindhis. So, relatively decentralized governance would manage the Sindhis grievances.

Fourth, MQM, the dominant party of Mohajirs, is asserting for its multiethnic outlook since 1990s. It has been renamed to incorporate other communities. It has been advancing territorial grievances of its province, Sindh, more vigorously. This suggests MQM’s inclinations to become a mainstream party of federal character. (Note 14) MQM believes in federalism and has been asserting for provincial autonomy. (Note 15) Nevertheless, MQM has not suggested any consociational element like proportional electoral system or segmental autonomy in its proposed autonomy bill. Therefore, it seems to suggest that a relatively decartelized federal set-up will satisfy the mohajir demands. Hence, decentralized federalism rather than consociationalism is the best option for Mohajir case.

Fifth, the movement of Siraikis’ is at its infancy stage and no substational protest has been seen in the southern Punjab, the Siraiki-speaking region. The main issue of this region, currently, is the demand for a separate province. However, there is disagreement over the name and boundaries of the proposed province. Some are arguing for a Siraiki province based on Siraiki identity, namely Siraikistan. Others suggest a province on administrative basis, namely Southern Punjab. Still, the people of Bahawalpur are asserting for Bahawalpur province outside the proposed Siraiki province. (Note 16) Siraiki demands and grievances are completely compatible with the federal design and require no consociational mechanisms for their fulfilment.

6. Conclusion

The paper contends that ethnic mobilization and political instability in Pakistan is the result of discrepancy in the theory and practice of federal arrangements. Though, the Pakistani federation fulfils minimum criteria of federalism, it operates more likely as a unitary system. The evidence suggests that centralization of political
power is the key factor connected with the political mobilisation in Pakistan. More mobilisations are protests against central interventions in provincial or regional matters. Equally, these mobilisations remained limited to the groups that thought they were deprived of their right of self-rule. Additionally, these protests were prominent in particular regions. It has been also observed that various nationalist groups remained internally divided. In this given situation, the all four elements of consociational mechanism seem least relevant to the identity politics of Pakistan. Hence, it is not the absence of consociational features but the centralization of political power that limits the capacity of Pakistani federation to manage ethnic diversity.

References


**Notes**

Note 1. Consociationalism is derived from the word “*consociatio*” that was used by Johannes *Althusius* for a particular form of ‘political union’. This word literally means “association between equals” (Clark & Foweraker, 2001, pp.91-92).

Note 2. The province of NWFP was renamed as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa under the 18th amendment of the 1973 constitution of Pakistan in 2010.

Note 3. Election results are available at the official website of Election Commission of Pakistan.

Note 4. Election results are available at the official website of Election Commission of Pakistan.

Note 5. Jeay Sindh and Awami Tahreek are hardliner Sindhi nationalist parties that ‘never attracted the support of more than 5-6% of the electorate nor have they ever won any directly elected National Assembly seat’ (Jones, 2002).

Note 6. The quota of Sindh province has been distributed between rural and urban Sindh. Similarly, the distribution of quota in Balochistan between Balochs and Pashtuns will lessened the disparity between two dominant communities of Balochistan.

Note 7. See for details: (Kennedy, 1987).

Note 8. This observation is based on the various statements published in daily news papers of Pakistan.


Note 10. ANP’s autonomy demands have been summarized in the apendex-1

Note 11. Akbar Bugti had led the Baloch rebellion during Musharraf period.

Note 12. The member parties of MRD signed a four point declaration to cooperate with each other for the achievement of (1) Lifting of the martial law immediately, (2) Restoration of the unanimously passed 1973 constitution with the amendments which had been made unanimously, (3) Holding of elections according to the above constitution, (4) Guarantees to preserve and protect the genuine interests of the four federating units of Pakistan (Hussain, 1989. p. 190).

Note 13. This observation is based on the statements of various leaders of PPP from Sindh and Punjab, published in daily newspapers.

Note 14. However, despite its all efforts, MQM has remained unable to get some support outside the Mohajir constituency of urban Sindh.

Note 15. MQM’s autonomy demands are available in the apendex-1

Note 16. Bahawalpur had a provincial status before the one-unit scheme of 1955.
## Appendix-1. Political Parties’ Stand over Provincial Autonomy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Party Stand</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PML</strong></td>
<td>To raise the degree of self-rule, PML suggested certain measures: Maximum provincial autonomy within the framework of the 1973 constitution: functional autonomy to the provinces i.e. the right to regulate and control the provincial natural resources, and to decentralize the administrative and financial powers to provincial and lower levels. It also recommended minimizing the central interference in the provincial matters. PML also suggested measured to ensure shared-rule – an essence of the federal polity. It recommended the Strengthening of the federal chamber (the Senate), abolition of concurrent list, and a consensus based formula (NFC Award) for horizontal and vertical allocation of funds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PPP</strong></td>
<td>The PPP has outlined more or less same provisions, as the PML, in its manifesto concerning the Provincial autonomy and intergovernmental relations. It has also stressed on the abolishment of the Concurrent list, multiple criteria for distribution through NFC award, strengthening the Senate and a just Share for Provinces in their Natural Resources. It also recommended an establishment of a federal Constitutional Court with equal representation of federating units to resolve constitutional issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MMA</strong></td>
<td>MMA’s program mainly focuses on the Islamization of society through Islamization of laws and enforcement of Shari’ah. Having the support base in minority provinces, it has also concerns regarding NFC Award, Gas royalty issue for Balochistan etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MQM</strong></td>
<td>MQM has introduced a bill in National Assembly of Pakistan that suggests more autonomy for the provinces. It meant to confine the federation to three subjects namely defence, foreign affairs, and currency. It also demands financial autonomy: Assignment of General Sales Tax and Excise Tax to the provinces. Like other regional parties, it suggests a multiple formula for allocation of funds in NFC Award. For promotion of harmony between federation and provinces, MQM has suggested for the creation of an inter-provincial council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANP</strong></td>
<td>ANP stands for the right to preserve and promote culture and language for all identities and the right for the federating units to reorganize on the basis of cultural, linguistic and geographical similarities. It is asserting for renaming the NWFP as Pukhtunkhwa. It demands maximum autonomy and suggests that Federation should retain only the control of defence, foreign affairs, and currency. It intends to strengthen the senate, the federal chamber, with the power to initiate the money bills and to approve the higher appointments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PKMAP</strong></td>
<td>PKMAP insists for the recognition of Pashtuns as a separate nationality and that the Pashtuns should form a separate province or be merged with Pashtun majority in NWFP. Within the framework of 1973 constitution, and being a regional party of Balochistan it demands that the decision making power regarding the Mega Project in Balochistan should be rest within province. It also demands that all income from the Mega Project in Balochistan should go to the Provincial Pool. Like Baloch nationalist parties, it advocates the reversal of the proposed new cantonments in Balochistan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Baloch nationalist parties resent Baloch’s under representation and interventionist policies of central government. They opposed the establishment of new cantonments in Balochistan and land allotments to outsiders near Gwadar port. Balochs resist against the inducement/settlement of outsiders on Mega Projects and assert for employment of locals in all Mega Projects and Gas Fields. They recommend due representation in all the Federal Government Departments for Balochs.


Note: (1) All India Muslim League was founded in 1906 in Dhaka. It demanded a separate homeland for the Muslims of India in 1940s. Its demand was fulfilled; and it was renamed as Pakistan Muslim League. Then it was divided into various factions. Currently, three factions are notable: PML-N, PML-Q, and PML-F. All factions have similar stands on various issues regarding the centre-province relationships. Therefore, they are treated as a single party: Pakistan Muslim League. (2) MMA includes: Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F), Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Sami ul-Haq faction (JUI-S), Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP), Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith (JAH), and Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP). (3) Manifestos are available at: www.pml.org.pk, www.mqm.org, www.ppp.org.pk.
### Appendix-2. Political Parties of Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Awami National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNA</td>
<td>Balochistan National Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNM</td>
<td>Balochistan National Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>Balochistan National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IJI</td>
<td>Islami Jamhoori Ittehad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIP</td>
<td>Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUI (H)</td>
<td>Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Hazarvi Group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUI-F</td>
<td>Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazal-ur-Rehman Group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JWP</td>
<td>Jamhoori Wattan Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMA</td>
<td>Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MQM</td>
<td>Muttahida Qaumi Movement Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKMAP</td>
<td>Pashtun Khawa Milli Awami Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PML-F</td>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League (Functional Group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PML-N</td>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMLQ</td>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam Group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Pakistan Peoples Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP-S</td>
<td>Pakistan Peoples Party (Shairpao Group)</td>
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