Conflict Transformation and Social Reconciliation: The Case of Aceh, Indonesia

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Abstract
This paper will discuss conflict transformation in Aceh and analyzes it in the international, structural, actor, issues, and personal contexts. The data show that the five contexts are supportive of the transformation of conflict from an armed rebellion and peaceful referendum to social reconciliation. The Aceh case shows also the complexity of the reconciliation that includes three parties: the GAM (Free Aceh Movement), which emphasizes politico-economic redistribution; the Islamic community, which demands the implelementation of Syariah (Islamic laws); and the central government, which determines to preserve the territorial integrity. The agreement and new law were implemented and resulted in compromise and consensus in socio-political spheres in the new Aceh.

Keywords: Separatism, Ethnonationalism, Conflict transformation, Social reconciliation, Autonomous region, Aceh

1. Introduction
The coming of peace between the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or Free Aceh Movement) in Aceh in 2005 was a turning point for Aceh, which has experienced long-term conflict in its history. Aceh became the last region conquered by the Dutch between 1873 and 1914 and the Dutch colonial war took a heavy toll of lives among its population, resulting in the death of 100 000 Acehnese and 16 000 Dutch (Bhakti, 2008, p. 9). After independence in 1945, there was a social revolution when 1,500 pro-Dutch hulubalang or aristocrats became victims of the ulama (Islamic scholars)-dominated forces. Moreover, there was a rebellion between 1953 and 1963, in which local leaders under the ulama and supported by local society, police and the army participated in it (Sjamsuddin, 1985). They demanded the establishment of a special autonomous region with the implementation of Syariah but it failed.

The last conflict led by GAM occurred between 1976 and 2005 and claimed between 3,800 and 35 000 lives (Kompas, November 24, 2002). The conflict ended in 2006 and the demand shifted from independence to referendum, then self-government, and currently to the acceptance of special autonomy “plus.” Looking back at Indonesian history, the reconciliation and reintegration of conflicting parties from armed conflict to the political arena by competing in the general elections is something very unusual. Previous conflicts were won by the GoI followed by legal enforcement and also “by accepting the rebel back to the fatherland,” but the losers were prohibited or restricted in politics. Furthermore, conflicts with the PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) in 1965 were settled by violence and repressive law, where their former members and relatives experienced political and social death.

The conflict in Aceh and its various dimensions such as its causes, process and peace reconciliation have been analyzed by a number of scholars. A theoretical analysis of GAM and nationalism has been constructed by Aspinall (2009), while a historical analyses of the conflict, which dates back to the sixteenth century, is provided by Reid et al. (2006). The process of the peace agreement has been written by a participant (Awaludin, 2009) and the early implementation of the peace agreement has been analyzed by the Indonesian Institute of Science (Bhakti et al., 2008). Finally, the change in Acehnese society is the subject of studies by Torquist et al. (2009) and Palmer (2010). All the works on Aceh contribute to our understanding of the conflict and peace. However, a parsimonious analysis focussing on conflict resolution is still needed to explain the complexity of the Acehnese conflict. In this regard, a model developed by Miall (2004, pp. 9-11; Ramsbotham et al., 2005, pp.163-165) is relevant and he identifies five types of conflict transformations: first, context transformation such as the Cold War; second,
structural transformation that is related to the power structure; *third*, actor transformation that includes the change in leadership and the supporters of the leaders; *fourth*, issue transformation concerns with the position of the parties in reaching compromise; and *fifth*, personal transformation of hearts and minds of individual leaders or decision-makers. Based on the model we can identify which factors and conditions support or hamper the transformation from conflict to reconciliation. This is shown in table 1.

In this paper the five issues as stated in Miall’s model will be applied in order to explain why the peace agreement in 2005 was successful. The analysis will begin with actor transformation, followed by structure, issues, personal, context factors, and social reconciliation.

2. Actor Transformation

The conflict transformation of conflict in Aceh must be seen in the changing context of the actors’ perceptions and positions in interpreting the conflict. The turning point is the change of presidency in 2004 from Megawati to Yudhoyono. At that time the Megawati presidency had weakened GAM but Yudhoyono changed the strategy from a military solution to a political one. Yudhoyono’s decision was supported by the military (the Indonesian Armed Forces or TNI), particularly its commander, General Endriarto Sutarto, who summoned 100 senior military officers and told them that “whomsoever in [the] TNI [Indonesian Armed Forces] who tried to stir up trouble over the Aceh peace talks he would personally place his pistol against their heads and pull the trigger” (Awaludin, 2009, p. 243).

The position of government in the Megawati era is known for its strong nationalism and unitary state. Megawati’s hardline strategy was based on the “military emergency” and “civil emergency” by deploying more soldiers and this eroded the power of GAM. The new strategy with the control of rural areas to block GAM’s supporters was more successful than the previous one of a search-and-destroy operation that focussed only on GAM personnel. The decision to implement hardline and all out strategy by the Megawati government was actually alarmed by the alliance of GAM and students and other CSOs in Aceh. There was a general strike on September 15 1999 and on November 8 1999 a mass meeting was held to demand a referendum, which was attended by over one million people (Prasetya & Birks, 2009, pp. 73-74). Previously, the central government had only faced armed rebellions by GAM in mostly rural areas but a new demand or peaceful referendum organized by students (SIRA, Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh or the Center of Information for Aceh Referendum) increased the possibility of separatism.

On the GAM side, the leaders became more flexible since both the Indonesian People’s Council (MPR) and President Yudhoyono agreed to a peaceful and dignified solution. In addition, the aging and weakened physical condition of Hasan Tiro, GAM President, enabled his representatives to be bolder on performing certain maneuvers, including lowering their demands. Moreover, Tiro, was interrogated, while two GAM leaders were arrested (for three days) in Sweden for alleged terrorist activities in Indonesia. However, they were later acquitted and the Swedish government dropped all charges against them (The Jakarta Post, June 16 2004).

The meeting between the leaders of the GoI and GAM was an important symbolic peace gesture. In this regard, the role of Jusuf Kalla, the Vice President, was very important, and with his trusted team (Hamid Awaludin and Farid Hussein), who were from South Sulawesi, could build good rapport. GAM leaders seemed to be more comfortable with them since both regions had conflicted with the central government in the 1950s. The first contact was between GAM Prime Minister Malik Machmud and Indonesia Minister of Law and Human Rights (Hamid Awaludin) and Minister of Communication and Information (Sofyan Jalil) during the Helsinki MOU in August 2005. The next meeting was in Banda Aceh in December 2005, when President Yudhoyono met with several GAM leaders, such as ministers, spokespeople, and the army commanders. This meeting was followed by Vice President Kalla, who met with GAM Prime Minister Machmud in January 2006 in Finland. However, Kalla failed to meet Tiro since the latter was ill. In April 2006, Machmud visited Jakarta and met again with Kalla; however he did not meet Yudhoyono, who was on a series of state visits to Middle Eastern countries. Machmud also visited Banda Aceh and was received by the governor and was a given a traditional Malay ceremony. He also met with *ulama*, which was in an effort to have a good relationship with religious communities since GAM was considered rather secular. The political theater of the GoI and GAM may have contributed to the grass-roots communities in Aceh as well as elites in Indonesia. However, some people, such as Amien Rais (former Chairman of MPR or People’s Assembly) and Abdurrachman Wahid (former President), criticized the warm reception of GAM leaders in Aceh because they were not Indonesian citizens (Koran Tempo, April 21 2006).
3. Structural Transformation

The structural context is about the power structure between conflicting parties and the case of Aceh shows an interesting phenomenon when there is an asymmetric power structure between the militarily stronger GoI and the weaker GAM. However, the GoI did not subdue GAM; on the contrary it offered peace and this imbalanced military power was put into a status quo. The situation is not a stalemate when conflicting parties are stuck with no clear winners and losers. At that time, the domestic conditions were not supportive of GAM since the implementation of “Military Emergency” and “Joint Operations” had reduced their soldiers and area of control (Nurhasim, 2008, p. 113). GAM had been changed from a people-supported movement to a trapped armed group. From the “Military Emergency” in May 2003 until the “Civil Emergency” in May 2005, GAM lost 3,738 members while 2,826 surrendered and 3,030 were captured (The Jakarta Post, June 9 2005). At the beginning of its establishment in the 1970s, GAM’s members numbered only in the hundreds, but prior to the end of “Military Operation Zone” (Daerah Operasi Militer or DOM) era in the 1990s, their numbers reached tens of thousands and developed a “shadow government” in 70% of Aceh’s territory (Schulze, 2004, p. 35).

GAM’s effort to exploit ethnic issues, for instance by stating that the government is “Javanese colonialism,” proved to be ineffective. Moreover, the weakness of GAM also occurred to groups that demanded a peaceful referendum when the government arrested 45 students and NGO activists (Aspinall, 2009, p. 143). The referendum movement in urban areas lost its leaders and momentum. On the other hand, the government intensified its contacts with Islamic groups and offered the implementation of Syariah. These groups, which were more Islamic compared with GAM leaders, saw this opportunity as a means to Islamize Aceh. In short, the centrifugal force of GAM had been reduced or neutralized by the centripetal force of the Islamic groups. The government actively divided GAM and Islamic communities by giving different concessions to both GAM (politic-economic resources) and the Islamic communities (Syariah and religious symbols). In Simmelian theory, the GoI practiced the divide et impera (divide and rule) (Simmel, 1950, pp. 162-169). Finally, the 2004 tsunami and earthquake disasters paralyzed GAM supporters, which in the end automatically paralyzed GAM itself. However, GAM’s decision to renew peace negotiation was made before the tsunami disaster and the tsunami was just an accelerating factor (Aspinall, 2009, p. 232).

The repositioning of GAM might be surprising, but looking at the combination of unfavorable domestic and international factors, it seemed realistic. Not only did they lower their expectation for independence or reducing gains but also lowering risk and cutting losses. They seemed to realize that their present situation and position would not support them in succeeding, like Xanana Gusmao and East Timor, but most likely similar to the defeat of the Islamic rebellion of Kartosuwiryo in West Java in 1960s or Kahar Muzakar in South Sulawesi in the 1960s.

4. Issue transformation

The changing of actors and power relations in the field resulted in a peace negotiation that led to a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Helsinki in 2005. The MoU tried to avoid the issue of separatism demanded by GAM or special autonomous region demanded by the GoI as stated in the 2001 Law. In this regard Martti Ahtisaari and the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) seemed to benefit the GoI since he stated that this agreement should be successful and the issue of separatism was not an option. It seems that Ahtisaari and the CMI were closer to the GoI’s position (Nurhasim, 2008, pp. 122, 128) or intervening mediator (Törnquist et al., 2009, p. 16). In the meetings, Ahtisaari rejected the options of independence, referendum, and self-government and he acted more like an arbitrator, not a mediator (see Tillet, 1999, p. 87). He stated to GAM delegates: “Go and check the invitation and the meeting agenda, which I sent all of you.” Here it is clear that this discussion would take place within the framework of special autonomy and not within the framework of independence” (Awaludin, 2009, p. 73). With regard to a referendum he states: “The idea and wish for referendum is right out of the question. This idea is not on our ticket. There is but one ticket and that is special autonomy” (Awaludin, 2009, p. 120). Actually Ahtisaari also proposed giving Aceh the status of a “self-governed within Indonesia,” but this was rejected by Awaludin, who insisted on special autonomy and the former agreed with the latter. Ahtisaari later used the term “self-governed within the framework of special autonomy within the Republic of Indonesia” (Awaludin, 2009, pp. 120, 150).

In the process of the agreement, GAM had shrewdly succeeded in obtaining their interest and the interest of the Acehnese people in the MoU. GAM’s negotiators and advisors were quite astute as they viewed the conflict and MoU in a triadic framework, where they were facing both the GoI and the people of Aceh. If we read the MoU further (Awaludin, 2009, pp. 310-320), we can find that it consisted two parts: first, programs for political, economic, and social development; and, second, reconciliation agreement between the GoI and GAM. In relation to the people of Aceh, GAM gave as much as it could to the people, but with the GoI, it demanded as much as it could. In the programs section that consists of 36 articles, there was only one article stating that GAM was allowed...
to participate in the BRR (Aceh Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Body). Most articles in this section indicated the various efforts that were beneficial to the Acehnese people, such as foreign affairs, share of natural resources, and the existence of local political parties. This section was a gift from GAM, and it further supported the special autonomy status, which was an initiative of the non-GAM Acehnese people and Local People Representative Council in putting an end to separatism. However, GAM was, relatively speaking, not too concerned with socio-cultural or religious matters, particularly the implementation of Syariah.

The Reconciliation section was a gift to GAM, as it was granted permission to join the TNI and Polri, though none of the former seemed interested in joining the latter. Furthermore, the non-organic TNI and Polri were asked to leave Aceh and the number of organic military forces and police were limited to 14,700 and 9,100 respectively. GAM members would also be granted amnesty and reintegration support such as funds, jobs, and lands as well as rehabilitation. Some people in Indonesia felt that the GAM gained victory or gave in with too high a price. Lowering their position of not demanding independence was regarded as something normal as GAM was already in a weakened position, so it was unnecessary to “pay” them with a high price. Should they be offered this position at the time of their peak power or before the implementation of the “Military Emergency,” then it was appropriate to say that GAM had made a great compromise.

In one respect, the Helsinki MoU may be regarded as a gift for the GoI, apart from being overly priced. With the end of GAM’s demand for independence, the government would face fewer burdens in terms of financing expensive wars, especially with the growing complex of Papua demanding referendum or independence. The emergence of reconciliation and this peaceful situation would facilitate the construction process of the post-tsunami disaster that had caught global attention. The government’s success in achieving the peace agreement with the MoU was appreciated by Indonesian citizens outside Aceh, as recorded in a poll conducted by Kompas, in which there was an increase in “satisfaction on government’s action” from 15.4% to almost 58.1% post MoU (Kompas, Agustus 22, 2005).

This position of special autonomy offered by the GoI was pushed to “self-government” by GAM with the Helsinki MoU, and although GAM did not succeed it still achieved “Special Autonomy Plus.” It gave the Acehnese more power in politics, such as the permission for local political parties, and in economic matters, such as increased oil and gas revenue. In the final draft, GAM’s demand of local political parties was fully accommodated in the MoU. The issue of Wali Nanggroe (Head of State) proposed by GAM that would have power over the legislature in Aceh was also adopted in the draft. The Wali Nanggroe has only symbolic and cultural authority and is indirectly elected every five years by social leaders consisting of ulamas and eminent figures. GAM wanted to give the position of life-long tenure to their leader, Tiro; however, the position of Wali Nanggroe was not filled until the Tiro’s death in 2010. GAM’s demand for human rights became a new chapter in the draft and its demilitarization demand or the withdrawal of non-organic military and police was stated in the draft. GAM also demanded that all civilian crimes committed by military personnel be tried in civil courts was also included in the draft.

5. Context Transformation

The peace agreement in 2005 was successful, since there were a number of changes in global and regional contexts. The global situation after 9/11 in the US resulted in a new situation where any armed movements could be considered as a terrorist. It seems that GAM’s political leaders in Sweden faced difficulty as they were accused of being involved as supporters of violent organizations. By accepting peace agreement, GAM tried to alter its image as a peaceful organization.

In terms of the regional context, the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries and Japan supported the territorial integrity of Indonesia. For those countries the presence of a new nation-state in the region resulted in new power structures, since the location of Aceh is very strategic generally, especially for trading routes. As stated by Horowitz (1985), the causes of social disintegration can be from within but its success depends on foreign countries and the international context. In the Aceh case, the contextual situation was not on GAM’s side and Aceh did not have sympathetic countries who would support their independence. On the contrary, before 2000, the international context was very helpful for GAM (Aspinall, 2009, pp. 103-119, 223-229). Its leaders had a safe exile in Sweden and were able to conduct global political campaigns from there. In addition, some GAM activists received training in Libya and most of them became field commanders, such as Muzakir Manaf (Sulaiman, 2006, p.38). At that time, Malaysia was also relatively friendly for refugees from Aceh and it did not apprehend GAM members.

6. Personal Transformation

An aspect of the context is “personal changes of heart or mind within individual leaders or small groups with decision-making power at critical moments may be crucial” (Miall, 2004, p. 10). In the case of Aceh the tsunami
disaster had changed the will and heart of the leaders and follower of the two conflicting parties significantly. A World Bank Survey shows that 10% of the GAM’s houses were destroyed while 14% were damaged by the Tsunami (The World Bank, 2006). Government reports show that the victims included 126,602 dead and 93,638 missing. Moreover, the disaster attracted the presence of foreign powers, particularly “superpowers” and neighboring countries that supported Indonesia in keeping its territorial integrity. These factors made GAM be realistic and transformed its separatist strategy into self-government. It seems that both parties experienced a traumatic event and some of them considered the tsunami as a warning or wrath from God.

The tsunami disaster made the Acehnese people more reflective, contemplative, religious, and humanistic. Something similar could also have happened to GAM members who lost their comrades and relatives in the calamity. It seemed that most of GAM troops survived since they were mostly in the hills, but their families and relatives could become victims. The tsunami not only changed the hearts and minds of all Acehnese people, but also the Indonesian people and many world organizations and citizens. These feelings of humanity overcame the feeling of hatred and vengeance in both parties and it transcended the solidarity based on religion, ethnic groups and nationalism. Previously, GAM utilized the identity of ethnonationalism while the GoI used nationalism, but after the tsunami humanism became the bridging value between the two conflicting parties.

7. Social Reconciliation

The conflict transformation discussed previously was followed up by programs that would reintegrate and restructure Acehnese society. In this regard, Aceh began to experience social change and moved from negative peace (the absence of war) to positive peace (reconciliation and rebuilding) (see Galtung, 1996). The change of conflict arena from war to election required new rules, i.e. the Law of The Government of Aceh, (Law No 11/2006), which was based on the synthesis between the Special Autonomous Law of Aceh of 2001 and the Helsinki MoU of 2005. The construction of the new law was based on academic drafts proposed by three Aceh universities and inputs from the Acehnese and it became a new arena that showed the triadic pattern of conflict in Aceh. In one position, Law No 18/2001 is a maximum position given by the central government that benefits the Acehnese by redistributing more resources and recognizing local identity. The law gives 80% of the oil and gas revenue to Aceh for the first eight years and reduces to 40% after eight years. Moreover, the law also supports the application of Islamic Syariah.

The Acehnese society used the construction of Law No 11/2006 as an arena to deepen and broaden the application of Syariah. In the Special Autonomy Law (2001) there were no articles referring to the Syariah Police while in Law No 11/2006 it is stated explicitly. The implementation of Syariah seemed to have gained support, as shown by the head of the ulama council who supported the death penalty for apostasy, though this was blocked by the Indonesian constitution and other laws related to Aceh. The above analysis shows that GAM succeeded in getting most of its demands, particularly political-military, economic and human rights in the Helsinki MoU. This supports McGibbon (2004), who underlines Gurr’s thesis (2000) that autonomy designed in agreement with a rebellious group will give a better position to the people while special autonomy given from the center is not broad enough.

7.1 The Reintegration Program (Note 1)

The majority of GAM (80.3%) returned to their communities two months after the Helsinki MoU and 89.8% stated that they faced no problems because most of them returned to their own families and communities (World Bank, 2006). Moreover, most (76.7%) received some form of traditional welcome. During the early return they were given assistance by families (74.3%); GAM leaders (45.4%); friends (37.7%); communities (17.5%); government and international NGOs (6.3%). There were only a few tensions with some local military, police, and local government of anti-separatists groups. At the elite level, the reintegration worked relatively well and there were new corporations in Aceh that were established by GAM leaders and commanders. Their businesses were used car imports from Singapore and Malaysia, and the provision of basic needs. Some GAM members also established a new shipping line between Malaysia and Aceh.

The Reintegration Program was conducted under the ARB (Aceh Reintegration Body), which was formed in February 2006 and consisted of representatives from CSOs, GAM, military, bureaucracy, NGOs, and universities. Its budget was around US 20 million in 2005 and US 60 million in 2006. There were also grants from 11 international agencies for 56 programs, which amounted to US 236.7 million. The target groups of the ARB were: former GAM members (3,000 soldiers and 2,155 non combatants); 1,985 former GAM political prisoners; and conflict victims consisting of 19,597 dead civilians; 2,000 disabled, 17,000 civilians; 426 civilian bureaucrats; 332 village heads; 2,000 former GAM members who surrendered before the Helsinki MoU; 6,500 government militia; 24,000 IDPs outside Aceh (non-Acehnese migrants); 12,000 IDPs in Aceh; and 10,914 houses.
To receive the funds, each former GAM member had to write a proposal. They were assisted by some NGOs and, on April 26 2006, the ARB received 6,200 proposals from GAM and non-GAM individuals (Kontras, 2006). Each former GAM soldier would receive 25 million rupiah (US $2,500) while non-combatants and former political prisoners would receive 10 million rupiah (US $1,000). They would also receive a monthly allowance of 1 million rupiah (US $100) for six months. The ARB also gave funds to civilian victims: 60 million rupiah (US $6,000) for the widows/orphans; US $1,000 for those who disappeared, the disabled, the IDPs; and US $1,800 US$ for destroyed houses. It was hoped that the assistance and compensation would convince former GAM members of the fruits of peace.

In March 2006, the implementation of the Helsinki MoU was relatively smooth and had achieved the fourth and final stage under the supervision of the AMM (Aceh Monitoring Mission) consisting of the EU and ASEAN countries. The government had withdrawn all of its non-organic military and police forces, which numbered 31,681 (Bhakti, 2008, p. 23), while GAM agreed to give up all of its 1,018 weapons (Yanuarti, 2008, p. 235).

7.2 The Local Election

An important reintegration of GAM is in politics, through political parties and local elections, which resulted in an inclusive process where GAM could cooperate with non-GAM. GAM has changed itself into KPA (Komisi Peralihan Aceh or Aceh Transition Committee), which became an embryonic political party. The opportunity to have a new political party and independent candidate had a positive effect on GAM, since they were not too dependent on other parties. During local elections in the province, GAM made an alliance with other parties - for instance, they asked Achmad Humam Hamid of the PPP as a partner for the election of the governor. However, the decision in a GAM congress attended by its representatives from 17 GAM regions and leaders of GAM residing in foreign countries chose an independent path. In the governor election, GAM’s candidate, Irwandi Yusuf, became governor with Mochammad Nazar, the leader of SIRA, as his deputy with 38.2% of the vote. They were followed by candidates from national parties, with 16.6% and 14.0% respectively (ISAI Aceh Research Group, 2009, p. 282).

The 2009 national election was relatively free and fair and was observed by many independent institutions, such as the Carter Center, EU, and UNDP. In the election GAM’s Partai Aceh won first place with 47.8% of local legislature seats, followed by national parties such as the Partai Demokrat (14.5%), and Golkar (11.6%). GAM also won in 16 of 23 regions, especially in areas where there were intensive conflicts (Palmer, 2010, pp. 292-293). In this regard, GAM was successful at the ballot box compared with its performance in the military or “bullet” strategy. In the Indonesian Presidential election, Yudhoyono garnered 93.3 % while Megawati, the prior President, and Yusuf Kalla, Yudhoyono’s Vice President, won 2.4 % and 4.4 % respectively. The voter turnout during the Presidential election shows that the majority of the Acehnese population still considered those candidates as their leaders at the national level.

In short, Aceh has moved from a compromise in the Helsinki Peace Accord to a concensus after the conflict. In the compromise, the situation of conflicting parties is win-lose while in the concensus it is a win-win situation (Krogerus & Tschäppeler, 2008). The concensus situation occurs with the general election, where all conflicting parties (GoI and GAM) accepted a legitimate new order and political system.

8. Concluding Remarks

Miall’s conflict transformation model can explain the factors that support or hamper peace and reconciliation. Moreover, it is also helpful in constructing the appropriate strategies and policies to achieve a peaceful peace solution to various conflicts. The model can also explain why the peace effort in Aceh, which was mediated by the Henry Dunant Centre (HDC) from Switzerland, failed, as happened in 2000-2003 (Prasetya & Birks, 2009, pp. 75-78). At that time, the GoI and GAM did not want to compromise; both actors were hardliners and the power structure benefited GAM, which gained more power because of the fall of Suharto in 1998. With regard to the issue of tranformation, the GoI insisted on the implementation of a “Special Autonomous Region” while GAM demanded independence. The international context was not conducive either, since the GoI tried to prevent the internationalization of Aceh and most foreign countries had a wait and see attitude. Finally, the personal feelings of conflicting parties was contradictory: the GoI considered GAM as a rebel and traitor while GAM felt that the GoI was an imperialist force. In this case the five contexts were not conducive to conflict transformation and the application of the model can clearly explain the failure of a peace agreement.

However, the model needs some feedbacks so that it can be much clearer in analyzing conflict transformation. There are five issues as follows: first, the most important factor is the actor or the willingness of both president and the military, particularly the military commander (“peace hardliner”), to settle the conflict peacefully. It suggests that model may put more emphasis on the presence of moderate, not peace hardliner, central government political
and military leaders. Second, the case of Aceh shows that the transformation of issue is important in regard to the third party. As the third party Martti Ahtisaari did not appear to be neutral, since from the beginning the agenda was closer to that of a particular party (GoI). Miall’s model does not consider that the changing of issue can strongly be influenced or determined by non conflicting parties. He states that: “Issue transformations concern the reformulation of positions that parties take on key issues at the heart of the conflict as well as the way in which parties redefine or reframe those positions in order to reach compromises or resolutions” (Miall, 2004: 10). Third, the model should integrate the possibility of conflict that has more than two parties. The case of Aceh shows that the triadic pattern can have different mechanisms of cooperation and conflict as well as its transformation. The triadic pattern has its own logic (Simmel, 1950: 145-169) and it can reduce conflict between the other two if they have similar identities. The Islamic communities have similarities with central government and this resulted in some sense of solidarity and cooperation such as the implementation of Syariah (Islamic laws). On the other hand, GAM has a similar ethnicity with the Acehnese Islamic communities and this enabled them to create an alliance with GAM against the GoI. Fourth, the role of history should be considered in the contexts of actor, issue, and personal. The situation is similar to the peace between the GoI and NII (Negara Islam Indonesia) in 1961, in that when the GoI had more military power but it promised a dignified peaceful agreement. The military commander at that time considered that the military might have won physically, but not spiritually, so they offered a peace agreement with compensation (Sjamsuddin, 1985, p. 302). Thus the historical context and collective memory can influence the decision of actors in achieving a peace agreement. Fifth, the case of Aceh shows the role of natural context such as the tsunami disaster which is not covered by the model can increase the chance of peace as long as the other contexts, particularly actor, structure and issue, have been made conducive.

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*Kontras* 27 April 2006, p. 11.
The Jakarta Post 9 June 2005, p. 3

**Note**

Note 1. The information of Aceh Reintegration Body ARB is based on its presentation in Banda Aceh, April 4, 2006.

**Table 1. Miall’s Model of Conflict Transformation**

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