Destruction, Survival and Renewal: Jining’s Urban Identity in the Political and Social Storms, 1937-2003

Jinghao Sun
History Department, East China Normal University
Shanghai 200241, China
E-mail: jinghaosun@yahoo.com

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Abstract
This article explores the recent experience of a once prosperous late imperial Chinese city from the Japanese occupation to the post-Mao reformist era. It focuses on the effect of the drastically changing political and social environments on the city’s identity, and how the city responded to the challenges. Over the last seven decades, Jining suffered, survived, restored and transformed like other places in China, whereas yet from its trajectory we can still see its distinctive individual characteristics. The article reveals the deterioration of its late imperial legacy and the destruction of its new “Westernizing” identity from the late 1930s to the late 1970s, while it also shows a seeming return of the city’s certain traditions in the following post-Mao New Era though not where all positive.

Keywords: Jining, Grand Canal, Urban identity, Taibai Pavilion, Political and social storms

The core conception of this article is “urban identity.” The term “urban” used here first takes a general “city versus countryside” angle, although there are different urban types identified by various categories and personalities throughout world history. “Identity,” refers to a distinctive persisting entity, and has both objective and subjective meanings. Nonetheless, identity is never static; there is both continuity and discontinuity in the definition of a place. A locality’s course is dependent not only on natural forces but also on social factors shaped by local cultural traditions, as human beings work to alter their circumstances for survival and development. In doing so they change their original cultural heritage. As Keith Schoppa points out,

Man acts within a specific spatial context. It is obvious, however, that humans do not simply interact with natural environment but also with artificial environmental features—for example, commercial exchange patterns, technological advances, and institutions to facilitate, mediate, and direct change. The natural and artificial environments affect sociopolitical elites and social structures and are in turn altered by these changed elites and structures. (Note 1)

Jining’s history has testified to the interaction between nature and human beings in various groups, institutions, social configurations and events. Situated in the proverbially unmanageable and poverty-stricken southwest of Shandong province, Jining had otherwise enjoyed an ancient cultural reputation mostly as a county-level seat before the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). With the Grand Canal becoming the lifeline of the empire, Jining emerged as an economic and cultural metropolis in much of the Ming and High Qing when it was a subprefecture (zhou, or zhilizhou, an independent department between the provincial and county levels) in the imperial jurisdictional hierarchy. Furthermore, it developed a distinctive local identity as a Grand Canal city. However, from the mid-nineteenth century onward this premodern urban identity began to dissolve. From that time on, China was hurriedly drawn into the Western-dominated modern framework and thus modernization was introduced to its domestic and local attributes in the late Qing dynasty and the early Republican period until 1937 when Jining as well as most eastern parts of China fell into the predatory Japanese occupation. The aim of this article is to probe the subsequent development in Jining from 1937.

In light of the dramatically changing politics in contemporary China, the leading concern of this article is how to identify the relationship between local identity and national political powers and social configurations. From this case study of Jining’s recent history I will argue that political and social storms of the earlier four decades ruined
the city’s old traditional and recent Western urban heritages while the recent decades of profound social transformation encouraged certain revival of its past glory with some falsification.

1. Forward: Jining’s Late Imperial Identity and Modern Legacy

The question of how to define Jining’s identity is first concerned with its path of urbanization as commerce and a market economy composed urban Jining’s infrastructural makeup. Like many cities and market towns in western Shandong and south Zhili (Hebei), Jining’s real rise was because of the massive use of the Grand Canal as tribute transportation in the early Ming, and its continuing prosperity was dependent on the canal’s normal operation. This specific urbanization and city formation demonstrated the dynamics of transportation, communication and trade via the canal as decisive roles in making an economic center, where factors beyond the locality shaped local identity. (Note 2) Therefore, Jining’s identity is not exclusively determined by its geographical location, but rather by its position in a field of communication related to the locality’s economic orientation via the canal. A northern city, Jining nevertheless absorbed many influences from the outside, especially from the economically and culturally advanced south. In spite of living in the homeland of Confucius and Mencius, Jining elites took outside literary men to be the city’s local cultural symbols. From the beginning of the Ming, the Taibai Pavilion on the southern city wall, in memory of the great romantic poet Li Bai, has remained as the principal icon of the layout of the city.

Jining’s high economic and cultural standing was complemented by the political activism of both the state and local powers in Jining under the imperial system. On the one hand, the pivotal role of government-led canal transportation in the local economy along the canal also meant that the state exerted formidable influence on local politics. On the other hand, in the public manifestations of Jining people’s everyday life, a salient feature of the cultural and social formation was the hegemony of a powerful and highly intellectually-cultivated gentry. There was the tension and separation between the state and the local society which existed not on a “civil society against the state” track but mostly in a cooperative or conciliatory tune. (Note 3) Largely due to both the city’s economic reliance on the state and its vital role in imperial transportation and trade networks, the gentry society in Jining seemed to be modest, but with a strong self-consciousness of their local urban identity.

The waxing and waning of the city of Jining was closely associated with the functioning of the Grand Canal. During the violent years of the Ming-Qing transition of the 1640s Jining endured devastation with the disruptions and degeneration of canal transportation and trade. Notwithstanding, shortly after the Qing regime consolidated order in China proper, Jining steadily restored its vitality while the Grand Canal returned to be the lifeblood for the empire.

However, from the mid-nineteenth century, Jining faced challenges beyond yet another dynastic cycle: not only the decline and then withdrawal of canal transportation but also unprecedented changes in the national economic network and mode of production brought about by the alien forces of global modernity, capitalism, and Christianity. Under this overwhelming intrusion, Jining’s prosperity and identity was at stake as the whole nation was on the brink of losing its integrity. However, Jining did not entirely fall down. An important reason for this consequence was the activism of the powerful and open-minded local elites who, like their predecessors, negotiated with the political authorities for local interest. In the late Qing and early Republican periods, they drew lessons from local experience about the dynamics of transportation, and based on constructing new transportation system they vigorously engaged in Western-style industrialization and urban construction, and therefore successfully adapted their city to a different national and international economic and political environment. (Note 4) Moreover, Jining’s modern transition was a compromise rather than a rupture with tradition. Although the influx of modern goods, technologies and institutions altered the structure of Jining society, older practices continued to be active resulting in a mosaic cityscape: the Taibai Pavilion, old workshops and indigenous festivals coexisted and interacted with churches, Western hospitals, department stores and the new schools system.

In short, from the last years of the nineteenth century to 1937, some industrialization, commerce and social reforms got underway in Jining, although this period was generally marked by upheaval, disruption and warfare. Jining’s modern story also exhibited its late imperial legacy: the Jining people’s recognition of the magnitude of transportation to both local economy and identity, the city’s strong commercial cultural ethos, and the influential open-minded elite. Native premodern urbanism and imported modern urbanization worked together to form a fledgling urban creature.

2. Jining after 1937: Disruption and Legacy

From the Japanese occupation to Mao’s regime, frequent, boisterous and disastrous wars and political movements not only brought physical destruction on Jining’s urban infrastructure and economy, but also caused...
psychological and cultural losses for its residents. Yet we still can see some remnants of its old urban identity which became the underlying basis for its later renewal.

2.1 Wartime Wreckage and Survival, 1937-1948

Since the Japanese invasion was met with tenacious resistance by the Nationalists’ armies in the greater Jining area, the invaders ruthlessly pursued the innocent local populations using terror. In Jining’s neighboring counties, the Japanese carried out several massacres: in mid-May 1938, in the space of only four days, 3,347 civilians were killed in Jinxiang. (Note 5) In the next years, to cope with ongoing Nationalist, Communist and spontaneous independent guerrilla activities based in the countryside, the Japanese continued to use terror to intimidate local people. In addition, the Japanese massively conscripted and coerced labor to build blockhouses and other military facilities. They established market monopolies and a rationing system to reinforce their control of the local economy and life. The east-west Yanzhou-Jining Railway was dismantled so that the rails could be used to supplement the north-south main line which enjoyed more significance in terms of military control and economic exploitation. (Note 6) The Japanese also directly pillaged local resources. Their predatory occupation emasculated the local economy much more than any previous devastation from the mid-nineteenth century, sharply breaking the modernizing process.

However, the Japanese strategy of collaboration achieved some success. On January 11, 1938, the Japanese subdued Jining. Later that month, the Jining Local Peace Preservation Association (Difang zhi’an weichi hui) was formed to assist the occupation. Within half a year, formal administrative institutions were established and began to operate under the provincial puppet government in Jinan. Jining city was still the seat for both Jining county and Jining circuit (dao). Their heads were natives of Jining or the nearby places. However, most of these “collaborators” were former veterans, former clerks, bandits, merchants and other sorts of local bullies; none came from esteemed gentry families. This situation reflected a general trend in north China as the domination of gentry waned. (Note 7) But in view of the relatively larger numbers of gentry elites, new intellectuals and professionals in Jining, we may trace the non-collaborative elite tradition to the early Qing when the famous Jining gentry leader Zheng Yuqiao (1599-1683) and a few his native peers turned down positions or honor offers from the Manchu rulers. (Note 8)

Regardless, the territory of the greater Jining area was relatively peaceful and stable, although both the Nationalist and Communist resistance headquarters were located in adjacent rural areas in southern Shandong. In comparison, the eastern Shandong peninsula saw more frequent and larger resistance battles by organized guerrilla solders and militias, and the more anarchic southwestern area of Heze (former Caozhou prefecture) and southern mountainous area of Linyi (former Yizhou prefecture) saw activities by various armed forces including bandits.

As for the Communist activities in Shandong, Kenneth Pomeranz observes that during the CCP’s urban phase it recruited more young intellectuals in Jining than in other cities of western Shandong. However, from the late 1920s when the Party developed its rural-based strategies, its mass mobilization lost effect in Jining and its vicinity. (Note 9) This situation also exposes the urban-rural tension in Jining. However, during the Civil War period (1946-1949), the Jining region became one of the major battlefields. The Nationalist and Communist forces vehemently competed for control of the city until mid-July 1948, when the former were permanently expelled from the greater Jining area. In summary, the eight years of ruinous Japanese occupation and the subsequent years of devastating civil war in fact broke down the local economy and society of the city and its neighboring areas, actually terminating the modernization process. However, a careful observation in accordance with the memoirs of many local elders still indicates that Jining’s identity, for the most part, survived as the basic values of life among the citizens remained. (Note 10)

2.2 Loss of Urban Identity, 1948-1976

Wars pummeled the cityscape, economy and people’s livelihood in Jining, but the Taibai Pavilion survived the tough years. It remained a focus for local identity, a testimony to the city’s traditional continuity and identity until the early 1950s. After the communist turnover based on the proposition that rural revolution could lead to national triumph while urban industrialization “could lay the basis for an independent socialist society,” the Communist Party began to focus on cities, as Kenneth Lieberthal observes from his analysis of the transformation of Tianjin in the early “liberation” years. (Note 11) The victorious revolutionaries started a process which utterly altered the trajectory of modern China patterned after the West, and also abandoned the long-standing national traditions for their utopian experiment, while establishing a Soviet-style bureaucratic hierarchy.
First, the new government purged “reactionary” forces “antagonistic” to its power. Actually as early as their first control of Jining in May 1946, they arrested some collaborators from the Japanese occupation including the head of the Chamber of Commerce and executed them. (Note 12) In the suppression of counterrevolutionaries movement and land reform during the late 1940s and early 1950s, many former gentry members and commercial and industrial elites were persecuted and some executed, signifying the deaths of the old landlord-merchant-gentry class and Western-style urban capitalists, together with their values and cultures. (Note 13) In 1953, foreign Catholic missionaries were dislodged. Wujidao and all other secret societies were disbanded and banned, and their leaders and activists arrested and even executed. As a city that had a high density of intellectuals and merchants, Jining suffered in the ensuing political movements. In 1957, more than 400 intellectuals and professionals in Jining city were accused of being Rightists and persecuted. (Note 14) During the Cultural Revolution, Jining was one of the hardest hit regions in Shandong.

In this political environment of purification and unification, the physical environment also underwent great change. In the winter of 1949, the southern city wall was pulled down but the section with the Taibai Pavilion left over. In 1951, the Taibai Pavilion was demolished along with the removal of the remaining southern city walls under the new government’s urban planning. In 1954, the other city walls were demolished. In 1952, a new Taibai Pavilion was constructed in the new city square. (Note 15) However, the new pavilion lost its archetype as it was patterned after the Zunyi Pavilion where the Communist Party and its Red Army on the Long March held an important conference authorizing Mao’s accession to the pinnacle of power.

An important agenda in setting up a new social order was urban economic reorganization. As early as April 1949, the government turned Jining Electric Light Company, the most prestigious modern stock company, into a state-run enterprise. In the “socialist transformation” of urban commerce and industry in the early 1950s, the most prominent and characteristic Yutang enterprise became the first joint state-private enterprise. (Note 16) Shortly thereafter, all private enterprises were transferred to state ownership. Since then, economic development has been highly organized and planned by the state. Under this highly centralized scheme, starting in the mid-1960s the government moved some industries from the coastal cities to the interior mainly for national defense considerations, thus changing the former framework established under Western-dominated commercialization, capitalism and international trade. As the economic and cultural center for southwestern Shandong, Jining was a major beneficiary of this transfer, and its local industry was enhanced. However, this type of industry altered its innate urban function. David Buck rightly perceives the Soviet style of urban development as following “the same path of maturation as Western cities were rejected”; that is to say, cities lost their role as “as centers of political, economic, and cultural advancement.” (Note 17) In its urban policy, as Buck sees it, the state “referred to transforming consumer cities into producer cities” as the goal of Communist urban policy. The city was taken as an industrial producer unit rather than a commercial center, as the state tried to “modernize without the degree of urbanization that occurred in Europe, North America, and Japan.” (Note 18)

The state organized all matters. Because of the harshness during the famine of the late 1950s, local people moved out to survive. The government arranged organized migration to Manchuria and Xinjiang. In the wave of agricultural infrastructure construction in the 1950s-1970s, the government enormously mobilized labor and organized the construction of new regional canals for the purpose of irrigation, and consequently the north-south Grand Canal course was almost entirely abandoned for the sake of local self-sufficiency, whereby there was little demand for transregional trade.

Losing the free market, commercial ethos, cultural domination and intellectual communication, urban life in Jining was as monotonous and dull as in other cities at the time. However, modest features of the old lifestyle still survived. For instance, eating out has long been a custom in Jining. Even during the poverty and asceticism of the Cultural Revolution, the custom prevailed, and sustained small private businesses in the commercial and service sectors. Jining’s urban consumerism was still unusual in inland parts of Shandong. On June 12, 1957, southwestern Shandong’s department store was opened in Jining to serve the larger region. (Note 19) Notwithstanding, from the concrete case study of urban Jining, we can see the across-the-board normalization and delocalization in Mao’s China: the new regime ambitiously consolidated China into one unit, or into a single village. Certainly, the loss of urban identity was not unique to Jining.

2.3 Heritage and Innovation in the Reform Era, 1977-2003

In the post-Mao New Era, rural reform first achieved great success in the direction of commercialization. (Note 20) Gradually, industry and commerce in subcounty towns and large villages began to boom, ushering in another large-scale phase of urbanization grounded on commercialization. (Note 21) Although state-run enterprises in cities were resistant to institutional reform till the early 1990s, cities’ urban function as centers of change and
progress were revitalized and increased. Administrative adjustments reflect this advancement. In 1953, Jining municipality (zhuangqu) consisted of twelve counties and one city, Jining itself. This configuration continued with little modification to the late 1980s, when many counties (xian) changed to municipalities (shi) under the rural to urban transformation. Accordingly at subcounty level, the number of zhen (urban townships) has increased and accordingly the number of xiang (rural townships) has dwindled.

Commercialization and urbanization encouraged individual development of the locality, inspiring people’s vigor and vivacity. Jining local governments continued to improve transportation infrastructure such as highways, railways, waterways, airlines and airports. (Note 22) In addition, like some other places that have characteristic local heritages, a major approach to local development in Jining was to rejuvenate tradition. Some historical scenic sites were repaired, reconstructed and preserved. To serve tourism in the “Grand Canal Culture Zone” rather than transportation use, the old canal course was dredged and decorated. On January 1, 1987, Li Bai Memorial Museum was set up in the Taibai Pavilion. At the same time, local symbolism has been broadly used for commercial purposes. On December 20, 1987, the first auction market in southwestern Shandong was set up in Jining. (Note 23) On January 6, 1994, Taibai Commercial Zone (Taibai shangcheng) was opened. Similarly, a residential district called Taibai was developed. On September 23, 1995, the “International Confucius’ Cultural Festival and Foreign Economy and Trade Fair” began in Jining, suggesting a strong commercial coloration. (Note 24) The innovations stemming from the locality’s heritage recall the city’s cultural and commercial past, conforming to what Liping Wang calls “the phenomenon of cultural creation in the name of tradition” through her study of modern tourism in early Republican Hangzhou. (Note 25) It appeared that Jining, like many historical places in the post-Mao era, sought the renewal of its local identity in the modernizing process.

3. Postscript: Retrospect and Prospect

During my annual visits to Jining during 2001-2003, I was impressed by the local government’s ambitious urban planning that aimed to vigorously remake the layout of the city for modernization and at the same time to emphasize the local character by adding traditional touch. However, many cases of “discovering tradition” became mere formalities serving economic goals and political propaganda. The government urged local scholars to construct an image of Jining as “capital of the Grand Canal” to maximize the locality’s reputation, whereas, just as in most other Chinese cities, local cadres did not seriously engage in developing a real modern urban society. Apparent material prosperity does not necessarily induce positive social effects. In other words, privatization, commercialization and urbanization under the current regime do not necessarily lead to the formation of a normal urban society. For example, there has been little growth of the so-called “public sphere” and “civil society”—the core content of modern urban society. (Note 26) While scholarly opinions on contemporary China vary, it goes without saying that there is no substantial opposition from urban society. The existence of certain “public sphere” and “civil society” ingredients have been limited to a few metropolitan cities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Canton which are more open to the media and international attention. In smaller cities and towns especially in the north, bureaucratic authorities control society more firmly. An incident in Jining a few years ago demonstrates how weak the power of Jining’s “civil society” was.

When I first arrived in Jining in August 2001, I was led to see the last Bamboo Pole Alley as it was vanishing. A vice-mayor had signed a contract with a real estate developer to have this lane demolished since it was in the area of a spacious compound designed to imitate ancient architecture while also providing modern commercial facilities and entertainment. This scheme is typical of the thinking of the reform generation of cadres. The destruction project was unpopular among most residents including many local cadres. Several retired teachers objected to the local People’s Congress, but public discussion in the media was censored. (Note 27) The project was halted temporarily after two thirds of the buildings had already been torn down. I only saw the remaining buildings and was told that the demolition would resume when quarrels wound down. According to my local contact, local leaders including a vice–chairman of the municipal People’s Political Consultative Council also worried about the loss of the precious local remains, but they cared more about their own careers and interests so that they did not take bold action as their predecessors did in the 1907-9 railway construction incident. (Note 28) I was so anxious that I asked a nationally influential senior scholar from Jinan to use his prestige to intervene, although I suspected he would be unlikely to really act for he had skillfully kept a good relationship with officialdom over half a century of political fluctuations. Finally, during my last visit to Jining in 2003 I was told that the Bamboo Pole Alley no longer exists. The controversy was eventually reported to the provincial government, which fined the real estate developer and criticized the vice mayor. The vice mayor was eventually removed from the position but ironically transferred to an equivalent position in the People’s Political Consultative Council. Ironically, architectural imitations were constructed on the former sites of the Bamboo Pole Alley and other adjacent old remains.
Jining’s development and its reversals continue to be dominated by the government’s pragmatic considerations. Since its subordinate county-level city Qufu, Confucius’s hometown, has resumed its magnificent standing under the government’s nationalist and international strategies, the Jining municipal government has made a proposal to move its seat to Qufu. If approved, Jining city will face another round of potential decline. In the absence of either traditional gentry society or modern civil society, I wonder how the local people will cope with this new challenge.

Glossary
Canzhou 曹州
dao 道
difang zhi’an weichu hui 地方治安委员会
hanjian 汉奸
Heze 荷泽
Jinan 济南
Jining 济宁
Linyi 临沂
Qufu 曲阜
shi 市
Taibai shengcheng 太白商城
Wanzhu yuan 万竹园
Wujidao 无极道
xiang 乡
xian 县
Yanzhou 兖州
Yizhou 沂州
Yutang 玉堂
zhen 镇
Zheng Yuqiao 郑与侨
zhili zhou 直隶州
zhuanqu 专区
Zunyi 遵义

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**Notes**


Note 3. This assertion about late imperial Chinese urban society is similar to Brook and Frolic’s evaluation of the recent social changes in China: “the state is seen to play an incremental and associative role, acting at times as a benevolent, if usually self-serving, partner of social entities seeking to make claims against the state rather than as their opponent.” See Timothy Brook and B. Michael Frolic, “Epilogue,” *Civil Society in China*, 196.

Note 4. About Jining people’ early undertakings to hold back the regression of their locality around the turn of the twentieth century, see my article “Resisting Marginalization in Late Qing China: Local Dynamics in Jining’s Modern Transformation,” *East Asia: An International Quarterly*. Vol. 26, issue 3 (September 2009).

Note 5. *Jining lishi*, 110.


Note 7. Prasenjit Duara portrays the “ubiquitous” phenomenon in the 1920s and 1930s when “local bullies” replaced gentry elites’ role in local society, and dominated the mainstream of political life especially at the village level. Prasenjit Duara, *Culture, Power and the State*, 261. Actually, bullies from lower classes in the chaotic early Republic were active at all levels of political life. This situation worsened during the Japanese occupation as most members of well-educated gentry families were reluctant to become the occupiers’ accomplices and thus condemned as *hanjian* (traitor), the most contemptible crime in the Chinese tradition.

Note 8. The Manchu pacification of Shandong proceeded smoothly and was completed in August of 1644 without substantial resistance. However, a few Jining native scholar officials bravely took the occasion to join the resistance loosely mobilized by the Ming loyalist regimes in the south. Zheng Yuqiao was disappointed with the fact that only a few Jining native families, among the entire gentry class of Shandong, went south to fight as Ming loyalists. Zheng Yuqiao, “Binan ji” in *Jiyu ouii*. One record shows that a total of five native Jining high officials died at their positions. *Jining zhilizhou zhi* (1785), 8.15b.

Note 9. See references in Kenneth Pomeranz, *The Making of a Hinterland*, 113, 117. But his use of the word “impermeable” to explain this character is too general. Why did the urban or intellectual wing of communism gain a toehold in Jining in the early period? I would ascribe this to an antagonism of urban culture in Jining towards rural and irrational teachings and practices, as discussed in the third chapter of my dissertation, “A Southern Identity in the North.”

Note 10. Various sources from many writings for the local *Wenshi ziliao* (documentary and historical materials) series, as well as my interviews. In a 2002 interview with Mr. Liu Ziyi, a well educated gentleman in his early
90s, I was told that in Jining in the 1930s and 1940s despite the poverty and chaos most townspeople of all classes retained basic traditional morality and polishing urban manners in a relatively harmonious social atmosphere.


Note 12. *Jining lishi*, 125.

Note 13. According to Kenneth G. Lieberthal’s description of the anti-counterrevolution campaign in Tianjin in 1949 and 1950, the Party used violence including arrest, public execution and public humiliation to suppress the so-called organizational and individual counterrevolutionaries. This situation was common in the whole country. Kenneth G. Lieberthal, *Revolution and Tradition in Tientsin*, 53-62.


Note 16. *Jining lishi*, 147.


Note 20. I agree with Philip Huang’s argument that under intensified commercialization, rural industrialization in the reformist era from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s which caused “development without growth” really changed the pattern of rural socioeconomic. But I disagree with his conclusion about “industrialization without residential urbanization,” for many villages and small towns have grown into urban and suburban zones along with their commercial economy’s expansion, and recent evidence shows that the radically growing rural-registered population has tended to settled down in cities permanently. See Philip C. C. Huang, *The Peasant Economy and Social Change in North China*, 283-285, 288-290. On rural industry and small town issues in the early 1980s, see Hsiao-tung Fei’s series of findings, such as “Small Towns, Great Significance: A Study of Small Towns in Wujiang County,” collected in Hsiao-tung Fei, *Rural Development in China: Prospect and Retrospect*.

Note 21. Through his fieldwork in northern Jiangsu in the early 1980s, Hsiao-tung Fei praised the “small towns” as “outlets” for the large agricultural population and economic development, but also as political, service, cultural and education centers in the countryside. Hsiao-tung Fei, “Small Towns, Great Significance: A Study of Small Towns in Wujiang County,” *Rural Development in China: Prospect and Retrospect*. See especially pages 65-66, 106-109. Although he does not underscore the tendency of urbanization, it is inferred that these small towns were experiencing urban transformation which has been proven in the last three decades.

Note 22. See data in *Jining lishi*, 161-163.

Note 23. *Jining shizhong qu zhi*, 43.


Note 26. China scholars in the West have been interested in using “civil society” to interpret rapid social changes in the Post-Mao era. See a brief review of this trend in Brook and Frolic, “Introduction,” *Civil Society in China*, 1-2. In the “Epilogue” of this collection, Brook, Frolic and the most contributors are cautiously conservative to the use of this Western term in analyzing the recent social changes in contemporary China, since the “reintegration” of state and society “through the formation of new forms and patterns of public behaviors” “may not immediately take what we might consider democratic forms.” For example, “trade union mediation, human rights activism, and the founding of private universities are not wholly or only explicable in terms of civil society.” Ibid., 196, 198.

Note 27. The situation in large cities could be better. In the mid-1990s, Shandong’s provincial capital Jinan experienced a similar incident but produced a different result. When the famous Ten-thousand Bamboo Garden (*Wanzhu yuan*) began to be demolished, the TV stations and other media exposed this process which elicited large protest from the populace. Under heavy popular pressure, the Jinan municipal government had to give up the demolition and then adjusted its plan so that much of the garden has been preserved.

Note 28. See the story in my article “Resisting Marginalization in Late Qing China: Local Dynamics in Jining’s Modern Transformation,” *East Asia: An International Quarterly*. Vol. 26, issue 3 (September 2009).