Taiwan, Manchukuo, and the Sino-Japanese War

Man-houng Lin
The Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, ROC
Tel: 886-2-2789-8239   E-mail: mhlmh@gate.sinica.edu.tw

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Abstract
With the establishment of Manchukuo in 1932, Manchuria turned into Taiwan’s most important area to trade with in Chinese mainland. Taiwanese entrepreneurs from countryside and urban areas of Taiwan joined this “international” trade mostly opened by the Japanese merchants and the Japanese government. The reinforcement of the Taiwan-Manchukuo trade was made at the cost of the Manchukuo-Inland China trade. When the overseas Chinese in the Southeast Asia decreased their purchase of Taiwanese products which had been categorized as “Japanese” products because of Japanese invasion against China, the Taiwanese exclaimed that the imperial army in Manchukuo and North China had saved their economy. This historical account discloses that the Taiwanese and mainlanders who had to live together in the postwar Taiwan had actually been opposing with each other during the Sino-Japanese War. It explains to some extent the two ethnic groups’ much congruent memory of Japan in the post-1945 Taiwan.

Keywords: War memory, Taiwanese merchants, Japanese colonization, Intra-Asian relations

1. Introduction
“918,” the date for the Manchuria Incident, and “77,” the date for the Marco Bridge Incident, had been crucial historical dates for early postwar Taiwan to remember for the Japanese invasion upon China. It is not until this study about the trade between Taiwan and Manchukuo that it is realized by this author that Taiwanese had joined the Japanese during the Sino-Japanese War to call these 2 dates crucial advance for the “Holy War.”

Taiwan and Manchukuo are located respectively in the north and south tips of East Asia. It had only small trade in between since the Qing dynasty. Yet, with the establishment of Manchukuo, their trade was greatly enhanced. Manchukuo’s cold weather made it a meat-eating place and good market for Taiwan’s tea. Manchukuo, being lack of vegetables and fruits, also had a good division of labor with tropical Taiwan. The soybean and fertilizer that Taiwan paid more to purchase than its export to Manchuria was actually functional for Taiwan’s growing agriculture. In such trade, even though the Japanese merchants had been more dominant than the Taiwanese merchants, Taiwanese merchants’ trading opportunities had been expanded. The old historiography has already taught people about the change into Japanese surname and speaking only Japanese in the kominka movement of Taiwan in the Sino-Japanese War period. Yet, this depiction had not disclosed that the Taiwanese and mainlanders had actually been opposing with each other during the Sino-Japanese War.

This paper is a sequel to my paper “Qiaoxiang Ties versus Japanese Maritime Power: Trade between Taiwan and Manchuria, ca. 1932-1939,” in Leo Suryadinata, Chinese Diaspora, Since Admiral Zheng He, with Special Reference to Maritime Asia (Singapore: Chinese Heritage Center, May 2007), pp. 137-159. Following the description of the exact trade proceeded between Taiwan and Manchukuo around the period of 1932-1939 in the previous paper, this paper will discuss about the impact of such trade which leave legacies for the postwar period.

The main sources used for this study include the major Manchurian newspaper Shengjing shibao (Mukden Times), (Note 1) the Taiwanese newspaper Taiwan nichinichi shimpō(New Taiwan Daily), (Note 2) as well as other related sources collected in Taiwan, America, and Japan. The impact will be elaborated around the reinforcement of Taiwanese transnational trade experience and the identity problems between the Taiwanese and the mainlanders.

2. Strengthening Taiwanese Transnational Trade Experience
After 1932, Manchuria was ruled by the state of Manchukuo. Even it was under the influence of Japan, Manchukuo had claimed to be an independent country. The trade between Taiwan, which was ruled by Japan,
and Manchuria, was in operation a transnational trade activity. Different from Taiwan-South China trade in which Taiwanese merchants assumed in many cases more dominant power than merchants from Japan proper, much of Taiwan’s trade in Manchuria was managed by Japanese merchants, the interference from the Japanese government was also intensified, but Taiwanese, particularly those from peripheral areas also reinforced its trading experience in or with Manchuria.

2.1 The Japanese merchants’ dominant role
Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Taishō, Kögyō, Anbeinobu, and Katagumi were the six major firms importing fertilizer, handling the import of ammonium sulfate from Manchuria to Taiwan. In 1932, the sugar exported from Taiwan to Dalian was the product of the Japanese firms Meiji and Shiomitsu Sugar Processing Corporation. (Note 3) In 1932, the heat-resistant boards shipped to Manchuria from Yilan of northeastern Taiwan were products of the Asano Bussan Company. (Note 4)
The Japanese government opened up many of the trade relationships between Taiwan and Manchuria. In 1936, the head of the Taizhong Industrial Development Section, Satō Shigenari, went to Manchukuo and Korea for a one month visit. When he returned, he said that there was a market in Manchukuo and Korea for Taiwanese products. And, he set about introducing Taiwan’s products to every governmental and local office in Manchuria, and in addition he set up the Taiwan Five-Prefecture Sales Mediation Office, as well as a Joint Mediation Office to increase cooperation in Taiwan. (Note 5)
Most of the top offices of the Taiwan Fruit Company were held by Japanese, many of whom worked to open markets in Manchuria. In 1936, Taiwan Fruit began a packaging union in Yingkou, with Satō as its representative, which imported Taiwanese bananas, citruses, and other fruits and vegetables to Rehe and Anshan, and exported black beans and soybeans to Taiwan from Yingkou. (Note 6) In 1937, Kajiwara Doriyoshi, an engineer for the Taiwan Colonial Bureau’s Product Division, worked together with Ikeda from Taiwan Fruit to market Taiwan’s special local products in Manchuria. (Note 7)
In the process of opening these trade networks between Taiwan and Manchuria, many Japanese merchants initiated promotion exhibition. The Taipei Prefectural Product Exhibition, which opened successively in the Manchurian cities of Dalian, Fengtian (today’s Shenyang), Xinjing (today’s Changchun), and Harbin City, displayed in 1935 products including black tea, dried bamboo shoots, and seafood. (Note 8) In 1935 it opened in Dalian from May 10-13, in Fengtian from May 17-20, in Xinjing from May 23-26, and in Harbin City from May 28-31. (Note 9) The exhibition did so well that it returned to Fengtian in 1936 from May 8-11 and to Harbin from May 14-17. (Note 10) In 1933, the mayor of Dalian invited Taiwan to the Dalian Exhibition to open a Taiwan Hall. (Note 11) In 1937, the Fengtian Trade Guild opened a store with products from Japan proper, Korea, and Taiwan. (Note 12) In 1935, Taiwan spent 1,500,000 yen on a massive exhibition, which included a Manchuria Hall, and lowered the cost of tickets for travel between Manchuria and Taiwan to encourage people from Manchukuo to come to Taiwan to attend. (Note 13) At the same time as Taipei prefecture went to Fengtian to show products at an exhibition, the Osaka Products Association also opened an exhibition in Fengtian. (Note 14) They did this in order to study each other. Before opening the Taipei Products Exhibition, the Taipei Prefectural Government openly invited businesses to attend, and at the second exhibition included six or seven merchants from Taipei and Jilong, as well as the Taipei manager of Sakei Products. (Note 15)
After Taiwanese products began entering Manchuria, much of the product sales were handled by Japanese. Of the fruit from Taiwan, Japan, and other ports that was imported into Dalian, 19% was delivered to agents in Dalian’s Central Market to be sold, the remaining being delivered to middle-man agents. Ten percent of the middle-man merchants were from Manchukuo, the remainder all being Japanese. (Note 16)

2.2 The Japanese government considered the entire empire’s interest
When trading between Taiwan and Manchuria, the interests of the Taiwanese merchants were less important than the interests of the Japanese empire as an entirety. Fearing that the import of coal from Fushun in Manchuria would threaten Taiwan’s coal industry, the Taiwanese businessman Yan Guonian wrote in the Taiwan Nichinichi Shimpō representing the Taiwan Coal Union, requesting that the imports of coal from Fushun be restricted to 50,000 tons. He proposed that even though the price of Fushun’s coal was less than Taiwan’s, it was possible that it could rise after Fushun’s coal had invaded and crushed Taiwan’s coal industry, at which point it would be difficult for Taiwan’s coal industry to revive. (Note 17) The three representatives of Taiwan’s coal industry union, Konoe Jigorō, Yan Guonian, Yamamoto Yoshinobu petitioned the Taiwan Government-General. Although the Government-General’s Colonial Products Bureau and Colonial
Development Ministry had considered restricting imports to a certain amount while lowering the cost of rail transport for Taiwan’s coal industry, the Government General responded with its final decision: “Although the coal from Fushun appears to be an import, in fact it is something developed by our government and it is managed by our countrymen. Now, with the establishment of Manchukuo, both sides have mutual benefit and await the construction of the economic union. For these reasons, we make the difficult decision to go ahead with the original plan.” (Note 18)

The government hoped that sugar processing companies in south Taiwan would import much of the coal from Fushun; as it only cost one yen per ton to transport the Fushun coal from Manchuria, while the cost of shipping from north Taiwan to south Taiwan would be approximately four yen per ton. Because the Taiwan Railway Department was in deficit, and moreover even though railway transport costs had been cut by 40%, it was difficult to compete with the transport costs of Fushun coal. (Note 19)

2.3 The Japanese Government’s Deeper and Deeper Intervention

The goods that Taiwan exported to Manchuria were increasingly consolidated under the control of the Japanese government. Among all of the goods exported from Taiwan to Manchuria, bananas took the lead being sold on a consolidated basis by the Taiwan Fruit Company since 1938. (Note 20) The Taiwan Fruit Company was a union of import merchants on the receiving end, export merchants in Taiwan, and the banana and fruit industry unions. This company had monopoly rights in the export of bananas. (Note 21) The company’s improvements in management, increase of production, and expansion of market were completed under the strict supervision of the Taiwan Government General and the Taiwan Fruit Union Federation. The Taiwan Fruit Company obtained the right to sell bananas in Manchuria, and set up a marketing network consisting of directly managed and commissioned sales outlets.

Within Manchukuo, only Dalian and Harbin had central wholesale markets, of which the Dalian market had the tightest relationship with the Taiwan Fruit Company. A new market center was built in November 1936 at the Dalian port where ships entered; the authorities demanded that the market have adequate facilities to keep fresh the imported goods.

The organization of the business in Taiwan’s citrus fruits in Manchuria was different from that of bananas; the marketing and selling of bananas were strictly controlled, but citruses were still permitted to be sold freely, so there was no control over their collection, shipping, or marketing.

In terms of the market in Manchuria, some unions contracted with the Taiwan Fruit Company for sales, while some did not. Those that did contract with the Taiwan Fruit Company sold only in the Central Wholesale Market, a marketing method identical to the direct management model used for bananas. (Note 22) Those that did not contract with the Taiwan Fruit Company, which included the prefectures of Taipei, Xinzhu, and Taizhong had to continue sending representatives to Manchukuo. They did business at the Dalian and Harbin Central Wholesale Markets, but they also did business “outside the market.”

Because of harmful competition among businessmen in the industry, in 1938 the South Manchurian Railway, the Taiwan Government-General, and the Taiwan Fruit Company started to investigate the details of the transportation of Taiwanese citrus fruit into the interior of Manchuria. (Note 23) In the end the selling became controlled by the Taiwan Fruit Company. (Note 24)

In 1932 the government required exporters of Taiwanese rice to Manchuria to apply, (Note 25) but once approved, exporters could sell freely. However, after 1939 the Japanese government no longer allowed Japan, Korea, Taiwan, or Manchukuo to set their own plans for grain supply and demand, but rather enforced unified control, so that any rice imported into Taiwan or Korea would be controlled by the government, and redistributed to areas that needed rice. (Note 26)

In order to control the export of Taiwanese vegetables to Manchuria, in 1939 the Agricultural and Forestry Section of the Taiwan Government-General and the Manchukuo government cooperated to research how to export low-cost vegetables from Taiwan to Manchuria which lacked vegetables during the cold season. (Note 27) In 1940, the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry announced that fruits would be subject to central regulations, and that Taiwanese vegetable, once transported by the South Manchuria Railroad, would be allocated to counties and cities in Manchuria according to ratios that would be regulated. (Note 28)

2.4 Taiwanese merchants’ participation

However, the trade between Taiwan and Manchuria was not without space for Taiwanese merchants to develop. Some of the beancake imported from Manchuria was purchased by prefectural agricultural associations in Taiwan, (Note 29) some were purchased by Japanese merchants such as Nisshin and Mitsui. (Note 30) Besides,
Taiwanese merchant Jian A’niu from Taoyuan also set up a business in Dalian that exported fertilizer to Taiwan. (Note 31) In 1923, Japanese businessman Sugihara was exporting 10,000 sacks of round, glutinous white rice, 10,000 sacks of round, glutinous brown rice, and 5,010 sacks of Penglai white rice to Dalian; meanwhile Jilong-based Taiwanese merchant Yuhe was exporting 3,000 sacks of Penglai white rice to Dalian. (Note 32)

Taiwanese also cooperated on the production side in developing trade between Taiwan and Manchuria. In order to make Taiwanese tea more palatable to the taste of people in Manchuria, a tea industry experiment station was set up at Linkou Village in Xinzhuang County, to invite authorities within the tea industry to a conference on processing tea that would be suitable for Manchuria. Taiwan Government-General engineer Yamura, Taipei prefecture technician Miyamizu, Xinzhu prefecture technician Hanke, and 15 participants from Taipei as well as 13 from Xinzhu attended. (Note 33) It is very likely that there were Taiwanese among the participants because the requirements for attending were as follows: “Those who have experience in the processing of Oolong tea, understand Japanese (kokugo), technicians or managers in the tea industry in the towns and villages, or people from other tea industry experiment stations are welcome.” (Note 34) In 1933, because graduates from the 1932 class at the tea industry experiment stations had studied how to process green tea but were still not up to standard, tea farmers from the villages of Xindian and Shiding were invited to the tea industry experiment station at Linkou village in Xinzhuang country to teach the methods of roasting the tea and infusing the scent of flowers, to produce tea for export to Manchukuo. (Note 35) Gaolixiong prefecture exported vegetables to Manchuria, so the agricultural association set up a teaching farm to teach local farmers how to plant vegetables that both were suited to the natural environment and met the needs of Manchuria. (Note 36)

While Japanese merchants sought to expand their market in Manchuria, Taiwanese merchants joined in. In 1933 the Mitsui Company began the wholesale import of Taiwanese tea into Manchuria and was relatively successful, (Note 37) and in spring of the same year powerful tea merchants from Taiwan began entering Manchuria to expand the market for Taiwanese tea. Taiwan’s largest tea company, Chen Tianlai’s Jinji Tea Company, first sent sample products all over Manchuria, (Note 38) and in 1933 Chen Rongsen of the Taipei-based Rongxing Tea Company went to visit Manchukuo to see if there was hope for expanding the market in Taiwanese tea there. (Note 39) In 1934, powerful Taiwanese tea merchants organized the Taiwan Tea Import Union in ports at Dalian and Yingkou in order to mediate the sale of Taiwanese tea. (Note 40) At the end of 1934, two powerful Taiwanese tea merchants Lin Jianyin and Wang Zuozhou jointly financed and established the Yongan Company to facilitate the import of Taiwanese tea, and they planned to expand the market for Taiwanese tea in Fengtian. (Note 41)

Especially after the market dried up for Taiwanese baozhong tea in the southeast Asia, the Taipei tea merchants who originally were so loathe to cooperate for the Manchurian trade actually began in 1936 to increase their cooperation, at the instigation of the Taiwan Government-General. (Note 42) The president of the Taiwan Tea Merchant Guild, Chen Tianlai, met with six men under Furuzawa of the Taiwan Government-General Special Local Products Section to organize the Taiwan Tea Publicizing Coops to go to Manchuria to show Taiwan tea. (Note 43) The cities they visited included Dalian, Yingkou, Fengtian, Xinjing, and Harbin. (Note 44) In each place they visited, they were welcomed by the important local tea merchants. (Note 45) Besides showing the various varieties of tea from Taiwan, they would also immediately arrange to work with local sellers. (Note 46) By 1937 Dalian had branches of many Taiwanese tea firms, including Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Minamikō, Wenshan, Wenyu, Dahe, Yihe, Dayu, and Jinji, which all belonged to the Taipei Prefecture Freight Union and which went through seven local middlemen merchants to sell tea to Manchuria’s interior. (Note 47)

Taiwan’s sales to Manchuria first went according to Mitsui’s procedures, then began to sell directly, as the Taiwanese firm Wenyu Tea did, through a contract with the Japan-Manchuria Trading Guild (Ri-Man maoyi huiguan, Nichi-Man Bōeki kaikan). Especially after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident (July 7, 1937) and the Japanese Invasion of Shanghai (January 28, 1938), the Taiwanese tea market network stretched across the whole Manchuria and replaced Fujian and Zhejiang’s black tea as the monopoly in Manchuria. (Note 48)

2.5 Grassroots leaders from south-central Taiwan participated in transnational trade

Because Taiwan’s tea was produced in the region of Taito, it was largely tea merchants from northern Taiwan engaged in these activities to expand Taiwan’s tea market to Manchuria. But the development of the trade between Taiwan and Manchuria in the later period of Japan’s rule had a particularly strong effect on the leaders from central and southern Taiwan and other remote areas, giving them the opportunity to accumulate experience in international trade. With the trade in Manchuria, the exports of banana, citrus fruit, pineapple,
and vegetables were increased. Other than vegetables and part of the citrus fruit crop, these agricultural products were mostly produced in south and central Taiwan.

Moreover, the primary import from Manchuria being bean cake, in 1930 one third of it was used for pork and fish feed, and two thirds were used as fertilizer for crops in the fields. (Note 49) and rice production was concentrated in south and central Taiwan. To take purchases of bean cake in 1933 as an example, Taizhong prefecture purchased the most (301,119 cakes), followed by Xinzhu prefecture (206,787), and Taipei prefecture (81,577), Tainan prefecture (21,103), and Gaoxiong prefecture (10,135). (Note 50) If we examine the customs house records during the years 1931-1939 for which we have data, for value of imports from Manchuria into Taiwan, which through Gaoxiong exceeded that through Jilong (see Chart 1). For the value of export from Taiwan to Manchuria, that through Jilong was approximately the same as that through Gaoxiong (see Chart 2). While, the value of trade with the Republic of China (mostly southern China) through Jilong was much higher on average than that through Gaoxiong, whether considering imports or exports, other than the year 1938 in which the figures for both customs were comparable (see Charts 3 and 4).

Other than the international trade reported at the maritime customs, there was also junk trade going through the smaller ports on Western coast of Taiwan specially opened for the Republic of China. In the years between 1896 and 1935, 26.28% of this trade was made through Dansui, the other ports were: 19.16% for Jilong, 8.36% for Gaoxiong, 8.26% for Lugang, 7.44% for Magong, 6.91% for Wuqi, 6.56% for Anping, 6.0% for Dongshi, 4.57% for Jiugang, 4.27% for Houlong, 1.62% for Dongang, 0.59% for Xiahukou. (Note 51) It means that most of Taiwan’s trade with the Republic of China (south China in particular) was conducted from northern Taiwan, but after trade with Manchuria opened up in 1932, south and central Taiwan’s portion of the trade with mainland China shot up in importance.

As late as 1936, authorities in Taizhong prefecture said, “While we can say that Taizhong prefecture’s products are doing quite well, they are not promoted well abroad, so the prefectural authorities will go to Dalian, Harbin, Seoul, Nagasaki, and the Nanyang” to introduce Taizhong prefecture’s products.” (Note 52) Besides this case of local government from central Taiwan actively promoting markets outside the island, in 1936 Taiwanese merchants from central Taiwan began planning a trip to Manchuria to tap the market there. As the *Shengjing Shibao* reported, “The major merchants from Taiwan’s Taizhong prefecture, in preparing for the shipment of a batch of products from Taiwan to Manchuria, surveyed Manchuria’s economic trends; full of hope, they are going to set up a consignment agency that will specialize in the import of Taiwanese bananas, pineapples, fresh fruit, yams, and camphor.” (Note 53)

The development of multi-national trade experience was not limited to large merchants. Taking bananas for example, the organization of shipment and sales of Taiwan’s bananas gave birth to Taiwan’s oldest agricultural association, the Taiwan Fruit Company. (Note 54)

From 1925-1941, Japanese dominated the managerial posts of the Taiwan Fruit Company (from the level of director and senior managing director down to section heads and chief clerks), with only one or two section heads filled by Taiwanese. In each prefectural industry union, the chairman held the concurrent post as either the internal affairs chief or production chief, and the vice-chairmen consisted of one Japanese official and one influential producer appointed by officials; beneath this level, chiefs at all levels and heads of production inspection sites were largely Japanese. Members of the board of trustees were selected by officials, while representatives were also selected by officials at first, but after 1934 half were elected by members. (Note 55)

Other than the one vice-section chief who was a Taiwanese producer, most of the administrative personnel in fresh fruit-related organizations were Japanese, but on the other hand most of the employee representatives or trustees and trustee representatives were Taiwan’s grassroots local leaders. (Note 56)

In the debate about state-society relations, most scholars view state-society relations as zero-sum, but Philip Huang has pointed out that when the state’s power weakened below the district level, family and religious organizations bolstered the society, and since the modern period one can find a “third realm” between family, religion, and the state, and within this realm the power of state and society was both extended. In the lower layers of Taiwan during the period of Japanese rule, one can see such realm in these agricultural associations. (Note 57)

Some of these grass-root local leaders were able to go directly to Manchuria; in 1935 the Taipei prefecture citrus industry union sent over 1,000 crates with an inspection delegation to Manchukuo and north China, led by the union manager Li Zhensheng. The group split into two, with two managers Lin Zhenshen and Li Fan going to Manchukuo and north China on inspection, and trustee member Zhou Bainian and Yang Jinfa along with union members Zhang Xiaojin, Chen Qiufeng, and Chen Toumu went to Guandongzhou on inspection.
The inspection was subsidized by the union. (Note 58) Because most of Taiwan’s imports to Manchuria between 1932 and 1941 were mountain products or agricultural products, “Most of the bananas exported by the Taizhong Prefecture Fruit Industry Union were from Nantou and Zhanghua, and from the mountainous in Taizhung and other counties such as Jiji, Shuili, and Zhongliao.” (Note 59)

Other than the creation of grassroots leaders from peripheral areas and their participation in international activities through the sale of bananas, pineapples, and citrus fruits from the mountainous areas in south and central Taiwan and citrus fruits from the north, other peripheral areas were also affected. For example, in Ilan there were often leftover fruit and vegetables, which for years had only been sold to southern and central Taiwan as well as Taipei and Jilong, but after 1935 a portion was exported to Manchukuo, which was received very well. Ilan’s pickled vegetables were famous throughout the island and were originally only sold within the island, but because “Recently we heard that Manchukuo is short of vegetables in March and April, so we have begun (in 1936) sending several thousand jin of pickled and fresh vegetables.” Plums in good harvest was also exported to Manchukuo, reporting that “Every morning more and more farmers come to market for this export.” (Note 60)

The transit trade composed the great majority of Taiwan’s trade with south China during the period of Japanese rule produced many island-level business leaders centered on Taipei, but Taiwan’s trade with Manchuria deepened grassroots leaders’ experience in international trade in Taiwan.

3. Identity Problems for People from Taiwan and from the Chinese Mainland

3.1 In Manchuria, Taiwanese were quite “Japanized”

After the establishment of Manchukuo, Taiwanese merchants came to Manchuria as Japanese subjects, and unlike in regions of the Republic of China where Taiwanese relied on Japan’s extraterritorial privileges and sometimes harmed the Chinese, Taiwanese merchants in Manchuria and local Chinese shared similar Japanese influence. (Note 61) With smaller proportions of Taiwanese compared to south China, their degree of identification with Japan was higher. For example, Liang Jinlan, whose father went to Manchuria as a physician, told in her oral history, “In Manchukuo we mostly spoke Japanese, so when I returned to Taiwan, there was a period when I couldn’t speak any Taiwanese.” (Note 62) There is no data suggesting that the locals in Manchuria hated Taiwanese to the extent they did in south China (where they were hated more than the Japanese); according to Wu Jinchuan, a Tainan native who worked at the Central Bank in Manchukuo, Taiwanese in Manchuria often served as bridges between people from Manchuria and Japanese. (Note 63)

In Manchuria there is also no evidence that the Japanese government used Taiwanese gangsters to engage in illegal business activities such as opium. Opium was legalized in Manchuria and was monopolized by the Japanese government, not sold by gangsters as in south China. The **Taiwan Nichinichi Shimpō** from 1933 entitled “Taiwanese invest 100,000 yen in the Manzhou Opium Company joint venture,” reported that some Taiwanese leaders were drawn by the Japanese government to invest with Manchurian people on some opium monopoly company for about a year and then failed. (Note 64)

In 1927 the Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced: “Foreign merchants who perform the following criminal acts are not allowed to do business: (1) Selling opium or other narcotics…”(Note 65) Although gangsters in Fujian who sold opium were protected by extraterritoriality, (Note 66) the “clean” Taiwanese investors would avoid to be involved with these investments. However, in Manchukuo, for these Taiwanese luminaries, their opium investments, which have been encouraged by the government, were quite different from the business that the gangsters did in Fujian, where local law defined as illegal investment.

While the trade between Taiwan and Manchuria accumulated Taiwanese international trade experience downward from the higher-level merchants to the lower-level merchants, the trade between Taiwan and Manchuria actually rose in social leaders from the lower levels to those on the elite levels, when it came to businesses such as opium. Both had more room to maneuver in Manchuria than in south China, due to the Japanese government’s control of state power.

Although the trade between Taiwan and Manchuria integrated them both into the Japanese empire, and although the trade eased the identity problems of the Taiwanese merchants who came to Manchuria, the strengthening of trade between Taiwan and Manchuria caused the Chinese from Taiwan to be enemies with the Chinese from the Chinese mainland.

3.2 The Taiwanese shared weal and woe with the Japanese empire

The Manchurian and Marco Polo Bridge Incidents may have been tragic for Chinese in the mainland, but for the Taiwanese who began developing the trade between Taiwan and Manchukuo; these incidents were cause
for joy. The establishment of Manchukuo and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident were key turning points in the strengthening of trade between Taiwan and Manchuria. The profits from the trade extended not only to the elite merchants, but also to villagers in the mountains and in the countryside.

After the Manchuria Incident, many products originally purchased from China now were bought from Taiwan. (Note 67) The *Shengjing shibao* observed that after 1936, with the worsening of relations between China and Japan, “Fruits imported from north China appear to have been cut off, and fruits from Taiwan have taken off.” (Note 68) The citrus imported from Shanghai known as the Shanghai Orange disappeared after 1927; the only Shanghai Oranges in the stores were actually Taiwan Oranges. (Note 69)

This process of replacement occurred because of the intervention of the Japanese government. For example, bananas had been imported from Guangdong, sold by Shanghai wholesalers to Chinese merchants in Dalian, who shipped the bananas onto Manchuria. After the establishment of Manchukuo, Dalian’s Japanese fruit wholesalers (who were representatives of firms from Moji, Japan) gradually began importing Taiwanese bananas. In 1923, the amount imported from Taiwan had been increased to be on par with Guangdong. (Note 70)

After the establishment of Manchukuo, the Japanese government began promoting Taiwanese tea to the public, and halted the import of Chinese tea. (Note 71) At first, Taiwanese tea was promoted only among a small number of wholesalers, and most consumers did not have a particular understanding of Taiwanese tea and saw it merely as Chinese tea; it was sold in the four cities of Dalian, Fengtian, Xinjing, and Harbin. Taiwanese tea was promoted by giving away tea on the street, over 10,000 customers trying the tea each day in each city. At the same time, Taiwanese tea was presented to Manchukuo governmental organs, companies, officials—as “Japanese tea grown in Taiwan.” (Note 72) Afterwards, the Taiwan Tea Industry Association, Tea Industry Union, and the Taiwan Tea Merchant Guild, annually sent a team all over Manchukuo to popularize and promote Taiwan tea. (Note 73)

In Manchuria before the establishment of Manchukuo, most Chinese tea that was consumed was grown in Jiangxi, Hubei, Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangsu, and Anhui, and the primary ports it was imported from were Fuzhou, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Hankou. (Note 74) Of this tea, most was purchased by branch merchants at Yingkou, where all of the retail merchants throughout Manchuria were centered, who went through wholesale merchants to the producers’ agents. Because Yingkou’s wholesalers had close relations with the places where the Chinese tea was originally grown, and it was there that they made investments and had factories, they had absolutely no knowledge or impression of Taiwanese tea. (Note 75)

The unique financial organizations of these wholesalers had existed for a long time. They were situated between the merchants from the hinterland and the merchants from south China, and they were a type of wholesale merchant that handled mediations between these two. They performed various services for merchants from out of town, including delivering payments, delivering goods, selling goods on consignment, handling customs payments and taxes by proxy, holding goods, and providing lodging. For this reason, local merchants did not deal directly with the opposite party, but rather with the wholesalers, in the hope that dealings would be safer. There was a well-established group of wholesalers who dealt in Chinese tea in Manchuria and tightly controlled the market network, especially top-quality tea; in face of this control, Taiwan tea could simply not compete, and this was the main obstacle to the development of Taiwan tea’s market in Manchuria.

Because of the economic depression, imported Chinese tea took a downturn, and with the changes in trends, Taiwan tea was being shipped to Dalian, and Dalian took Yingkou’s place as the port for trade with the interior. (Note 76) After the establishment of Manchukuo, Taiwan’s tea exports to Manchuria included three types, baozhong, maofeng, and black tea; baozhong was almost all consumed by the market in Manchuria, maofeng was mostly consumed in Dalian, Fengtian, and Andong, and black tea was consumed in Rehe, Xing’ian, and other places in the Northwest. (Note 77) Maofeng tea was processed in the same way as baozhong tea, giving it a light golden luster and a light taste. In order to make baozhong and Maofeng tea palatable to consumers in Manchuria, they were infused with the scent of flowers as well as some flower products. (Note 78) Taiwan studied the processing of Maofeng tea from people in Manchuria, and together with the difficulties in shipping Chinese tea all the way from Anhui, Zhejiang, and Fujian, and the fact that Taiwanese Maofeng tea had fewer surcharges added, it turned out that Taiwanese Maofeng tea was cheaper than Chinese tea of the same grade. This improved the reception of Taiwanese Maofeng tea in Manchuria. After the establishment of Manchukuo and the institution of various customs barriers between Manchukuo and China, the customs barriers between Taiwan and Manchuria were comparatively lower, and the trend of
Taiwanese tea taking the place of Chinese tea began.

The entire customs system after 1932 also caused Dalian to take Yingkou’s place as the port through which most goods traveled. (Note 79) The port of Dalian was a free port, and its customs were originally different than that of the rest of Manchukuo, but when Singapore adopted a protective trade policy that began to influence the exports of Taiwanese baozhong tea to Southeast Asia, Manchukuo passed an emergency law to control trade, with the aim of causing Guandongzhou to adopt currency controls and achieve trade control. (Note 80) In 1936, six of the tea merchants of Manchuria began to sell Taiwanese tea. (Note 81)

After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937, the cutting off of resources from central China was a good opportunity for the development of Taiwanese tea. (Note 82) Eventually, the Taiwanese tea that had long been kept out by the merchants of Yingkou overcame Chinese tea. The wholesale merchants of Yingkou who dealt in Chinese tea began to consider selling Taiwanese tea to Manchuria because of how the disadvantageous customs situation with China had hurt their business and how the tea market in Manchuria was still nonetheless booming. (Note 83) The Japanese government believed that if the Yingkou tea merchants would not cooperate, the Japanese government would request that Mitsui and Mitsubishi come in to sell Taiwanese tea or to ship it to the interior of Manchuria. (Note 84) In 1938, 17 Yingkou tea merchants organized the Gongyi Gongsi (the Taiwan Tea Import Association) to work with the Dalian Taiwan Products Promotion Office, in order to solve the problems of selling Taiwanese tea in Manchuria. After Manchukuo formally signed the contract to purchase Taiwan tea, the tea merchants of Yingkou in Manchuria, interested in investigating the tea industry in Taiwan, flew the president Sun Fuchen and two other merchants of the Guangyi Corporation on the Shanxi-hao ship bound for Jilong; the three men planned to stay for ten days to visit tea production facilities in Taipei and Xinzhu provinces. Incidentally, Sun Fuchen was also the official in charge of industry promotion in Jilin province, in addition to being responsible for the contract signed by the Guangyi Corporation, the Taipei prefecture tea shippers association, and the Xinzhu prefecture black tea association, for sole rights for buying and selling of Taiwan tea. (Note 85)

In August 1938, the businesses involved in the import of Taiwanese tea into Manchukuo included: Mitsui bussan kaisha, Mitsubishi shoji kaisha, Wenshan tea firm, Wenyu tea firm, Dahe tea firm, Yihe tea firm, Dayu tea firm, Jinji tea firm, and the Taibei Prefectural Association for the Export of Tea to Manchuria. There were seven wholesale companies run by people from Manchukuo involved in the Taiwan tea business; they handled about half the amount of Dalian’s business in Taiwan tea, and in addition to selling in Dalian, they also sold to the hinterland. The Taiwanese tea shipped to Dalian was partly handled by local merchants, and then sold in Fengtian, Xinjing, and Yingkou. On the other hand, the Taiwanese firms (other than Mitsui and Mitsubishi) sold more and more directly in the hinterland.

The merchants who operated in the hinterland often mixed Chinese tea in with the Taiwanese tea leaves, so that only 20%-30% of the tea was Taiwanese tea. They branded this as Chinese tea, and most consumers did not know there was any Taiwanese tea mixed in. However, between merchants, they definitely first confirmed before buying that the tea they were purchasing was Taiwanese tea from Dalian.

On the eve of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937, most Taiwanese tea was sold freely in Manchuria, and other than Mitsui and Mitsubishi, there was trade between representatives of Taipei tea firms in Manchukuo and the local wholesalers in Manchukuo. The former would bring samples to the Dalian tea merchants to carry out business, and the following month payment and goods would be exchanged. Because there was fairly fierce competition among the Taiwanese tea merchants and because of the relatively high tariffs, Taiwanese tea merchants often found themselves in deficit. The president of the Taiwan Tea Association, Chen Tianlai, requested that the Association’s manager, Iwata survey the situation in Manchuria, with the hope of strengthening government controls. (Note 86) The Taiwanese merchants approved of the plan. (Note 87) They also hoped to reduce the import tariffs for tea in Manchukuo. (Note 88) In 1936, the Taiwan Nichinichi Shimpō noted that: “It’s no longer profitable to sell baozhong tea in Manchuria.” (Note 89) In 1937, Chen Tianlai, five other tea merchants, and Furuzawa of the Taiwan Government-General Colonial Products Bureau Special Local Products Division Service Office went to Manchuria and discovered that because of the effects of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Chinese tea had completely been cut off, and Chen Tianlai remarked that this was a good opportunity to import Taiwanese tea. (Note 90)

Since 1933, all of the countries in Southeast Asia had been boycotting the importation of Taiwanese baozhong tea, and in 1938, Europe, America, and Java began boycotting the import of Taiwanese Oolong tea; both of these boycotts caused Taiwan to rely more and more on the market in Manchuria. (Note 91) With the extension of Japan’s ports into north China and Mongolia, the power of these Taiwanese tea merchants in
Manchuria also grew into these areas. (Note 92)

In 1938, a Chinese merchant from Qingdao, Shandong Province registered as Japanese in Taiwan switched from selling Chinese tea to selling Taiwanese tea, and in the two months of April and May, 1938, a total of 7,734 jin of Taiwanese tea was imported to Qingdao by the tea firms Nanxing, Yihe, Mitsui, Jinji, and Wenyu. (Note 93)

In 1940, the Taiwan Government General and the Manchukuo Bureau of Economic Affairs disagreed about several issues including the price of Taiwanese tea, and in spring of that year, the import of Taiwanese tea was banned. However, the ban was lifted after July 23-26, 1940, when the concerned parties—the Taiwan Government General Special Local Products Division Head Tamade and the Taiwan Tea Manchukuo-China Exports Association head Suzuki met. (Note 94)

According to Chen Tianlai’s son, Chen Qingpo, Japan’s invasion of China was a “holy war.” The “brave warriors” of the “emperor’s army” moved him to no end. Chen Qingpo said of the development of the market for Taiwan tea in Mongolia, “The Chinese merchants cannot be trusted, so they are hated deeply by the people of Mongolia.” He continued, “And today, the Japanese Empire is guiding these peoples to establish a great Asian union.” (Note 95)

In 1933, Chen Rongsen of the Taipei-based Rongxing tea firm visited Manchukuo, and the Taiwan Nichinichi Shimpō reported, “There is hope for this country’s consumption of tea… The tea market is now in a depression. The tea growers deem this as savers.” (Note 96) Two Shipping Organizations from Mingjian of Nantou, Taizhong prefecture, under the direction of engineer Suzuki Sato, had begun shipping 1,000 crates of oranges from Mingjian to Japan, Dalian, and Tianjin, and was preparing its third shipment. There were now two inspectors inspecting the oranges, 20 men and women working on packaging per day, and this time the shipments would be sent to Harbin and Fengtian. Each crate contained 85 jin, and each crate fetched 11.60 yen in Dalian and 15 in Tianjin; the local producers were overjoyed. (Note 97)

The Taiwanese Japanese patriotism continued. Taiwan coal mogul, Yan Guonian, who had constantly faced competition from Fushun’s coal mines, visited the Taipei prefectural magistrate with his son Yan Qinxian, after which he drove to the military headquarters to present a gift of 50,000 yen for national defense, the use for which would be decided by the headquarters. (Note 98) In 1936, over 100 merchants who traveled between Taiwan and Manchuria organized the “Taiwan Club” under the leadership of Iwamitsu Shigeru, and they welcomed other Taiwanese from other cities to participate. (Note 99) In 1943, the Taiwan Association was formed to express its sincerity in performing its public duty and assisting in the completion of the holy war. The Association’s head was Meng Tiancheng, the assistant head was Jian Rennan, and the adviser was Chen Zhangzhe. (Note 100) According to the oral history of Yang Lanzhou, who had been to Manchuria, Jian Rennan who had not left Manchuria before 1945, “afterwards was harassed by the Chinese Communists and committed suicide.” (Note 101)

4. Concluding Remarks

The strengthening of trade between Taiwan and Manchuria between 1932 and 1941 is one example of how Taiwanese came to share weal and woe with the Japanese Empire. The expansion of such trade by the Japanese government and Japanese merchants went through a lot of detailed arrangement. They include: promotion exhibition of products from both Taiwan and Manchuria, improving the market facilities for Taiwan’s products in Manchuria, inviting local producers in various parts of Taiwan to visit Manchuria, having the Japanese merchants or Taiwanese merchants replacing the Manchurian Chinese merchants for Manchurian external trade or having them shift to selling Taiwan products instead of products from Chinese mainland. Providing lower custom rates or more convenient transportation was also functional for Taiwan’s products to compete with mainland China’s products. Not only small Taiwanese merchants were mobilized to join such expanding trade, big merchants from Taiwan were mobilized to attend the Opium Monopoly. The subordination situation of the colonized people to the colonizers had been vivid. But, the colonized people felt the same destiny as the colonizer. And, the colonized people enjoyed the victory of the colonizer no matter the war has been won over the Chinese in mainland China. The process of Taiwanese ‘becoming Japanese’ was a process that put both the Taiwanese and the Japanese government in the same boat. The Taiwanese were not only ready to die for the Japanese emperor, as Leo T.S. Ching notes, (Note 102) they were also seeking their own benefit while staying with the Japanese empire. Not from the perspective of ideology formation as Prasenjit Duara did for Manchukuo, this paper takes exact livelihood to see Taiwanese identity.

However, the history education after the war in Taiwan, in the Chinese mainland, and around the world rarely describes this process. To take the example from Taiwan’s middle school textbooks on the War to Resist
Japanese Aggression for example, the section on Taiwan only discusses Lin Xiantang’s nationalist movement and the movement to retrocede Taiwan carried out by the Taiwan Revolutionary Association, and the section on the mainland only discusses those who joined the Wang Jingwei government in the context of describing them as traitors who were later punished by the state. (Note 103) To examine this period from the point of view of “Resisting Japan” makes it difficult for people today to understand the process of Japanization experienced by many Taiwanese during the Japanese rule over Taiwan. The stereotype view of Lin Xiantang as a hero to fight against Japan would neglect his being asked by the Japanese government to invest in an opium monopoly. (Note 104) The current discussions about Taiwan’s status as well as the cross-strait problem have seen the continuous incongruence between those who resisted Japan and those who had been Japanized during the war. This essay, by pointing out the opposing position of the Taiwanese and the Chinese mainlanders during the Sino-Japanese War while engaging in the Taiwan-Manchurian trade, has presented one historical contingency for such postwar divergence.

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Notes
Note 1. Cited hereafter as Sheng. The original Meiji, Taishō, and Shōwa dates are cited hereafter as M, T, and S.
Note 2. Hereafter, the Chinese edition will be cited as Nichi, and the Japanese edition will be cited as Nichi-J;
Note 3. Nichi, S7.3.19.
Note 4. Nichi, S7.9.17.
Note 5. Nichi, S11.5.20.
Note 6. Sheng, S11.3.25.
Note 7. Nichi-J, S12.11.27.
Note 8. Sheng, S10.5.1.
Note 9. Sheng, S10.5.1.
Note 10. Nichi, 11.3.31, 11.4.1; Sheng, S11.5.1, S11.5.8.
Note 13. Sheng, S10.10.2.
Note 14. Sheng, S11.3.25.
Note 15. Nichi, S11.4.1.
Note 16. Sheng, S8.10.7.
Note 17. Nichi-J, S7.5.10, S7.5.11.
Note 18. Nichi, S7.9.28.
Note 19. Nichi, S7.5.19, S7.9.23.
Note 21. Yamaguchi Toshio, Showa 4 nen han Taiwan bashō nenkan, pp. 39-40. Chen Ciyu, Taiwan xiangjiao de chanxiao jiegou, p. 11.
Note 22. Taiwan Sōtokufu Dairen Taiwan bussan shokaisho, Taiwan kajitsu no tai-Man bōeki gaikyō (1927.7).
Note 25. Nichi, S7.12.27.
Note 27. Sheng, S14.1.28.
Note 28. Sheng, S15.11.19.
Note 29. Sheng, S7.12.29.
Note 31. Nichi, T6.3.29.
Note 32. Nichi, S7.12.27.
Note 33. Nichi, S11.10.22.
Note 35. Nichi, S8.4.12.
Note 36. Nichi, S8.12.27.
Note 37. Sheng, S9.3.13.
Note 40. Sheng, S9.3.13.
Note 41. Sheng, S10.1.15.
Note 42. Nichi, S11.12.6.
Note 43. Nichi-J, S12.9.25.
Note 44. Nichi-J, S12.7.20.
Note 45. Sheng, S13.11.2.
Note 46. Sheng, S12.9.24.
Note 47. Sheng, S12.10.22.
Note 49. Nichi, S5.1.9.
Note 50. Sheng, S8.5.23.
Note 52. Nichi, S11.11.27, S11.11.28.
Note 53. Sheng, S11.2.2.
Note 54. Yamaguchi Toshio, Showa 4 nen han Taiwan bashō nenkan, pp. 39-40; Chen Ciyu, “Taiwan xiangjiao de chanxiao jiegou,” p. 11.
Note 55. Chen Ciyu, “Taiwan xiangjiao de chanxiao jiegou, 1921-1927,” p. 13
Note 57. Philip C. C. Huang, ““Public Sphere” / "Civil Society" in China?,” Modern China, vol.19, no.2 (April, 1993).
Note 58. Nichi, S11.4.18.
Note 59. Nichi, S11.2.1.
Note 60. Nichi, S11.5.26.
Note 64. Nichi, S8.11.7.
Note 65. Sheng, S2.12.1.
Note 66. Sheng, S3.11.18 conveys the Opium Ban Council’s sense of helplessness about this kind of phenomenon: “When foreigners do business, they are not subject to judgments by Chinese law, and this council’s resolutions will be ineffective for them.”
Note 68. Sheng, S11.5.5.
Note 69. Taiwan Sōtokufu Dairen Taiwan bussan shokaisho, Taiwan kajitsu no tai-Man bōeki gaikyō (1927.7)
Note 70. Taiwan sōtokufu shokusan kyoku, Hoku Shina, Kantōshū, Chōsen ni okeru hontō seika hanro chōsa ni kansuru hōkoku (Taisho 12.10), pp. 12-13.
Note 71. Taiwan Sōtokufu Dairen Taiwan bussan shokaisho, Taiwan kajitsu no tai-Man bōeki gaikyō (1927.7)
Note 72. Nichi-J, S13.11.27.
Note 73. Sheng, S13.11.2.
Note 74. Taiwan Sōtokufu Dairen Taiwan bussan shokaisho, Taiwan cha to Manshū bōeki (Showa 12.8).
Note 75. Sheng, S12.10.22.
Note 76. Iwamitsu Shigeru, “Taiwan bussan no Manshū shinshutsu jōsho.”
Note 78. Taiwan sōtokufu Dairen Taiwan bussan shokaisho, Taiwan cha to Manshū bōeki.
Note 79. Sheng, S9.8.9.
Note 81. Sheng, S11.3.27.
Note 82. Nichi-J, S13.12.5.
Note 84. Nichi, S11.11.7.
Note 85. Sheng, S13.1.27.
Note 86. Nichi, S11.2.13.
Note 87. Nichi, S11.5.6.
Note 89. Nichi, S11.1.16.
Note 90. Sheng, S12.10.17.
Note 91. Sheng, S8.9.7; Nichi-J, S13.7.4.
Note 94. Sheng, S15.7.28.
Note 95. Nichi-J, S12.12.27.
Note 96. Nichi, S8.4.12.
Note 97. Nichi-J, S13.11.22.
Note 98. Nichi, 1936.2.12.
Note 99. Nichi, S8.11.7.

Note 100. Sheng, S18.7.22.
Note 103. Taibei guoli bianyiguan ed, Guomin zhongxue lishi jiaokeshu, pp. 75-87.
Note 104. Nichi, S8.11.7.

Chart 1. The value of the trade in products imported to Taiwan from Manchuria through the customs houses of Jilong and Gaoxiong

Source of data: Compiled from information on the years 1931-1934 from Taiwan sōtokufu zaimukyoku, Taiwan tai Nanshi Nanyō bōeki hyō (Showa 10), p. 6 and from Taiwan sōtokufu zaimukyoku, Taiwan tai Nanshi Nanyō bōeki hyō (Showa 14), p. 6. On Jilong duties: using specifically the trade data of Jilong, Danshui, and other harbors’ with both Guandongzhou and Manchukuo. On Gaoxiong duties: using specifically the trade data of Anping, Gaoxiong, and other harbors with both Guandongzhou and Manchukuo.
Chart 2. The value of the trade of products exported to Manchuria through the customs houses of Jilong and Gaoxiong

Source of data: Compiled from Taiwan sōtokufu zaimukyoku, *Taiwan tai Nanshi Nanyō bōeri hyō* (Showa 10), p. 2 and from Taiwan sōtokufu zaimukyoku, *Taiwan tai Nanshi Nanyō bōeri hyō* (Showa 14), p. 2. On Jilong duties: using specifically the trade data of Jilong, Danshui, and other harbors with both Guandongzhou and Manchukuo. On Gaoxiong duties: using specifically the trade data of Anping, Gaoxiong, and other harbors with both Guandongzhou and Manchukuo.

Chart 3. The value of the trade in imports to Taiwan from the Republic of China, through the customs houses of Jilong and Gaoxiong

Source of data: compiled from Taiwan sōtokufu zaimukyoku, *Taiwan tai Nanshi Nanyō bōeri hyō* (Showa 10), p. 7 and from Taiwan sōtokufu zaimukyoku, *Taiwan tai Nanshi Nanyō bōeri hyō* (Showa 14), p. 7. On Jilong duties: using specifically the trade data of Jilong, Danshui, and other harbors with both Guandongzhou and Manchukuo. On Gaoxiong duties: using specifically the trade data of Anping, Gaoxiong, and other harbors with both Guandongzhou and Manchukuo.
Chart 4. The value of the trade in exports from Taiwan to the Republic of China through the customs houses of Jilong and Gaoxiong

Source of data: Compiled from Taiwan sōtokufu zaimukyoku, *Taiwan tai Nanshi Nanyō bōeki hyō* (Showa 10), p. 3 and from Taiwan sōtokufu zaimukyoku, *Taiwan tai Nanshi Nanyō bōeki hyō* (Showa 14), p. 3. On Jilong duties: using specifically the trade data of Jilong, Danshui, and other harbors with both Guandongzhou and Manchukuo. On Gaoxiong duties: using specifically the trade data of Anping, Gaoxiong, and other harbors with both Guandongzhou and Manchukuo.